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Marlborough Daily Times, Volume IV, Issue 374, 24 February 1882, Page 2

A REVIEW OF ME HERP.ERT ftI>EXCEEDS “ THEORY or Tin: WILL.” j At (lie December meeting of tlie Victoria I Philosophical Institute of England, which I took place at its house, 7, Adelplii Terrace, ! London, the Secretary. Captain E Petrie, | announced that this Society, founded to : investigate philosophical and scientific questions, especially those said to militate against the truth of Revelation —had enrolled 1 -‘2 members during the year, of which .V> were resident in America and the Colonics, the total number of its members was now 940 : it was further stated that this year many of its American members had combined and founded the “American ! Institute of Christian Philosophy,” a Society to carry out the same objects and organisation in'America, and for that purpose it had adopted the same objects and whole, scheme, hut- that while taking this step its founders had decided to keep up their individual connection with the Institute in England. After this a paper was read on Mr Herbert Spencer’s “Theory of the Will.” The author showed that Mr Spencer’s philosophy denied all freedom of will, and ; mai

aspect of tins commingling of nerve-mole-cules. In the time of indecision these were colliilimr one against another, but when a decision has been reached the strongest nerve-stream had made head against all the rest, and was flowing unobstrueed on its way. Snob, according to Mr Spencer, was the passage of deliberation into decision, of hesitancy into volition. Manifestly this set aside all freedom of will, made tins whole process mechanical, and as Mr Spencer allowed, was the negation of moral obligation. The paper criticised Mr Spencer’s argument, and maintained that Mr Spencer from first to last, had only made one bold assertion, and had repeated it many times, hut had given not one iota of proof. Thirteen of these arguments—all he had presented were carefully examined, and shown to lie nothing more than confident assertion. These were classified and replied to as follows First Mr. Spencer said that “ the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will ” is that every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire. ” Against this Kant and Hamilton were quoted, as admitting that we must desire, but holding that free-will can restrain desire. The martyrs could not but desire to avoid the Haines, but their sublime will held in control their lower nature and compelled it to obey the law of righteousness. Secondly, Mr Spencer simply assumed that the will had no control or power of free choice, which was the very thing he was bound to prove. He next called y t “an illusion ”to think “ that at enKA moment the c<jo is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas actual and nascent which then exists. ’’ Evidently this was eon found ing.substance with phenomena, between which elsewhere he carefully discriminated, and it was making the t></» only a succession of states, and denying all substance of mind, which was going contrary to one of the structural doctrines of iiis philosophy. Mr Herbert Spencer bad frequently stated that the cj>> was nothing else than the state of consciousness passing at the moment, but this statement was never sought to he proved, and indeed lie contradicted himself, inasmuch as he spoke of “ the subject of such psychical changes.” Xow “ subject "is that which underlies phenomena, but lie had said the w/o was only phenomena, so that his’subject was only an hypostatiz.ed zero. lie next suggested that tlie will seems to be* free because its action is incalculable. This was shown to be only an ad atjifaiidum argument, for the flight of a bird through the air seems to the untrained intelligence to be free but tlie student of science saw that every movement of its wings was according to fixed law. Mr Spencer lastly urged that if psychical changes conformed to law there could not be such a tiling as free-will. In reply to this, it was shown that the will might make its own law, to which psychical changes would conform and yet lie free, and that the will would, in this way, adumbrate its own moral nature. Taking for a moment the Theistie position; surely God was free, and yet Ho perfectly conformed to His own law, so also man might be free, purposely made so by God, in order that, being free, he might acquire the true valour of righteousness. Thus all Mr Spencer’s arguments hail seemed to fail when examined thoroughly, and the matter stood where it was. Finally, it was contended that the freedom of the will was the unassailable citadel from which alone the doctrine of moral responsibility could lie defended, and as such it was a question appealing powerfully to all, and having in it the gravest moral issues. With the will free, conscience was seated on the throne, and life was a great moral test of fitness for an eternity of righteousness.