NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17926, 21 October 1918, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR.

Idle Germans aro still retreating and aro likely to bo retreating for somo little time to come. West Flanders is probably not yet quito clear of them, though there aro unofficial reports that Allied cavalry Is on the outskirts of Ghent, but it may be taken for practical purposes that the enemy’s rearguards on the northern sector are along the Lys. In Belgium, therefore, a rectangle roughly forty-fivo miles by thirty has been recovered or will have been recovered in the course of the next day or two. This, manifestly, does not represent the extent of tho territory that the Germans are abandoning. Tho Lys is not a practicable line of defence, nor is the Scheldt feasible, except as a lino on which delaying battles might bo fought. It is true that by avoiding battle until the winter has set in tho Germans might hope to stabilise an irregular series of positions and to hold it until the spring, but quite evidently it is no part of the enemy’s plan to cling lo irregular lines 1 unless they are naturally strong. In Belgium the retreat has been so rapid during tho past few days • that the Allies have lost contact with tho Germans at many points, and now that the enemy is clear of the Lille-Douai entanglement there is no reason why his withdrawal on tho northern sector should not bo accelerated.

Proof that the retreat' is being carried out in a drastic fashion is provided by the fact that the British are already in Denain, only fivo miles from Valenciennes, the movement east of Douai having become very rapid. The reason for this is doubtless to be found in the new offensive of tho British and Americans beyond tho Selle. On the east bank of the Sello the Germans occupied hastily prepared positions in which they hoped to check tho Allied advance, partly to gain time for an orderly retreat from Douai and partly to cover tho organisation of new defensive positions on the further bank of the Oise-Sarnbre canal. It is imperative that this canal line, linking the upper Oise with tho Sambre, should be retained for tho present, because if it is lost the Germans retreating in the centre will find themselves crowded back on lines of communication that are already badly congested. They are losing no time in getting back, of course, but there is a limit to tho capacity of roads and railways, and in these days when . armies carry with them an enormous amount of material the blocking of a road is liable to be a very serious matter.

Tho attacks by the British and Americans south-east and east of Le Gateau have now cleared the temporary trench lino occupied by the enemy, and tho Allies are along the west bank of the Oise-Sambre canal The success is obviously important. The Germans themselves showed their appreciation of the critical value of the defence on this sector by concentrating there an unusual number of divisions on a narrow front, their function being to cover the canal line. This was the sector, of course, on which the German front had twice been broken, and the enemy was not disposed to permit another break-through. A retreat ol twelve or fourteen miles from Douai has relieved them from immediate anxiety for the safety of the divisions north 01 Lo Gateau, hut to tho south they have still a great body of troops involved between the Oise and tho Serve, and

Aisne, and tho importance of tho OiseSambre lino is, that it covers the lines of communication of tho German centre. Tbc Germans aro said to be carrying out their retreat in good order, but it is obvious that they are being hard pressed on tho flanks. That, of course, is the meaning of tho intense fighting on the Le Gateau sector and on tho American front between 1 tho Mouso and tho Aisne.

Railway junctions on which the Gormans used to depend for the maintenance of wide sectors aro falling automatically into tho hands of the Allies now. Tournai and Valenciennes will both shortly bo occupied. Ghent cannot long bo retained by tho enemy. Ath and Mons seem bound lo fall to tho British in the not distant future. This vast movement of tho armies, which is now rapidly freeing northern Franco from the invader, commenced with tho French attack between the Aisne and tho Marne in July, so that it would bo almost literally correct to say that tho war. in France began and ended with a battle of the Marne. But the expulsion of the-enemy has been, in the main, the work of the British. Tho offensives of the Fourth and Third Armies in August broke through the German front, compelling tho great retreat from Montdidier, Amiens and Albert. The Germans were never allowed to halt. Tho Australians on the Somme and tho Canadians on tho Senseo led tho alternating thrusts, compelling the enemy to fall back constantly, sometimes rapidly, sometimes slowly, but always to fall back. When the Hindenburg lino was broken, first in the north, then in tho south, what had previously been a German front became a German flank, a flank threatened with envelopment, and tho Germans took tho only possiblo course in ordering a general retreat.

One can only guess where that retreat will end. The present indications .are that tho enemy will rest a flank on tho Meuse north of Verdun and will pivot on that point, swinging back his centre and his right'wing until the lino follows the course of the Meuse as far as Namur and then rests on Brussels, with the right flank on Antwerp. That is a sound line of defence from most points of view. There aro reports that tho enemy is. preparing to evacuate Brussels, and if that is his intention he may carry his retreat ,in Belgium back to the Meuse at Liege. But there is no definite promise of that at the moment. His army has been badly bustled and lie has lost heavily, but ho is shortening his front as ho retreats, and it is quite likely that when he reaches tho Aleuse-Ant-werp lino he will havo a strongly held barrier, with possibly half a million men in reserve. The retreat from -Montdidier and tho Marne will have reduced his front by perhaps a hundred miles, so that tho estimate of half a million men withdrawn into reserve cannot bo regarded as excessive. It is true that tho Allied front vviil bo correspondingly reduced, but it is not an advantage to the Allies, with their armies actually expanding, to have to operate on a restricted front. It will bo time enough to discuss that question, however, when tho Germans have halted.