WAR IN FRANCE.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17946, 13 November 1918, Page 5

WAR IN FRANCE.

.THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. * Germany’s plan ~of campaign was based on the assumption that the Russian mobilisation would be a comparatively sjow process, ithat consequently her eastern frontier would not be seriously endangered in tho first week or two of the war, and that ihe Russian armies in Poland would bo fully engaged and contained by tho Austrian armies, whoso mission it would be to invade Poland. It is possible, even probable, that tho Germans anticipated marching.through Belgium unoppos--1 cd, but in any case von Moltke’s strategy involved the invasion of Belgium in great, force, the plan being to hold the centre arid left, while the right wing rushed through Belgium to the French frontier. The French left wing w'as to be smashed ior enveloped This plan miscarried, because, although the Belgian opposition was Overcome, tho delay in reaching tho French frontier gave the French time to send astrong force into Belgium and for the British to land in France and to send into Belgium tho advance guard of 'their Expeditionary Force. Moreover,

the Allies avoided envelopment by a general retreat. When the Germans forced the passage of the Meuse, the small Belgian Army retreated, fighting, on Antwerp, holding there a»superior German force, since the fortress jhad to be masked, and the resistance offered by the Belgians at Liege and Antwerp was of very material value to the Allied cause in the first critical days of tho war. However, the Germans were still in sufficient force to break the resistance of the Allied left wing immediately north of the Belgian border, though in the first fighting this resistance was. never subjected to "a full test. The enemy’s weight further east had compelled a French retirement, and the whole Allied lino was soon in retreat. The French had endeavoured, by an invasion of' German Lorraine, to lift the pressure from the Belgian front, but this advance had failed, and subsequently they were called upon* to resist a very powerful German attempt to roach the Meuso south of Verdun. General Joffre, who was in command of tho Allied armies, could fight no more than a delaying battle, at this, stage, since- tho French mobilisation was not yet complete, and his whole line fell back from the Belgian border towards Paris,'the British being on tho extreme left. He left tho Channel ports uncovered, intending, obviously, to draw the Germans .away from the coast. And the Germans, intent on the envelopment of the Meuse line, were eager to follow him. their right ultimately crossing the Oise and moving south-east towards tho Marhe. The Gormans could not know, definitely whether Joffre intended to defend Paris or not, but the general direction of the retreat being known their plans could be adjusted to suit circumstances. There is reason to believe that' the enemy greatly over-estimated tho strength of the French army .that had retreated from Belgium, that lie m believed it to havo been shattered and that ho hqd no knowledge of Joffre’s reserve strength. Finding the French falling back between .Paris and the Meuse, therefore, he changed the direction of tho advance of his First Army on the extremo right, from south-west to south-east, believing either that the whole Allied force coula be smashed or that he could at least clear the Franco-German frontier. But his confidence led him into a fatal error, for in his eager pursuit ho left his right flank exposed. A new French army, rushed north from Paris by motor transport, suddenly attacked this flank and at the same time General Foch, afterwards to become more f,*v mous as a winner of victories, struck hard and true in the centre. The German advance was halted, and then it was converted into a retreat. The invasion of Franco had reached its limit. This defeat of the Germans on the Marne was one, of the decisive battles of history. It definitely saved France, at a time when the Germans had an overwhelming superiority in numbers of men, in guns and machine-guns and in munitions. They were never again to establish such a superiority in the western theatre, because the complete mobilisation of the French man-power was accompanied* by the steadv expansion of the British’* Army, and in the fourth year of tho war, when tho elimination of Russia had once moro permitted Germany to mass tho whale of her force in the west, tho Americans had come to the aid of the Allies in* tho defence of civilisation against Prussianism. -

