NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17702, 31 January 1918, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR.

One is brought at length into touch with the facts of the American achievement with the report that some seventy thousand .troops are being dispatched each month to France. Before tho war it used to be estimated that 170,000 tons gross were required for tho transport of a division, with all equipment, oversea, and on tho same basis one would say that not less than hall a million tons gross would be required for the transport of the 70,000 American troops per month. A more recent estimate, for infantry alone, is three tons per man, so that the transport of 70,000 troops across the Atlantic, apart from stores and impedimenta, would necessitate tho employment of over 200,000 tons of shipping- This estimate, it is pointed out, is under the mark, because for practical purposes a deduction of 40 per cent ought to be made from the gross tonnage available. On the other hand, special loading experience with vessels of a suitable type has shown that for tho Atlantio voyage the nominal capacity of a ship may be exceeded to aa great an extent as 30 per cent, without eeri-

ously interfering with tho comfort of the men. All such estimates, however, are approximations, and their value lies in the indication they afford of the enormous amount of shipping that is required for the transport of large bodies of,troops. If the American authorities have boon able to select the more suitable ships for transport purposes they could exceed the nominal carrying capacity safely, and in view of tho concentration of shipping in the north Atlantic it is to be assumed that such a selection could be made.

The authority for the present report is not staled, but possibly the figure quoted in the cable message was given out officially. It refers to the present rate at which troops are being transported, not to the averago rate since the transfer of the first two divisions. In six months of tliis year, assuming that tlia rate is not accelerated, about half a million men should be transferred to France, including those sent across last year. Mr Baker’s anticipation that a million and a half would he sent across the ocean by tho end of the present year implies, therefore, a very marked increase in the rate. And tho citation of such figures is likely to create quite a wrong impression in regard to the assistance that the Americans will be giving in the field, because only a proportion of the formations can bo regarded as trained, and tho untrained men must remain in the depots and training camps until their preliminary drilling is complete. There is a vast difference between the training of men to fill gaps in existing formations at the front, and the training of entirely new formations. In tho one case the armies have their staffs complete. Every platoon lias its officers and noncoms. already trained in the business of war, and tho reinforcements settle down into their places in the ranks by the side of experienced men. In the other staffs and company and platoon officers may be untried, and it is far more diffioult to train officers than to train privates.

The meaning of the reports now being published is just that tho American authorities aro determined to train their new armies as far as possible in the atmosphere of war. Some of tho formations that reach Franco tliis month may not be sent into the firing line until January of next year. They may be needed earlier, but unless there is an imperative call, neither American 'nor French military authorities would desire to run unnecessary risks by rushing partly traiaed troops prematurely into the trenches. The presence of these troops in Franco will not be without influence on the course of the campaign, because the numbers of men in depots must always bo taken into consideration, and the Germans will have to plan on tho assumption that on a given date some 6ix hundred thousand or seven hundred thousand American troops will ho available to relievo a corresponding number of Frenchmen or as reserves for offensive or defensive operations- The day when there null bo as many as half a million Americans in the firing line in France is not very near, and it would be folly to imagine that a huge American army will be immediately available.

Unexpectedly there has been heavy fighting on the Italian front, the .Italians having launched a vigorous local offensive east of Asiago, on both sides of the Frenzela valley, and they claim to have carried Uf-cful mountain positions. Obviously the purpose of this attack was to vocover portions of the ground that were lost in the tremendous fighting of the first week in DecemberIt was then that the Italians had to evacuate Sisemol and to allow’ the enemy access to the head of the Frenzela valley. Undoubtedly the general Italian position between Asiago and the Brenta was seriously -weakened by this withdrawal, and the efforts now being made to recover the lost linos aim really at the improvement of the defensive organisation. A month earlier Boriani’s gallant brigades had defended the advanced positions on Meletta and Castel Gomberto until they were utterly exhausted, and gradually they had fallen back to a line that covered the approach to the Frenzela valley and had the advantage of regularity that the old line lacked. Then came tho, December assault, and in the course of three or four days tho enemy captured tho heights commanding the upper Frenzela valley and were threatening a genera] descent on the right bank of the Brenta.

In a vivid account of the fighting in this region Mr Percival Gibbon has described how the Melctta salient was lost, early in November, and how Boriani had recovered all the essential advanced positions. It seemed then that the Italian situation on the Asiago plateau was tolerably secure, and the abandonment of theso advanced posts, which w'ere known to bo powerfully organised, was unexplained at the time. The truth, it now appears, was that Boriani could not hold the pronounced salient under tho tremendous Austrian pressure, and ho decided to widen the sa'liient if that were possible. He attacked gallantly, but was overwhelmed by superior numbers, and by the end of November he had withdrawn on a ten miles front to the positions that were lost in the December struggle. Singularly little of the story of tho fighting in the mountains during November and December was told in tho cable messages, and even the dispatches of tho correspondents are far from complete, but enough is known now to show that tho Austi finis and Germans put their whole weight into the effort to reach the plains, and that tho achievement of the Italians in preventing them was one of the finest expositions of tenacity of tho whole campaign, whilo it was also, of course, of enormous importance in that it definitely stopped the invasion of Italy-