THE CAMPAIGNS.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17861, 6 August 1918, Page 4

THE CAMPAIGNS.

Ihbbb are two significant messages I horn German sources in this morning's Inews. The first is the admission of von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff to German journalists that the scheme | of the enemy's. offensive had failed. ,'Von Hindenburg is reported to have ! claimed, however, that the Germans 'afemain masters of the situation. The second message is the candid «and even pessimistic comment of tho '.'Frankfurter Zeitung." Th 6 "Zeitung" is not an organ of the military party, of course, and its consistent desire for peace by negotiation, even to the ex,tent of an adjustment of boundaries lan the west, may have led it to take 'to unusually gloomy view of the Ger'toan prospects, but its patriotism Would not have permitted so candid a ieomment unless it had been convinced jibat the position was bad and was jJikely to become worse. It is true, ,'to an extent, that the Germans rc'main masters of the situation in the JiWestern theatre, because they can still dictate the character of the campaign, •«ven though they can no longer hope "for a decision in .their favour. The fretreat from tho Maine, involving as ■it does a drastic shortening of the front, jiwjll immediately release a number of s idfivisaotis from service in the front iSine, and by extending the process, pay, between tho Oiso and Arras, an[othor large body of troops could be from the trenches to tho 'general reserve. Tt is obvious that in this way it is still possible for the ; enemy to build up a considerable imobil© reserve, and the fact that he is ; operating on interior lines gives him [always the chance of delivering a surprise attack. It would bo a desperate gamble to commit his reserves to another battle on a great scale, but we (cannot be sure that the attempt will j-aot be mad'e. The worst feature of !tho situation from the enemy's point jef view is undoubtedly the rate at J which his best troops have been used : up. These oannot conceivably be replaced by troops as efficient, and even [ if, by a drastic contraction of tho I front, it were possible for tho enemy [to accumulate a mobile reserve of fifty 'divisions its quality would be far ! below that of the shock divisions that learned out the big drive in March. I The def Vat the Germans have just 'suffered south of the Aisne was 1 particularly disastrous from this point of view. No fewer than twenty-five divisions from the reserve must have been sont into the salient in the 'desperate attempt to savo the situation, and they ~ suffered enormous 'losses, and it k» stated confidently that i at the moment the enemy has only bfcwenty fresh divisions left. On the

other hand the Allies havo a steadily increasing reserve of tho finest material, and the " Frankfurter Zeitung's" pessimism regarding next year's campaign Sis therefore amply justified. The operations call for no special comment. Tho Germans have retreated beyond the Vesle and apparently do not intend to make a serious stand south of the Aisne, though rearguard actions are likely to bo fought on the north hank of tho Vesle. Tito minor enemy withdrawals are reported, for he has given up unsatisfactory positions west of the Ancre and has also abandoned his lin&3 west of the Avre, where the.recent French success had left tho Germans in two small precarious salients.