From tiro Marne the Germans in 1914 fell back to the Aisne, where they entrenched. There followed a rapid extension of the* German right and the * Allied left, until the flanks rested on the sea, but the important fact about this movement is that it enabled the Allies to cover the retreat of the Belgian army after tho fall of Antwerp, and at the same time to protect the Channel ports. That was not accomplished without an intensely bitter struggle,* lasting three weeks, which has com© to bo known as tho First Battle of Yprcs. The Germans - hoped by smashing through at Yprcs to accomplish what they had failed to achieve on tho Marne, and the brunt of the defence fell on the little British Army, which was outnumbered by five to one. It stood firm, arid the battle will remain for all time one of . the glories of British arms. Tho campaign of 1914 closed with the opposing sides deeply entrenched in parallel lines, and there they remained for the winter. Apart from a brief burst on the Yprer. front early in tho spring, in which the Gormans for the first time mad© use of poison gas, the enemy was content in 1915 ho hold his positions and to contain tho British and French, while he dovotcrl his attention to. the campaign against Russia. The. British opened two minor offensives, neither of which produced results of importance, and the French fought two bitter battles, one in Artois and the otljpr in Champagne. But at that time the Allies had .neither the number of men nor the 'weight of guns to smash through the German trench lines. The history of the war in 1915 is mainly tho history of the offensive that expelled the Russians from Poland and virtually paralysed the Russian armies. In 1916 the Germans returned in strength to the west, having spent tho winter in the preparation of a great effort to break through the Meuse lino at Verdun. The attack opened in winter weather at the end of February, and . was maintained for four months, producing cr.a of the most remarkable military episodes in history. It was : not a siege, for thfe French had their lines of communication open, and vet its characteristics were entirely those of fortress warfare. It is estimated that from first to last tho Germans had not fewer than ihreo-quarters of a million men engaged, and they aro said to have had ' two thousand guns of all calibres massed on a narrow front. The offensive was a failure and an expensive one, but tho defence of Verdun had involved a tremendous strain on the French man-power. However, throughout 1915 Britain had been rapidly organising her new armies, and these were, transferred to France in the spring of the year, the British front being then extended south as far as the Somme. In July, when the French were hard pressed but still triumphant on the Meuse, the British, with "a French army' on the right in support, opened their first great offensive, and ion tho next five months the Battle of tlie Somme continued. The new armies were called upon to assault fixed defences, held by highly trained troops, and the defence was control led by tried and experienced staffs. The offensive. drove a big dent in the German front, and as the operations wore continued ana extended in the lato winter, the Gormans were compelled to make an important rectification of their front. They retreated between the Scarpe apd the Aisne to a strong line of defences, deeply organised, known as the. Hindenburg lino, and there, in the spring, they encountered a fresh Allied offensive I The Allied plan in 1917 involved simultaneous French and British attacks, the French driving north front Champagne and the Aisne line, while the British 'fought a containing battle in front of Arras. The British plan had beon to throw a great weight into Flan, . dors in the hope of clearing the Belgian coast, but it was postponed in order that tho French plan 'might .be fought through. Tho double offensive came near to success, and it was stopped—by political intervention, according to current report—when an enemy retreat seemed imminent. Then the British proceeded, late in the year, with the Flanders plan, the way having been cleared in June by a brilliant action in which tho Australians and New Zealanders and Irish troops stormed tho Messines Ridge. *.. However, the British troops wore still required to fight on the Scarpe and Sensee sectors, because the Germans had launched a counter-offensive north of the Aisno and wore battering hard in an effort to break the French resistance. 'When at

length tho offonsive opened in Flanders i it round the enemy fully prepared and 1 massed in groat strength, ffsa struggle continued until November, t-y which 'tune the high ground oast of Yores had been won. These battles of 1917 inflicted an enormous toll on the enemy, and although their importance was not realised at the time they undoubtedly "f>"depleted the enemy’s man-power to au . extent that permitted no full recovarv. '*'■ In the winter of 1917-18, however, . the Germans were able to transfer to the west virtually tho whole of their effectives from the eastern theatre, peaco having beon forced on Russia and Rumania. They thus massed an unsually strong mobile reserve, besides holding their lines in great strength. > In all they had more than two hundro,d divisions at their command, a high 0 proportion qi them consisting of §peci- & ally trained, storm troops. Tho intervention of the United States in the'' 5 ' previous year made it