THE WAR.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XL, Issue 7846, 25 May 1904, Page 3

THE WAR.

News by Mail.

Statement by Baron HayasM.

Interesting: Interview-

Japanese Plans by Land and Sea.

Auckland, May 21. The mail steamer Sierra, from San Francisco, brings the follcwmp:— London, May 2. Baron Hayashi, Japanese Minister here, who has been the recipient of numerous telegrams of congratulation on the Japanese successes on tho Yalu, and especially on the result of the first serious fighting, said to a correspondent:—"The immediate result of General Kuroki's success will probably be a movement on Fen-hoang-chong, which the Chinese had fortified with their usual brick structures since the commencemsnt of the war. The Bussians doubtless have added earthworks, but their loss of guns yesterday must seriously diminish their defensive strength. I understand, though 1 cannot vouch for the absolute accuracy of 'he staiemeno, that Bussia has only i 100 guns in Manchuria. Ii that is the oase her artillery strength has been diminished almost one-third. They fight well, these Bussiane, and Fenghoang cheag will not bo taken without,» struggle, unless General Kuropatkin again changes his plan of campaign. The announcement that the Russians would not contest the crossing of the Yalu has proved, as we thought, to be misleading. Thirty thousand men is far too large a body for any general to leaye in the faco of the enemy if it were merely intended to hamper his movements. General Kuropatkin evidently meaot to make a determined resistance, but he either under-estimated onr strength or disposed his forces in the belief that we would not venture on a frontal attack. I take it from despatches received that we have now practically secured control of both banks of the Yalu. In consequence, our base will probably be moved to Antnng. To bo perfeotly frank I must cay I expected yesterday's engagement would be more decisive, especially in view of the Urge number of Buasiau troops opposed to us. Its significance must largely depend on our ability io pursue the enemy." Beviewing the whole future of the struggle that has just commenced in each deadly earnest on land, Baron Huyashi said : : " The duration of ths war must be rather with Bu-.sian th-n wiih Japan. For the moment the military advantage is wich us, for General Kuropatkin has extended his front, and we can strike where and when wa will. Our aggressive movement may bo carried oq to Mukden, perhap3 to Harbin, and per--haps even further, bat before long ihore must come aßtageoftheoampaignwhero Bussia will assume the rolo o« an invading Power, end where we muse act solely on the defensive. Frou* the boginning it has been so, and our aggression is and has been but a means towards the eventual repulsion of an invHding army. General Kuroki himself probably cannot cay at this moment exactly at what poms r.ur aggresaioD will be ohanged into defensive tactics. General Kuropsitkin, so I believe, says he wiil not undertake to drive us back until he has 300,000 men ready to take the field. T think that what that means ip. that at lesat five per cent of that force mil die from sickness, so that to keep his force at »ho maxi' mum' required General Kuropatkin will always have to be transporting 15,000 men frora Sr, Pefceraburg, no small task. This year's harvest m Manchuria, I learn, promised to be bad. A million Eussians there, in addition to the army, must be fed. We have, or shall have, closed every source of food supply, axcept by the "Siberian railway. Even with double tracks and no men or munitions of war to transport, the problem of feeding the Russian population and army in Manchuria would in itself be intensely serious, but with a single-track road, which is Buiaia's only vital smew, it is almost impossible, and famine appears inevitable. With this dreadfnl accompaniment of war, there is only too likely to be a rising among the Manchurians. They mey attack the Bussians or they may attack us Either is bad enough to contemplate. To help us to sit down and await all these contingencies we are working day andnigiiton the Corcnn ruilway, and by Outub r tin- now vi fi .is'ted portions of the roud be'wevn i:u»nn and Seoul to Wiju will also bo reaoy.' Locomotives aru coining froiu he Uniud Scutes, and as soon aa tho ; e arrive, we will have a strong and rapid lino of communication through all Corea, which will almost touch our mnirsland, and we will not be likely to suffer from want of supplies or reinforcements.

"As regards Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the situation' ib somewhat different. I cannot say anything about the movements. of our other armies that have been mpbilisod, but there is no doubt that the Liaotung peninsula will be cu£ off from supplies, if any success attends our laird forces. Neither Port Arthur u,or Vladivostock can be taken from the sea front, but I think you. will find Port Arthur either takqn by our land forces or starved out by September. Chinese are smuggling provisions into Port Arthur now from Chefoo, but only to an immaterial extent, and that will soon cease. . • Vice-Admiral Togo doubtless will remain on watch outside Port Arthur... By September, when the hurricane season comes, he should be able safely to •house his fleet in a Japanese port. No fleet, Russian or Japanese, could be particularly effective* then. I scarcely think Russia will send the Baltic fleet to face our autumn hurricanes. If the ships go ,before, then they, will encounter the monsoon period, which lasts from May to August, and in which coaling at sea on route to Japan would be exceptionally dangerous,- if not impossible. , And: coaling at sea is the only way in which, the Baltic fleet can take a hand in the war." Referring to the long period which' elapsed between the declaration of war Sn!d land fighting, Minister Hayashi I said : " That waiting, which1 taxefl the patience of the whole worlfl, has been a busy <alnd exciting time' for us. Our troops have been continually marching and working in! anticipation of striking a 'blow which would initiate the campaign in Manchuria. Ido not -think our morale lias" been in any way af c fected by what is so erroneously 'do* scribed as a p.Qniod of inaction.. > ' ".

General Kuroki may even by his own countrymen be thought to be rather slow, but it is better to b* sure. The most unfortunate incident of the campaign to date is Vice-Admiral Kamimura's misfortune in missing the Vladivostock.. fleet. It seems from here that it was a pity that the vice-admiral 'did not stay outside of the port instead of trying to ; find the Eussian in the open sea. ~