BALKAN MUDDLE.

Mount Ida Chronicle, Volume XLV, Issue XLV, 2 March 1917, Page 1

BALKAN MUDDLE.

RUMANIA'S SACRIFICE. 1)R DILLON'S DISCLOSURES. SARRALL'S ADVICE IGNORED. Ia tho December 8 issue of the London ' Daily Telegraph' Dr Dilloa makes a lengthy survey of the circumstances attending Rumanian intervention and the series of disasters that swittly followed. He begins by assailing the Press of the allied : countries for systematically creating and diffusing an atmosphere of xqsea'te hopefulness which the situation never justified. He cites a reassuring Reute'r message as late as .November 17, and comments: • ilore than a month previous to this. reassuring message I had telegraphed a very dilfcrent view, in which I pointed out the imminent- danger that threatened Rumania, the efforts Hindenburg was making to capture .Bucharest, the acumen of General Sarraii, who, having foreseen what was coming, had made practical suggestions to his Government in vain, and the miscalculations of - the allied Staffs. I also mentioned that Hindenburg had more troops than was commonly supposed; that Bulgaria had added to her army a oontingent of 70,01)0 men, and was on : the point of obtaining 15,000 inore from among her Moslem subjects. I concluded my message with these words: "It is fafr to say that tho decisive victory j which the Allies need, and are determined , to obtain on that front, is of much less easy' attainment than the average newspaper reader imagines." . —Bulgaria and Turkey Weary.—From the start the allied Governments have never understood either Balkan affairs or the Balkan peoples. They are.devoid, of a sense wuh wh;ch to apprehend' the workings of the Balkan mmd. Their statecraft possesses no piummet with which to take soundings in the cross-currents of Balkan politics.. What was the state of things there before Rumania's intervention overturned them? That of . Equilibrium in ter- : rit6r.al possessions and of relative indifference in mood. Bulgaria, with the acquisition of Macedonia and Kavala, was satiated, aud would fain rest on her oars. She certainly felt, no desire to send her soldiers'to the shambles of other fronts. By offering up further sacrifices for Germany or Austria there was nothing to be gained, and •as interest in the mainspring of the Bulgar's action it pr6mpted quiescence, which was all the more indispensable that financially, economically, and in man-power Bulgaria had been made" lean and weak by the wars of the past four years. She felt drawn towards Germany as towards a puissant protector; but, having received all that Germany had tor the moment Ho give, the sentiment was starving for want of nutrition. Bulgaria's one desire then was to see the end of this war, and her unavowed determination was, if possible, to lie low until it, was at hand. Turkey's plight was similar, but her attitude towards it was somewhat different. Patriotism is unknown to the Sultan's subjeots, aud religious fanaticism is its nest of kin. But the Turk is a ivarior by nature. There are, however, very few real Turks left in-the country, aud the other races go unwillingly to fight the battles of the Giaour, tßesides, Turkey had with Germany's help achieved a great part of what she had striven for. She was delivered from the Dardanelles menace. Constantinople'' was secure. Aud ahe considered that she was discharging a sufficiently useful part in the concern by • saving as much as she could of her Asiatic empire and keeping large forces of British and Russians occupied.- To contribute men to the German.and Austrian armies was no part of the Young Turkish programme. And it is affirmed by people who are' in close contact with the governing circles of Stamboul that it was only after pressing and reiterated solicitations that the grant of a few brigades to operate against: the Russians was reluctantly accorded".* In jthis state of satiety and exhaustion Germany's two. Oriental confederates were slowly sinking into passivity. The open corridor to the