imperative for the enemy to seek a r decision at the earliest possible date, and hd devoted all his energies to . the task. The condi- < tions under which the effort was mado may be briefly outlined. Germany* - * knew that she could not again hope find a favourable opportunity. Tho recall of the divisions from the eastern front gave her a positive advantage inthe west both in the number of formations and in the* number of men. Her . production of guns, munitions and material generally had reached its maxi- • mum,* because the stocks of raw material were approaching exhaustionHer population had been combed and recombod for effectives, and she to make good tho wastage of the war had only the annual contingents of recruits to •fall back upon. Then both British and French forces had been reduced by the arduous and costly battles of 1917 and by the diversion of reserves to the Italian theatre. Tho, temporary paralysis of tho the Italian armies after tho great enemy offensive of the' previous year had reduced tho Austrian requirements in the matter of munitions to a minimum, and reinforcements of Austrian batteries verp available for tfae western front, As for the American armies that were one day to appear in France, their transfer across the Atlantic had been comparatively slow*, though rapid enough according to earlier ideas, and it was, not anticipated that any considerable force of trained Americans would be in thejield before.;* the autumn of the year. Moreover, a‘ great development of the submarine campaign was counted on to interfere with the Allied supplies and to infcerrupt,. if not to stop, the transport of American troops to France. The year therefore, offered tho most favourable opportunity for securing a decision, and there was the added incentive of tho knowledge that Austria, Bulgaria and • Turkey were all tired of' the war and were in no mood to face fresh sacrifices. There was no lack of Care in the* enemy’s preparations. ’ Through the* winter the shock divisions were thoroughly trained - for a smashing often- . sivc, and tho reserves were practised in the art of manoeuvre. The final dis-. positions fvere carried cut with the utmost secrecy. The plan aimed at the separation of • the British and French * armies by a weighty blow against tho British Fifth Army, which was holding a dangerously long front north and south of St Quentin. Tlie blow Was struck in foggy weather at the end .of March, and it achieved an immediate and sensational success, in that the. British were swept back, overpowered* by superior numbers, and a wide gap was opened. Through this gnu the' Gormans poured rapidly. Fortunate-, ly the British Fourth Army, on the left of the Fifth, fought a stubborn retreating battle, and as the French ra-' * serves came quickly into line fought magnificently on tho other flank* of the gap tho German advance was *’ confined to a front narrow enough toper mit it to bo controlled. It reached Montdidior and was there fought to a standstill. The Allied losses were admittedly heavy. Checked at Montdidier the Germans shifted the weight of tlieir attack further north to th*‘, Somme, where once more they drove at ■ tho junction of British and French, 5 with Amiens and the Calais-Paris rail it way as tho objectives. Here the Brit isli and French defence proved sound • * The Allied front had been re-establish. ed. The Gormans next endeavoured tc. ■ extend the front of the battle by a lute attack on Arras, but were beaten off by the First Army, in a- short battle that was much more costly to tho enemy than to the British. Another diversion came further north still,, where tho Portuguese troops were fielding a section of the line west of Lille. There the Germans immediately opened a gap, and finding, as they thought, the way easily opened to the Channel ports they threw in all the reserves available, diverted divisions intended* for tlie main . battle in front, of Amiens and oven transferred divisions from the Somme. In spite of the amazing weight of this new offensive the British defence held good, and the enemy was again fought V to a dead stop. . . This Flanders offensive is he’d, by all the authorities, to have been a blunder on the part of the enemy. Tlie breakthrough was not expected, and when it occurred the enemy spent invaluable time and invaluable material in the-, effort to exploit it. . At the best the objective was only a secondary one, and his pursuit of it gave a priceless breathing space to the' Allies’ divisions covering Amiens, while it cost the Germans in men r, price altogether out of proportion to the results. Having failed in their enterprise in Flanders, tho Germans turned south with a new surprise attack. They struck along tho Ailetto and on tho high ground north of Cracnne, with a simultaneous attack between Craoruio and Rheims. the intention being to turn tho French positions north, of tha Aisne. Breaking through, they od- * vaneed very rapidly to the Marne, : where they were checked. The Allies clung tenaciously