THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK.

Marlborough Express, Volume XLIX, Issue 11, 14 January 1915, Page 3

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK.

GERMANY'S LONG-PLOTTED WAR.

PEACE EFFORTS BAULKED.

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs at tho end of November made public a "Yellow Book" bearing on the causes of tho present Avar. The French volume is much more complete, Than the publication of this nature given up to the present time by other Grovernments (writes the Paris correspondent of the New York Times).

The French report has 216 pages, and comprises no fewer than 160 documents. It is devoted primarily to a recital of the negotiations which followed the delivery of the Austrian Note to Servia (23rd July, 1914), and Avhich preceded the declaration of war by Germany oh Russia (Ist August, 1914) and on France (3rd August, 1914). It is brought to a close by the reproduction of the declaration, of the Triple Entente Powers that Great Britain. Russia.! and France would not conclude peace separately.

DEEPER CAUSES OF THE WAR

The French diplomatic documents in this book are divided into chapters in . order to distinguish the preliminaries from the principal phases of the European crisis. The first chapter is entitled '"Preface" (1913), and. is devoted to the' remoter regions and the deeper causes of the present conflict. An extract from the' "Yel'.ow, Book" given out officially in Paris, reads as follows : —

"It was first in the spring of 1913 that we noted the colossal and expensive military effort, which alone can explain the desire to impose the Germanic superiority and hegemony upon the powers of the Triple Entente. When France responded to this meance by the drafting of the law of three years' service in the army, this measure of defence was denounced in official circles in Berlin as a L provocation which should not be tolerated

"in April of 1913 a secret and official German report defined ' the objective and the means of the national policy as follows: Convince the people of the- necessity of an offensive war against France-, prepare uprisings in Russia and North Africa: provide for, in case of hostilities, the immediate absorption of Belgium and * Holland. *

"These are the ideas extolled in this report; such is the programme that, shortly after, we saw the Germans endeavor to put into operation.

KAISER WON TO THE WAR

PARTY

"We declare that Emperor William, who up to that time had posed as a champion of peace, admitted, in the course of a conversation with the King of the- Belgians, that he had finally come to share the ideas of his military advisers. He had placed himself among the partisans of a war which ho thought would not- be long delayed, and the overpowering success of which seemed to him certain. Public opiniom, in its turn, permitted itself co be won over by the passions of the Military Party, and came to consider the affair of Agadir as a defeat for Germany. It regarded the existence of a strong France as a danger to Germany, and the breaking out of a European war as the only remedy for all difficulties and all uncertainties.

"These bellicose dispositions constituted a permanent danger for the peace of Europe.

' 'From 'a perusal of the six other chapters of the ' Yellow Book,' which are devoted to the diplomatic negotiations carried on in the month of July, there are to be deducted, and supported by evidence, the following impressions: —

"That the combination between Austria and Germany had decided upon war, and that on four successive occasions this combination endeavored to precipitate war by violent proceedings, the purpose of which was to prevent, or to ensure the failure of, all efforts at conciliation. The first of these proceedings was the Austrian ultimatum to Servia''(,24ths July), winch was the origin of this conflict. In spite of the fact that the Belgrade Government offered, for the prosecution of tiie .assassins, of the: Austrian, Archduke,, every facility compatible with its dignity, the Cabinet of Vienna summoned the Government at Belgrade not only to disavow complicity with the crime of Sarajevo, but, furthermore, to permit foreign functionaries to seek the authors of this crime on Servian territory.

PEREMPTORY DEMAND ON

SERVIA

"Vienna gave Servia only two days to accept integrally these Draconian conditions. In spite of the fact that M. yon Jagow, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, claimed to be in ignorance of the contents of the Note (which was nevertheless known to the President of the Bavarian Council), Germany immediately and without restriction united herself with her ally. The German Ambassador came to the Quai d'Orsay (the French Foreign Office in Paris) and endeavored to carry through a proposal which he represented as being peaceful, but which was in reality threatening. He declared that the conflict should remain ' localised,' and that any intervention on the part- of n third Power would result in ' incalculable consequences.' This was tantamount to letting it be understood that Austria should have every liberty to crush Servia, and that Germany would have recourse to arms to prevent Russia from - encouraging Servia.

"Confronted with this situation, the first thought of the Powers forming the. Triple Entente was' to gain time to examine the conflict with greater care, and if possible to render it less acute. The Powers therefore asked that Vienna extend the.period of delay allowed Servia for her answer. Then Austria became fearful that she would be left without a pretext of war, and she endeavored to ward off this danger by another expedient. She declined, or avoided the request for an extension, and declared insufficient the Servian answer, which was given to her in good timo, and which admitted, and accepted her principal demands. "Austria thereupon ordered her Minister at Belgrade to leave tlvr> Servian capital (26th July), and diplomatic relations with Servia were severed.

"With this development the situation became considerably aggravated. Tho Powers of the Triple Entente, however, ■ still endeavored to bring about a settlement. In the meantime, M. yon Schown, the German Ambassador in Paris, came tn the Oiuii d'Orsay and demanded that France should exert her influence on Russia in a peaceful sense; but he refused to oxert similar peaceful influence at Vienna.

GEE MANY REJECTS A PEACE PROFFER.

