BATTLE OF CORONEL

Lake Wakatip Mail, Issue 4326, 10 August 1937, Page 6

BATTLE OF CORONEL

INEFFICIENT BRITISH EASY GAME FOR GERMANS Further light is thrown on the relative British and German strengths at the Battle of Coronel by a letter received by Hector Bywater following a recent article in the ‘Daily Telegraph’ on the subject. The letter is from a correspondent who is now an officer of H.M, Coastguard Service. He served in the Monmouth on the China Station from April, 1912, to January, 1914, _ the Monmouth being one of the British ships sunk in action at Coronel on November 1, 1914. He writes: “We of the Monmouth and other ships forming the China Squadron knew the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau quite well. We had met at Yokohama, Nagasaki, Hong Kong, Wei-Hai-Wei, and under the guns of the Woosung forts during the bombardment of Woosung at the time of the Chinese trouble. “We knew of what the German ships were capable, both in regard to gunnery and speed. The Scharnhorst was reckoned to be, as you stated, the crack gunnery ship, but her speed had to be kept down to that of her sister ship, as the Gneisenau was supposed to be inferior in that respect. We also knew equally well Admiral Spee, as he had been on board our ship and inspected us. “What made the German ships so smart at gunnery and other work was well known. In the fßritish Navy the two years’ commission was then in force. After eighteen months our ships were as smart as any, the men knew their guns, knew everything about the ship, and worked as a team.

RAW CREWS “But just at the height of her efficiency the ship was sent home to pay off and recommission with another crew, thus becoming disorganised for a period of twelve months or so. This was not the case with the German Navy. They only relieved part of the crew at one time, a method which did not seriously affect the fighting efficiency of their ships. “To give you two examples of the result of our system: When I was serving in the Aboukir in the Mediterranean we used to take in 1500 tons of coal before we had our breakfast. After paying off I took passage in another ship of her class, on the way to China with a new crew, and at the very same place, Malta* we took the whole day and part of the next to take in the same amount of coal. “Up to the beginning of 1913 our squadron in China was a match for the Germans. The Minotaur and Defence, with their 9.2 in guns all mounted on the upper deck, were superior to the German big ships, while we also had the advantage over them in speed. The Monmouth’s guns were only Gin, but, providing we had no heavy weather, we could match the German cruisers of the Emden class. We also had the Newcastle, a modern cruiser, so that, all things considered, we were superior, “On February 19, 1913, the Hampahire—a less powerful ship—arrived at Hong Kong to relieve the Defence, which was withdrawn from the China Station. We knew that this was going to make the German force in those waters superior to ours. A HOPELESS FIGHT j

“On November 1, 1914, the Monmouth, together with the Good Hope, was sunk by the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. What are we to say who knew her ? The same crew was not in her then, but a scratch crew scraped up from anywhere. Von Spee, I believe, used his superior speed to get to windward of the Monmouth and

Good Hope. This meant that only the few upper-deck guns could fire. Von Spee knew this as well as we did. It Was impossible to open our ports to windward in a rough sea, for the casemate immediately became flooded, and water would pour down the ammunition hoists.

“A captain with speed behind him can determine or dictate his own terms of battle and choose whether to tight at long or short range. Even the effects of the smoke from the guns blotting out your targets can be made a weight , facto: if yo have speed at your command cuperio to the enemy. “What was the use < f practising in peace time gun for gam and then, as soon as war broke out, withdrawing the very ships we we e keeping to match those of the ener ly I suppose it will always remain a mystery as to why both the Defence and Minotaur were withdrawn from China before the and Gneisenau were at the bottom of the sea.

“You were quite right when you said that the Defence would have made all the difference, and I for one would not have minded going into action in her against both the German armored ships, two to one. Not, however, in the Monmouth, and not in a newly-commissioned Defence either.”