on tho flanks of tho. advancing, enemy, who was thus confined to a deep salient between Rheims and the Oiso. The enemy’s.next effort " came on tho Montdidier-Oisc sector, tho intentibn being to force the French out of Compiegne and to open she way to Paris by the Oiso valley- In this offensivo the Germans suffered an. early and definite defeat, and indeed in all., their subsequent attempts to break - through towards Paris they came to, grief. Curiously enough, in spite of tho stiffness of tho French resistance.: the Germans seem to have convinced themselves that the Allies were at tho end of thoir resources. On no other assumption can one explain their July offensivo. They had a long flank ex- -, posed between * the Aisne and tho Marne, yet they left it inadequately protected and quite ignored tho possi- * bility of a strong counter-offensive. "In truth, they committed precisely tho blundor they had perpetrated in 1914, believing .the whole of the Allied reserves to havo been absorbed and showing by their recklessness that they treated the Allies as an utterly beaten side; They oven neglected the precautions necessary to preserve, the secrecy ' so their plane, so that when in July they Punched what was to be the culminating and triumphant phase of their offensive campaign they found the Allies fully aware of tlieir plans. The German assault, delivered on a wide front, virtually from Chateau Thierry on the Marne to tho Argonne, was a failure •* from tho outset. Only on tho Marne front did it promise any progress, and * there / is .every reason to believe that, there the Allied intention was to en- . courage tho Gormans to become more deeply involved in the salient. From this point the whole aspect- of the western campaign changed. Koch, who had been appointed generalissimo iti the west in March, had hitherto been fighting a defensive campaign,' with the minimum * employment of his reserves, and consequently tho German successes had been deceptive. Sud-. dealy he struck on the- flank between , the Aisno and the Marne, broke , through the enemy’s lines and ened to envelop the Germans on ijfl| Marne. A struggle of heroic lions developed. The division alter division tiVViiy’fxCi

So save the situation, but the French, S'fch American, British and Italian risTons co-oporating, out-fought them ta series of violent actions in which e enemy suffered extraordinarily |snv,y losses. Thereafter' the Allies i©ver lost the initiative. . The thrust !®tweeu the Aisne and the Marne was flowed by a powerful attack by Britfflh and French between tbe*Somme and •Monkudior, the enemy’s front being broken. Before the position had been stabilised the British Third _ Army, north of the Somme, launched its attack, and thereafter a series of alteraaiiu" thrusts, first on one sector, then an another, threw the Germans right back to the Hiudeuburg* line- . ins powerful defensive line was broken in the Scnsee Valley, and the British advanced right- up to the Scheldt. Then, the Australians of the Fourth Army !*poke through the Hindenburg between Cambrai- and St Quefi^fo., ,A French and American offensive in Champagne and tho Argonne and on the Mouse forced the enemy into retreat on tile whole of that front, and finally, a bold Belgian and British offensive, commenced on the Yores ,seo- ' tor, cleared the Belgian coast, forced the enemy to evacuate Lille, Lens and Douai, and threw the Germans back on the Lys and the Scheldt, • ‘ Between July 21 and the end of October the Germans were defeated on every sector between the sea and ’ the frontier south of Mota. Foch’s masterly strategy allowed them no restThey had spent men and material with the utmost prodigality in their offensives, and now suffered the inevitable consequences of their extravagance. It is estimated that their casualties in 1918 exceeded two and a half millions, of which a million were permanent or definitive, and that 6000 out of 18,000 gum of all calibres vrero destroyed • or captured by the’ Allies. Consequently when it became necessary to meet the Allied thrusts, launched in -such quick succession on so many sectors, there wpro no reserves available, and the most the enemy could achieve was to establish himself strongly on the Meuse and pivoting'on that river to swing his • centre and right wing rapidly back. SJven this drastic,process dfd not save him, however, and repeatedly h© Imd to sacrifice divisions in rearguard ac- \ tions in order to cover the general r'e;treat ..Tho hopelessness of the enemy’s positron was now . plain. The Americans had been playing an increasingly im-;;port-nut part in the battles,, and as xTosli troops worb arriving isi I?ranee* a-t ■ tho rate of 200,000 or 250.000 a month ll wn . s that 1918 would give the Allies-an overwhelming numerical . superiority. Moreover, Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria had been.in turn shattered and driven to seek peace, leaving Gerniiiny to carry on the ..war unaided. • At the end of October she anplied for in armistice. * '