East was still, indeed, a precious boon to the Central Empires, enabling them to escape the worst consequences of the naval blockade. But beyond this they were getting little help from their partners. —To Precipitate Entry.— lu these circumstances Rumania could not render a more valuable service to the Allies than by remaining neutral—towards them benevolently neutral —uui.il such time as her active co-operation could be utilised as one of many co-ordinate elements in a big offensive. In the meantime there was no grounded fear that she would side with our enemies. For during- the first year of the war il. Bratianu's Cabinet h;d concluded a neutrality .'treaty with Russia which gave an international -sanction to national sentiment, and very much later he had come to a political agreement with, the same .Empire about the reward of intervention. Bug no engagement was entered into as to the time, because that must necessarily depend on the military situation. .Rumania's frontiers are so vast in extent and 'so exposed to attack that she could not possibly try conclusions with Austria-Hungary unless her army had for its right wing, so to say, the Russian forces in the Bukowina. And, besides this, the Bulgarian danger had to be adequately proyided for. That 3kl. JBratianu grasped the situation, anil impressed upon the Allies the necessity of leaving the country "as it was until such time as they wero fully propared to cope with all the forces which rtumania's declaration of war would undoubtedly unchain.- This exhortation was prompted by plain common sense. It constituted the alpha and omega of the policy >f the Rumanian Prime ilinister. It was incumbent on the allied Powers, in their >wn interests, to adjust their action to this :anon, and to help the Rumanian Premier :o carry out his policy. But they were eager o obtain a moral victor}*, together with the mlitary co-operation of a new ally, and also :o prove their superiority over an enemv vhose strength and resources they systematlaliy underrated. .When, therefore, the ipKng offensive was opened by the Russians md was followed by that of the British and :he Trench on the, Somme, the situation a« :ontemplated athwart the roseate atmosphere which envelopes the peoples of the entente appeared' inviting, and pressure was put upon the Rumanian Cabinet to in-

luce it .to make the fateful pmu»e. The ipshot of phe conversations that ensued was ihe conclusion of a convention between Ruaiania and the Allies, by which llie former bound herself to join the latter as soon,as certain military conditions were fulnlled One ol these conditions turned upon 'tlio efforts of ihe great RussiaTi army, supposed at that time" to be somewhere near the Rumanian frontiers, and in which hi»h hobes were centred. Tho absence of the Russian army, which was supposed to be within easy distance of the Rumanian frontiers, must have inspired with misgivings those ,who were acquainted with the unvarnished facts, such as recent events have disclosed. For it opened up the disquieting perspective of a Bulgarian offensive and a Rumanian war on two different nnd distant- fronts—an impossible task for an army which at the outset could not exceed 450,000 fighting- men, commanded by inexperienced officers, and confronted with hardv veterans familiar with all the devices of latter-day warfare. Bulgaria had ever been the bugbear of Rumania, who instinctively felt that her day of need would be the Bulgars opportunity for revenge "and aggrandisement. —Bulgarian Slimness. There was an assurance offered by a 1 least ono Gorcrnment, •which were it not al

