NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17250, 18 August 1916, Page 6

NOTES ON THE WAR.

If the impression existed that the Allied offensive in the region of the Somme was exhausted, it should be removed by to-day’s news. The French army north of the river, with the support of the British on its left, attacked apparently along the whole fiout. North of Maurepas trenches were taken on a front of about a mile, and as the line was apparently irregular it may bo assumed that tho effect has been to rectify it. While tho British are stationary at Guillemont, tho normal French front, having regard to the position south of the river, should run south-east through Maurepas and Clery to Buseourfc. on the Somme, and’ this is approximately the position now reached. at least north of Clery. Tho completion of the occupation of Maurepas and an advance to Clery would seem to bo the next movements to be undertaken, but in view of the method of tho offensive there. is no reason why the attaoks should bo confined’ to these particular portions of the front. Tire British have been pausing at Guillemont, where the Germans have strengthened their position by heroic measures, but the tactios that reduced Fricourt in the first stage of the offensive can be repeated when the time is ripe.

South, of Maurepas tho French are attaining a remarkably strong position, for they are now across the MaurepasOlery road, and must be progressing on the 'slope towards Hill lOfl, the crest of which is little more than a mile north of Clery. Nothing in the shape of a break-through is being attempted, and it is obvious that the Allies are working deliberately to widen their salient, beforo opening.a now offensive on a grand scale. It has been proved repeatedly in this long war in tho trenches that a break on a narrow front is possible, hut not profitable. The sacrifice of men involved is out of proportion to the results'obtained, and as the enemy can easily close the gap the new position is virtually tho 6amo as the old one, and tho work has to be commenced again. But in the present offensive the Allies are carefully conserving their human resources and are relying #n the artillery to drive out the enemy,

so that the cost of an advance is little more than tho cost of holding the ground gained while the gains are being consolidated. The purpose is tho improvement of the tactical position, and' each small advance brings tlio Allies nearer tho desired lino. All tho time, moreover, they are threatening a greater movement, and may thus bo preparing tho way for operations on quite other sectors. The advance south of the Somme, south of Belloy, has tho samo purpose as that north of tho river. Belloy is on tho flank of tho salient, on the Soyeeourt-Barlcux road, and tho latest progress brings tho French front very close to a group of villages near tho Cliaulnes-Pcronno main road and on the edgo of the plateau behind Chaulnes. Tho Chnulnes-Pcronno railway is still nearly two miles away.

Tho tactics of the French in their advanco are apparently tho samo as those adopted- successfully by tho Australians at Poziorcs, though tho attack was delivered on a four-milo front. Tho strength of tho enemy’s now defences is partly responsible for tho slow method's of the Allies, hut. tho immediate advantage of tho system is its low cost. The ndvanca is stopped before tho now front can becomo irregular. The isolation of small parties of men is prevented, support is always at hand and no dangerous little salients result. Tho infantry is always protected ,l>y the curtain firo of the guns, and is thus able to repair and fortify tho new trenches with the minimum of wastage. Heavy forces are not required for tliQ work, bocauso as the rush is a short ono and as tho path is beaten by tho guns, no great weight of men is needed. The losses inflicted on the enemy aro at least equal to those suffered by tho attackers and may bo much larger, so that while tho fighting is purely positional in character tho objects aimed at arc cheaply obtained.

The report given in tho “ Petit Parisien ” that tho British have captured Mouquet Farm is not officially confirmed, and as tho position is one of some importance the absence of the official statement must be taken to mean that the French journal is in error. Mouquet Farm is about midway between .Thiepval and Pozieres, a little to the north of tho road between those two villages. It is rather more than a mile from Courceletto and is almost due east of Thiopval. Being on the higher ground behind Thiepval it lent itself to fortification, and was converted by the Germans into an exceedingly strong work. Hill 152, immediately to the north of the farm, is part of the crest of tho main ridge. There must have been some shnrp fighting at this point, but if the British had held the farm tho fact would have been recorded. However, to the immediate right the wholo of tho trenches lost in a recent German counter-attack were recovered, and it would appear that a concerted attack on Courcolette and Martinpuich, an 4 probably an attack on Thiepval, may bo looked for in tho near future. The roports concerning the position at the High Wood, on the eastern flank of this sector, suggest that tho Germans arc posted there in great strength, so that it may "not be possible to support the push northwards which seems to bo in preparation by a simultaneous advance towards Flers.

Tho important sector of the Italian front is not now that east of Gorizia, because the comparatively narrow front of the advanco north of the Vippacco limits its possibilities. The Austrians rallied on the heights three or four miles east of the town, and as tho Italians could not at once bring their artillery into action across the river the enemy probably had time to consolidate now defences well in advance of the Ternova-Vogersko line which was indicated in earlier messages ns being under attack. In the Vippacco valley, however, the Italians i-ushed on to Dornberg, and the position in that region is still obscure, though there is reason to believe that’ only advanced parties occupied Prevacina and Dornberg. South of the Vippacco, on the Carso plateau, tho new position is already defining itself on the anticipated lines. It is clear that the capture of tlio enemy positions on Monte San Michele was followed by a pronounced collapse of the Austrians on the Doberdo plateau, and it was only the existence of secondary positions on the heights to the east that delayed the Italian rush and enabled tho enemy to rally. The actual depth of the Italian advance is shown to be at least four miles, because the attacks are now being delivered against Hoight 291, described in the cable message as Monte Precinka, a mile and a half beyond Oppacchiasella. Prccinka is itself only the advanced position, covering the main lino of resistance, of which the centre is Mrdajti, or Height 432, a mil© and a half further east.