PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVIII, Issue 18435, 15 June 1920, Page 6

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC.

Tn his annual address to the Canterbury Branch of the Navy League, the presi- j dent, Mr A. Boyle, made it a strong point that '' everything at the moment points to the. Pacific becoming the centre of naval activity in tho future." The American naval vote, he rAd, gavo grave food for thought. If the Urited States carried out the programme recently outlined Britain would find herself "not only inferior in power of capital ships, but in the number of her fleet." Britain, he urged, must keep level in naval construction with her friends of to-day. She must either continue building sufficient costly capital ship* to ensure maintenance of her supremacy of the Beas, or she must form a fleet consisting of very largo numbers of the fastest cruisers and destroyers, .with submarines and aircraft, the total cost of which would probably not be less than that of the larger vessels. Mr Boyle subscribed to the view that tho appointment of Lord Jellicoe as Gov-ernor-General of New Zealand was inspired by a desire that a naval authority of tho highest standard should bo stationed. in the Paciflo, and pointing the moral to New Zealand of all these things he urged a very much larger monetary contribution by this Dominion to tho British Navy and also that this country should find a fair proportion of tho men. Most people will agree with Mr Boyle that New Zealand ought to pay her fair share for naval protection, both in money and in men, but the larger matters upon which he touched will not; produce any unanimity of comment. The view that the Pacific is to be tho most important sphere of naval activity in the future is fully understandable only on tho which Mi Boyle touched upon, that " our European enemies cannot for many years bo counted as serious naval opponents, and no Western Power is likely to trouble us." This, however, in itself contains no valid argument for transferring to the Pacific naval armaments comparable to those Britain has been maintaining in the North Sea, the English Channel and the Mediterranean. The reference to America is obscure unless wo are to regard the United States as a possible or probable aggressor, and Mr Bcylo does not go so far as to suggest that. There is another Pacifio Power, of course, which ought to be guarded against on behalf of sparsely-populated Australasia, but surely America's proposed increases in naval armament should relieve us of some anxiety on that score? Does the Navy League suggest tuat the old game of the "balance of power" should be started afresh in this new field of tho Pacific? With the warnings of history in mind wo are not disposed to dismiss lightly the counsels of those who would strengthen our defences, but if the Navy League is right and the result of the " war to end war" has been to increase the Empire's dangers, then the League's spokesmen must more clearly indicate where those dangers lurk. While we may invite attack by weakness we may also incur enmity by a display of warlike preparation tho purpose of which is not clearly understood. It may be that the League of Nations is a broken reed to, lean upon, but it i 9 not conducive to the strengthening of tho League to ignore its existence. Britain is committed to the covenant of the League of Nations, and that covenant makes reduction* of armaments a cardinal point. We hold the view that America's ambitious naval programme, whether it is inspired by wiso statesmanship or not, should certainly not challenge Britain into competition.