NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17251, 19 August 1916, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR.

The hint of an American correspondent with the German armies that a great and mysterious commander was directing the enemy’s defence .in the Somme region was doubtless intended to stimulate speculation as to the general’s identity. The obvious guess, in the circumstances, is that von Mackeusen has been given new employment. Tho suggestion, which was advanced a day or two ago in this journal, comes also from the military correspondent of the, London “Times,” but there is no reason to accept it as definite. It happens that von Mackensen has been “in reserve” since the invasion of Serbia, though from time to time the correspondents have professed to discover him elsewhere. He was supposed to be in Galicia in January, and a littlo later there was a story that ho .had appeared in Alsace. In March neutral journals that derive tliedr inspiration on occasion from official German sources, surmised that he was, in reality, superintending the German offensive on the western front. A Swiss newspaper, for instance, has been quoted as saying that his hand could he seen in the preparation for tho attack on Verdun, and that he supervised the plans for that great offensive, though the immediate execution of them was entrusted to tho group commander. v

So brilliant and popular a fighter was not at all likely to bo allowed to rest. In the regular course he' should havo been on the Russian front when Brussiloff opened his great offensive, but there has been no suggestion that ho was oven in the eastern zone. Von Linsingon had to repair the broach in BoehnvEnnotli’s front, and more recently yon Hindenburg’s oommand has been extended to tho northern border of Galicia. Von Mackensen certainlyvisited Constantinople to examine the condition of the Turkish armies and no doubt ho lent Bulgaria hia advice. According to still another story he visited 'the Trontino front and examined the plans for tho great Austrian attack on tho Italian plateaux,. but whotkor he

was at Trent when tho invasion commenced is not stated. It is hot improbable that he would he given command or the sectors threatened by the Franco-British offensive, because of all the enemy leaders lie has the highest reputation as a tactician.

If von Mackensen is actually on the Somme there will he an abundance of bloody fighting. His efforts to reach Warsaw in the earlier campaign in Poland proved that he drove his infantry without mercy. It was ho who developed tiio wave system of infantry attack until the waves became successive attacks in dense formation. When three rifles to the yard had been mentioned as a desirable attacking concentration he asked for eight-, and then refused to movo until ho had ten. German character sketches of him declare that lie is a man of the kindest heart; but against that view may be quoted the statement of Germnn prisoners captured in Poland, that “ Mackensen’s front line meant certain death.” “ You can make a parapet of corpses,” is a remark attributed to tho fieldmarshal, in reply to a subordinate’s observation as to tho lack of cover l on tho ground of a contemplated advance. And actually tho Germans did make parapets of corpses in tho fighting on the Bzura and Rawka, when attacks wero dolivered in formations sometimes twenty men deep.

It was in this struggle on the Bzura and Rawka that von Mackensen first revealod his skill in tho employment of massed artillery. Of course the concentration in Galicia in the spring of last year was on a much greater scale, and consequently it attracted tho more marked attention. But as an artillery preparation for battlo tho preliminary bombardment of the Russian positions in February was sufficiently terrible and effective. It was begun on a wide front, was maintained for a couple of days generally, and led up to a night’s special bombardment of tho positions against which the infantry attack was to bo hurled. It was the more impressive because tho Russians had no similar concentration of guns at their command. Tho attack failed because the preparation, effective as it was against even three lines of trenches, did not reach tho main Russian lines, and tho German infantry, exhausted by its efforts —the battlo was fought in a snowstorm—was overwhelmed in the counter-attack. In less than a week of fighting von Mackensen sacrificed something like 50,000 out of 150,000 men, most of them, in the initial attack and th© immediate oounter-attack. •It was in this. battle that, to quote Mr .Buchan, “around Borzymov the slaughter was so great that the German dead formed the material for redoubts and embrasures.”

There was a brief cabled reference last month to the employment of British cavalry in tlio battlo north of the Somme, this being the first occasion on which tho British mounted men wero given tho opportunity to distinguish themselves in the open since tho commencement of the war in the trenches. Of course mounted divisions had to be put in the trenches in tho early •'part of tho war, as when they gallantly held a section of the front at Ypres against enormous odds. There wore cavalry in reserve at Nouve Chapeilo and again at Loos, but they had no opportunity to got into tho action. The French, however, had used cavalry in tho Champagne fighting in September, and thero was thus a precedent for, tho appearance of the British cavalry on the field- of battle. Some interesting particulars of the work of the cavalry east of Albert are now available.

Reuter’s correspondent at the British headquarters says that the Deccan Light Horse and the Dragoon Guards started early on the morning of July 14 to patrol, reconnoitre and cooperate in covering tho, flanks of the attacking infantry. The men in the trenches cheered to the echo as the troopers clattered past-. Their route lay threragh a perfect morass of ground, covered by craters, disusedtrenches and wrecked entanglements. The Germans spotted them between Bazentin and Mametz, and opened fire with guns and machine-guns, but the casualties apiong the cavalry were few aa the ranks opened. Some of the men dismounted and poured a heavy fire on the machine-gun emplacement with very effective results. A British monoplane .assisted the cavalry in tho pluckiest manner.' When they were fusilladed from a deuse copse, the monoplane swooped down to within 300 feet of the horsemen. It encircled the copse four times till it had emptied all tho drums of its machine gun and then soared up after signalling the enemy’s positions. The Deccans then rode hard at the grassy bank, from which a desultory fusillade was still being kept up, with the result that eight Germans emerged- howling for mercy. They clung to the horses’ legs till tho infantry came up and captured them. The cavalrymen, never -losing touch with the infantry,, rod© right at the last new Goman trench, which was deserted, except for some few machine gunners. . The opportunity for a charge came near Flers. 1’ rom behind waving corn came the crackle of small arms and half a troop each of Dragoons and Deccans, riding in advance in extended order, the former with lances ,and the latter with sabres, trotting sharply, wero ordered to charge.. “It was like a polo .field dash,” • said one officer, “only the men ware too grim to cheer. We stuck fifteen- to twenty of the beggars, while thirty more threw up their hands. It was a decent little show; a pity it was not bigger.” The cavalrymen were withdrawn at dusk to help the infantry to consolidate the poistions won.