variance vrith fact, must have seamed 'equally satisfactory. Bulgaria, tliey said, wao not only satiated, and. weary of the war, but. she was a. house divided against itself, the Crown Prince bitterly opposed to liia father, the " great Russophile opposition" up iii arms against the Government, and the Government ready to compromise matters/ by displaying fidelity to Germany and observing neutrality towards Rumania aii<\ Russia"! And tliis legend, which was launched by the bland and childlike Bulgars, v.'as greedily assimilated by the Rumanians,' and, 1 am assured, by Russian diplomacy. These two assurances once accepted, the/practicall conclusion .was unavoidable that the sooner Rumania declared war-the better. The French Government, I may- add,/dissociated* itself from those who believed in Bulgaria's neutrality towards Russia /and Rumania, but rot from those who p /essed for Rumania's active co-operation. j To the competent outside observer it was abundantly clear that Bulgaria, who was reaLy desirous of repose, and had no wish to let her men. be sacrificed, for the interests of Austria and Germany, would be irresistibly drawn into the rvar anew by the advance of Rumania's army. Her motives were revenge for past humiliations and the hope of further territorial expansion. And thia was the view taken by my friend de Russi, who was Rumania's Minister at Soiia. He knew what' to think, of the Bulgar legend, and he made known his view to his Government; and as soon as i was informed of the situation I, -in turn, felt impelled to communicate the facts to the public, but in response to aii appeal to, my patriotism, ana to assurances that the only effect of such admonitions would be to damp enthusiasm, I remained silent. —Skeleton at the Banquet.— And' yet the situation itself was eloquent enough." Rumania's attitude of Sphinx waß a thorn in the,flesh to Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Central Empires. It gave them a feeling of painful uneasiness!. It was tho skeleton at their triumphal banquets. It was the Damocles'sword suspended by a thread over their heads, which at any moment might fall, with' fatal effect. Whenever the Central Empires should request Bulgaria to weaken her army by allotting a contingent to one of them,, Radpslavoff could always return the telling answer that so long as Rumania had not given guarantees of her good behaviour it would be as harmful to Germany's interests as to those of his own country to pare down the forces destined to check her advance. And Turkey could, plead the same argument. And thus, without moving a brigade, without uttering a covert threat, Rumania was keephig.all our enemies in a state of continuous apprehension. To abandon this attitude, in which she . was render-, ing inestimable services to _ the Entente, would obviously be a calamitous error unless the Allies had completed their equipment and left nothing to chance. For it would impose a fresh burden ou the Allies, who were just wen ropairing their past mistakes in the West. ;' If it be objected that, for reasons withheld from tho public, it was indispensable that Rumania should take the field on August 27—my own information which, after all, may not be infallible, despite its trustworthy source, docs not conlirm this contention—then it is fair to urge that it was for the Allied Poweis to see that Rumania's offensive was victorious, that the contribution she brought was a positive help, not a heavy burden. Besides the figures already • quoted, there were the momentous issues at stak'e which ought to .have made it clear that the Central Empires would offer up the heaviest sacrifices and put forth all their energies to get the upper hand of our latest Ally. The loss of their precious corridor to the East would have subjected them to all the consequences of the naval blockade, frustrated their Mittel-E'uropa scheme, deprived them of two partners, and probably ended the war. On the other hand, by crushing Rumania, they would tighten the blockade of Russia, acquire the rich wheat fields and oil wells of Rumania, and liberate the Bulgarian and Turkish forces for employment else-

where. —Salonika Expediton.— Sarrail, with the means at his disposal, has aohieved more than anyone could have' anticipated. He'has conquered 70 kilometres of trcuches—a feat which has hot yet been -equalled by any army on tho western, fronts. The natural configuration of the cotintry in which he had'to operate, the means of transport which ho possessed, and the number of troops ho commanded all combined to keep his achievements within the narrowest limits. An average lieutenant would have had sufficient military experience to foretell the .impossibility of Sarrail's heterogenous army advancing more. than a few hundred miles against an opposing force of 250,000 men. On the. Salonika expedition there is but ono more brief remark to offer. When Great Britain made her own independent proposal ou the subject of an expedition, which in her judgment was feasible, and would have been conducive to the end, it was,her right and duty to carry,the point, in spite of momentary opposition, because, in virtue of her naval' position, of her finances, of her industries, and of her armies, she is the leader of the Entente. But once she assented, however coldly, to the choice of Salonika, it was tho duty of the responsible authorities to see that Sarrail had an adequate army—and, as I wrote at the time, his effectives should not be less than 1,000,000 men—supplied with everything requisite in; the way of field artillery, mides, motor lorries, etc. For if the business was worth undertaking it was worth doiug well. The victory, then, which _ Rumania's courageous decision was to have, given us, has not been obtained. On the contrary, its place has been taken by a series pf defeats. The enemy arc elated and arrogant. The neutrals are impressed with his loyalty to his partners and with the Allies' impotence to protect theirs. . King Constantiue chuckles and tells the paladins of his table, round that he saved Greece from the fate of Serbia and Rumania, and nobody i's able to refute the assertion. He has t veil gone so far as to humor his Imperial brother-in-law by ordering his. troops to fire on those of the Allies at the moment when Bucharest was in danger} and the Allies' fortunes in the East were l at their lowest ebb.