THE CAMPAIGNS.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17199, 20 June 1916, Page 6

THE CAMPAIGNS.

Tire effect of the fall of Czernowitz on tho Galician campaign cannot bo estimated at all confidently, bocnus© wo havo no hint of tho strength of the enemy in the Bukowina. The point is manorial. General Leshitsky should be able to advance between, tho Dniester and the Pruth, and although he is likely to encounter opposition when he reaches the Sniatyn-Zaleszcziki road, ho will be able to co-operate with the Russians to tho north of tho Dniester, and tho capture of Zaleszsziki would nppear to bo tho natural sequel to the capture of Czernowitz. So far as our present information goes the success on tho Pruth seems to havo led to no very important captures ot" men and material, and it is therefore to be inferred that tho • Austrians retreated south. Leshitsky will endeavour to prevent them reach Kolomca, where the enemy is bound to be holding important forces to guard the oilfields, and mo necessity for operating south of the l'ruth may delay his advance westward. Hut if the Austrian army in ihe Bukowina is only a weak one, Leshits&y will be' in no anxiety concerning his loft flank, and wo may hear of im-

portant progress in the course of a few days. Concerning the rest of the front we have little fresh news, but we may look for the rallying of tho enemy with reinforcements hurried to Kovel and Sokal. Stubborn fighting continues on the middle Strypa. There is no report from the northern armies. Tho struggle north of Verdun is once more intense, tho uermans attacking strongly on both sides of tho Mouse. In view of the Russian offensive we should expect tho enemy to renew hi? efforts to secure a marked success in tho western theatre, and it will come as no surprise to find that the assaults on the Verdun fronf are pushed wit greater frequency than ever. If i J is true that Gorman divisions from th< western theatre havo made their appearance in Volhynia we shall be justified in assuming that tho enemy has no important reserves at his disposal either in Germany, or in the eastern theatre, and in those circumstances it would be all tho more necessary from his point of view to inflict a crushing defeat on the K'rench. There can bo no doubc that whatever reserves were available wore sent to Verdun and Flanders in the spring, and if new formations havo been organised for the eastern theatre they would almost cortainly be sent to strengthen von Hindenburg's inevitable offensive agains\ the Dvina line. These are the conditions under which we should look for a quickening of tho Allied efforts in all theatres, not necessarily to the extent of opening a big'offensive but at least to the extent of preventing the diversion of enemy troops. It may be contended, of course, that the French are already sufficiently occupied wit!: the defence of Verdun and the Italians with the fighting in the Lessine Alps, but in neither caso is an energetic local activity out of the question. The British front is quiet, hut i n the circumstances it can handy continue so, and in making that comment we do not forgot strong evidence that the Allied General Staff has imposed on thBritish armies a severe policy of restraint.