"England proposed to avoid a crisis by submitting the Austi-o-Serb difficulty to'the.'official mediation of the four Powers which were not directly interested therein. France and .Russia

accepted this proposal to internationalise the question, but Germany refused under the pretext that she could not thus humiliate her ally, and she proposed, in the place of this common action, the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, saying the latter was ready ito consent to this arrangement. The >conflict seemed consequently at this time to be proceeding toward' a' settlement, when, for- the third time, Austria, by a fresh provocation, killed the hopes authorised by all thait had been done, up to the present, in' the direction of conciliation. She declared Avar on Servia (28th July), and began at the same time a partial mobilisation against Russia on her frontiers (29th July). "The chance of peace now seemed greatly reduced,' particularly as the Austrian army began the bombardment of Belgvade, the occupation of

which seemed to be nothing more* than a question of hours. The Powers of the Triple Entente did not, however, give up all hope of . accomplishing something in these last remaining minutes. On one side Sir Edward Grey started a new project for foursided mediation,, a project in which Russia joined at the demand of France. M. yon Jagow, ito whom this project was communicated,. evaded it by declaring that, while he adhered to its principle, it was necessary to find a formula that would be acceptable to Austria. He was then invited to formulate himself a proposal of settlement, but he again avoided the issue by saying that he would consult the Vienna Cabinet on this point.

RUSSIA'S OFFER TO DELAY ACTION.

'"Sir Edward Grey, whose spirit of conciliation seemed indefatigable, then came forward w rith a new compromise proposition which provided that- all the Powers should call a halt to their miiltary preparations. Furthermore, Russia gave a fresh evidence of her desire to maintain the peace of Europe by offering to maintain an attitude of expectation if Austria would engage not to undertake any measures directed against tho Sovereignty of Servia, even after haying occupied Belgrade. r 'lt was then that the Cabinet of Vienna, perhaps fearful of the consequences of its irreconcilability, and feeling the necessity of taking a step backward, declared for the first time •that it was ready to discuss with Europe the fundamental principle of its difference with Servia. At the very moment that this work in the direction of reciprocal concession seemed to warrant a last hope of peace an irreparable movement on the part of Germany promised to endanger indefinitely the results acquired with so much labor, and to force the crisis to a violent solution.

"At the beginning of the conflict this Power, Germany, had commenced military preparations, and she continued * them with feverish haste. At the very momen/t when her representatives in foreign countries were protesting her pacific intentions, the 31st of July in the evening, Germany addressed to the Russian Government an ultimatum giving Russia twelve hours' in which ito demobilise on her Austrian as well as on her German frontiers. The alternative was that Germany would mobilise. This was done at a time when the Russian Government had given evidence of its conciliatory attitude, and at a time when AustriaHungary was showing herself disposed to discuss with Europe the question of her Note to Servia.

THE BLAME PLACED ON GERMANY.

"There could be no> doubt as to the answer to such an ultimatum. From that moment the cause of peace was definitely lost, the reason being this precipitate aation on the part of Germany. The obligations of alliances had to be observed, and the great Powers were drawn into the fatal conflict.

"Events which then took place are fresh in the memory of everyone. On the 31st of July there were acts of hostility, clearly defined, on our frontier; the 2nd of August saw the violation of the neutrality of Luxembourg and the entrance by German troops upon three points of our territory,, while our troops were holding themselves at a distance of 10 kilometres, (six miles) from the frontier. The same day Belgium was_ summoned to permit Germany's military operations, against France. Finally, on the 3rd August, the declaration of war was brought by M. yon Schoen to the Qua! d'Orsay, which' act preceded bv-a short time only the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.'

"In the light of the documents contained in this Yellow Book, the roles played by the different Powers in this European crisis show up with striking clearness. It is scarcely necessary again to emphasise the responsibilities of Austria, primal cause of the conflict. The responsibilities of Germany are even more crushing, in spite of the fact that in the beginning she stood for the second plan. The reason for this is that Germany systematically avoided every pppontunity to discuss measures of conciliation. She forced Austria to an intransigent- attitude, and she made the war inevitable by an ultimatum (to Russia) issued at a moment when the basis of a direct agreement between Austria and Russia had been found and accepted by these two Powers.

"From the beginning Germany declared that she was in ignorance of the contents of the Austrian Note (to Servia), buit at the same time she voiced •her resolve to approve it and sustain all its pretensions. ~ "When the Russian Government showed that public opinion and the historic traditions of Russia did not permit it to turn a- deaf ear to (the fate of Servia, Germany endeavored to force France, by intimidation, to. associate herself with the exerting of influence at St. Petersburg, but at ;the same time she refused to undertake like steps at Vienna.

GERMANY'S DELIBERATE PROVOCATION.

"When Sir Edward Grey proposed four-Power mediation the German Government refused to consider his proposal the first time under the pretext that she thought preferable the opening of direct negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and the second time under the pretext that such a; conference was not acceptable to Vienna, and that the British proposal was not in a very practicable form. When finally Germany perceived, in spite of all her dilatory proceedings, that the conflict was proceeding toward a settlement to be effected by the conciliatory efforts of Russia, and.England, which finally had been accepted by Austria-Hungary, she precipitated the rupture ,by hurling at Russia an ultimatum couched in unacceptable terms.

'■'France, with an indefatigable good will, associated herself with the greatest sincerity with every effort made to compose the conflict. She counselled Servia in-the line .of wisdom; she endeavored incessantly at St. Petersburg to strengthen her ally, Russia. in her attitude of moderation, and she took part in all the peaceful endeavors' made f*t Berlin and at Vienna. France again- can truthfully say that she did not take up arms except after .she perceived military measures and military provocations which placed her national existence in peril.

"France, moved by a deep love of peace ,exhausted every means of conciliation at her command. The successive violations of the neutrality of Luxembourg and of Belgium, and the invasion of hen1 own territory, were necessary before she decided to draw the sword to defend her \?er.v life."