The Matamata Record PUBLISHED MONDAY AND THURSDAY THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1933. THE WORLD CONFERENCE.

Matamata Record, Volume XVI, Issue 1447, 3 August 1933, Page 4

The Matamata Record PUBLISHED MONDAY AND THURSDAY THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1933. THE WORLD CONFERENCE.

IT is very difficult at this distance to know exactly what has happened at the World Economic Conference. This much may be said safely: that expectations have not been realised. But it may be that too much was expected. The stupendous nature of the task and the varying and conflicting interests involved were probably never realised. The weakness rested in the absence of a definite plan. There was lacking the strength of great leadership. Much had been hoped from the meeting of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and President Roosevelt, but little eventuated. When a visionary and an untried practical man meet to set the world’s affairs in order there is the danger that the two may nevei come near enough to find a meeting point of their ideas. And such it is feared was the case with the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States. And as time passed there were ominous signs that President Roosevelt’s power over Congress waned. The two Houses chose to deal with essentially national matters in preference to giving the President special power to deal with tariffs. The outcome was shown in the treatment accorded currency stabilisation by the l Conference. The wind blew hot and cold. The central banking experts of Great Britain, France and the United States reached a working agreement for mutual stabilisation, which it was hoped would be ratified by their Governments. But the United States was not compliant and stabilisation dropped. And almost as quickly President Roosevelt repudiated the unofficial Cordell Hull proposal for an all-round 10 per cent, tariff cut. The lofty ideals of the Conference crashed.

Generally public opinion denounces President Roosevelt as the villain. The justice of this censure is doubtful. Senator Couzens said frankly:

“ Developments in America seem to indicate that interciationalism will conflict quite severely with our national economic programme. If my analysis is correct we cannot carry through both programmes.”

President Roosevelt may not have been able to give effect to the wishes of the Conference. On the other hand he may not have wished to. America has commenced a daring and ambitious scheme to restore internal prosperity. Possibly President Roosevelt saw further into the future than Mr. MacDonald and realised that international stabilisation depended and rested on national stability. The two interests are not in reality so divided. If American prosperity is to mean anything it must mean a big industrial revival. That is impossible without a restoration of export markets, which can be achieved only through a general reduction of tariffs. The determination of the American Government to raise internal prices must bring about a similar reflection in other currencies. Improved trade will demnd the easiest medium of extension, which can only be given by stabilisation of foreign exchange. The basis of internal exchange is a matter for each country, and is of less importance than the creation of internal stability based on price levels.