NOTES ON-THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17274, 15 September 1916, Page 4

NOTES ON-THE WAR.

On T, v +V Frp«ert t'-oons np«"m- ---*•! *b-> r>ff<vnc : v a ncrn?T) on t''P front of .".♦ber mor* trrn tbrec miVs bptweon Oomb'es and t>P SonrniP *»nd swept for-wi-d to the Pprrmn"-Baomrme main -nod. which th"v proved. Tn'the cpntre f he vi'lbte of was captured. Briefly, the effcrt of this movement has been to ndvneo the Allied line north of the Somme until it apnroximnHv conforms with tint to thp couth. Tbe northern half of the eomoMe saPent, however, is now eonsiderablv larper than the southern part, and whereas it was only on a very narrow front—perrnps three-ouarters of n Trl*"—thai the iilt'mnt" rush was made towards Peronne in July, the front of tho present advance, as already ftnted. is rnori* than three miles. Rancourt is nn the B-»niume road, nearly five miles north of Peronne, and apparently the French hold fully three miles of the road. Feuillaucourt, a little village on ►he Tortille stream, about a mile and a half east of Olery and the same distance north-west of Peronne, is under attack, and the ind ; cations are that there w : ll be plenty of hot fightincr before tbe attackers are able to reach the outskirts of tho town.

But impressive and important as tho capture of Peronne would bo, the Allies nerd not proceed at onec to tho assault. They have developed a great salient north and south of the Somme, and it is possible that they will now leave Peronne on their right, just as temporarily they have left Combles on their left, and push east across tho Papaume road. It is important to remember that this eastern push is giving them a long front to the north, and if they elect to change the face of their offensive it will no longer bo a case of attacking on a front of three or four miles, with tho prospect of causing a, small change in tho enemy's positions. Sooner or later they will sweep north, attacking the southern flan.': of tho German salient between Combles and Arras, and when that happens the new offensive front will exceed ten miles. Tho consequent rectification of tbo German

front would givo the Allies possession of Bopriirno. and the continuation of tho offensivo would ultimately, though tardily, cause the evacuation of still more important positions.

Simultaneously tho front south of tho Somme would be affected, and if tln« French and British pursued their plan along the present lines the rectification would extend from Arras to No von on the Oiso. This result would be variable in itself, of cours". but it would hove one disadvantage frnin the A'lrd point of.view, because while it wou'd expel the Germans from a cons'dcrable extent of country, it would also enable the enemy to shorten hi* front. Aecord'nc to all the authorities, the enemy will have to adopt that course as the pressure cont : nncs. but there is no reason why he should bo permitted to do it by eonparativcly cosy stages, if, by a extra effort. tlio Allies can compel him to carry cut a sudden and drastic shortening. The suggestion that follows from this argument \s that instead of abandoning the c-.stcrly movement and aiming merclv at o rret : fict ; on or of Hie line between Arras and Peronne, the Alh'es should drive their wedge deeper and deeper ; nto the enemy's lines, past P-Tonne to St QucTt'n prd rast St. otrnt : n to the Oise. Monnwlrlp there will bo heavy fighting on the flpnks. of course, because as the wedge goes deeper the pressure on the sides automatically increases. And the enemy's l : nes rnrt he remforerd if they are to ho'd together under the pressure, drawing men and guns from other sectors. There will be a stage at which this process must stop, either through lack of driving power behind the wedge, or through lack of supports on the enemy's side. If it is the enemy that weakens first there "ill be ,a rervd "rectification " of the lines on either flank.

It may be asked why the Germans do not shorten their lines now and avoid the more serious troubles fiat will como to tlieni later. The first reason is that the enemy is now in positions that have been prepared and perfected during nearly two years of trench warfare. Ho probe.bly had ccond and third systems of defensive lines in tho rear, but they are not of the same strength as the first and they aro not as complete. Moreover, in breaking away from his first system, he is liable to suffer sharp losses, and he necessarily invites a general attackfor on the first sign of such a movement tho Allies would open a genera! bombardment and . would follow it by infantry assaults to "contain" him or fix him to his positions. Then th n very fact that he retreated would discourage his own men and hearten the Allies, and tho' moral effect would therefore be serious. There is another very good rc-ason why tho Germans should not bo in a hurry to morten their front. They are probably not yet convinced that that course will bo neoessary. It is pos sibk to carry on trench warfare in very irregular lines, and von Gallwitz may bo of opinion that lie will be able to check the Allied attacks before the necessity for a retreat becomes imperative ; or he may believe that the offensive will exhaust itself.

At a reasonable computation the \llied offensive since the beginning ol July has added seven miles to the length of tho front between Thiepval and Chaulncs. One does not know what concentration of men is being used by the Allies in tho offensive, but it may reach ten rides to the yard, ■ounting the necessary reserves, and the extension of tho front may thus have necessitated the transfer of at least three corps to the Sommo sectors. Tho Germans would have to .•cply with a similar concentration, because a front that is .attacked has to bo defended, and the defence cannot bo made merely by stretching an attenuated line. It is true that the attack requires a greater force than will suffice for the defence, but the .Method of the Allied offensive has been economical, for the preparatory work has been thoroughly done by the gunsConsequently the Germans would need al.uost as many reinforcements as the Allies, and if they hope to check the iffensive they will need more. It is probable that the Allies have drawn troops from other sectors for the fig'ting. but they would take the veterans. Tilling the places with new troops. The question of interest is what the Germans are doing, and how they are replacing the men that they have had to draw from other portions of the front.

It is a safe guess that there are now <ome very thin pieces of the Gorman front in France, and that is one reason why it is reasonable to expect .hat tbe Allies will continue the on-, largement of the salient. They have 'ho men and the guns now, and as sured of their superiority in thoso im portant resprcts they are likely to proceed with the stretching of the enemy's front, in the hope that n Tronic will shortly occur. The Allie nay have other pians, but this lookto be tho suro method, even if the results are slow in coming. The Germans, no doubt, will devote theii mcrgies mainly to the strengthening >f their points d'anpm, Thicpval, Coin hies, Peronno and Cliaulnes. but every .in.* of these places is under bombard;nent—Peronne by <'<o long range artillery— and three of them can be captured whenever the Allies aie propared to pay the price.