NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17198, 19 June 1916, Page 6

NOTES ON THE WAR.

Tho positions now held by the Italians in the Adigo Valley and on tho Asiago Plateau are gradually being defined as tho various local operations are mentioned in the communique, and it is possible to estimate fairly accurately the extent of the Italian 10treat. In tho Lagarina Valley, down which flows tho Adigo, tho loss of ground is not great, comparatively speaking. The advanced front has beou withdrawn from Mori—tho railway junction for Riva—to Serravalle, a distance, roughly, of four miles. And the same average loss of ground seems to have occurred from tho Adige to the Col Santo, just north of Monto Pasubio. The loss of Zugna Torta was, perhaps, tho most serious blow on this sector, for it deprived tho Italians of a most useful height overlooking Rovereto and dominating tho Vallarsa. Tho new defensive front is established on the northorn slope of tho Coni Zunga,

tho crest of which is probably 1800 ft higher than Zugna Torta.

The crest of tho Col Santo is probably in Austrian bands, for otherwise it is difficult to see how tho enemy could have maintained his rush into the Posiua Valley, which, of course, is south of the frontier. It was in this valley that the Italians were slowest to rally, and the result was the loss of Arsicro, at the confluence of the Posina and tho Astieo. At this point tho line must have come back ton or twelve miles. East of tho Astieo, rising to tho Altipiano dei Sctte Communi, the lino lies north-east, passing Asiago at a distance of seven miles from tho border and meeting the frontier again in tho vicinity of Mnrcosina, a m.ilo or two west of the Hrenta. A circle with Trent as centre and a radius of about twenty miles would include nearly all the Italian territory occupied by the Austrians. The twentymilo radius would fall short of Arsicro, but on tho other hand it would include a mile or two in tho Adige Valley held by the Italians. To bo precise, the Italians aro less than oigliteen miles from Trent on the Adige, and they are rather more than twenty miles from Trent on tho Asiago Plateau.

Tho communiques relating to the mountain fighting do not convey a great deal of information to tho reader, because for tho most part tho positions affected by local fighting are not to l>o found on any of tho maps available. On the western front farms and small hills have acquired an extraordinary fame, duo to their importance in the positional fighting, and so it is in tho mountains on tho Italian front. There is a track that leads north from Asiago right up to the frontier, where heights ranging from 4500 ft to 6000 ft look down steeply into tho valley of tho upper Brenta. Rest-houses and inns, large and small, but for the most part small, aro to bo found wherever there is a track, and these not infrequently lend their names to tho positions for which the opposing forces are fighting. To-day, for instance, it is reported that tho Italian right wing—tho wing holding tho valley of tho Brenta and the neighbouring hills—captured positions, at Marcosina. Marccsina is a mere inn, on a frontier saddle, standing a littlo way to tho right of the track from Asiago. Malga Fossetta, another of tho positions mentioned. marks the termination of tho formed path and tho beginning of the foot track across tho frontier ridge.

It is so long sinco there was any fighting of consequence in tho Thann region that the reader has probably forgotten tho position there. Indeed, sinco the great struggle for possession of Stoinbach, on tho lower slopes of tho Vosges, aboroC'ornay or Sennheim, thero has boon no indication that war was raging in the neighbourhood. Two or three miles to tho north, on Ilartmaiinsweilerkopf, however, a battle of the utmost violence raged, and periodically ono sido or tho other assumes tho offensive on that important height. To-day there is news of a French raid on tho German trenches on Hill 425, which is immediately south of Steinbach. It looks as if tho French caught tho enemy napping, raided tho trendies, which wore found to bo very weakly hold, and, on tho arrival of tho enemy'« reserves, returned to their own trenches virtually without loss. Hill 420 is about a milo west of Cernay, just above the little village of Enchenberg.

The French claim that the railway station at Vigneulles, the German headquarters in tho St Mihiel salient, was set on fire by a big shell, gives point to a statement made to an American interviewer by M. Albert Thomas, tho French Minister of Munitions. M. Thomas was asked to say something concerning tho artillery, and apparently some reference was made to the new French heavy howitzers. “ All I can authorise you to say about the 400 mm. guns (15.7 inch), is that some are actually at the disposal of tho Commandcr-in-Chief in the zone of the armies,” the Minister observed cautiously. Then he added briskly: “Tt is an exaggeration to say that the Germans uso guns of a greater calibre than 210 in artillery preparation against the trenehos or in opon field fighting; 305, about which so much has been written, is much too cumbersome for operations other than against forts like Dounumont and Vaux. We have no evidence of any German quickfiring heavy gun—if they have one its effects haven’t been noticed—but it is a fact that they have largely discarded their 77 field-gun, although we are using our 75’s to an ever-increasing extent."

“ I consider the 75 still the finest artillery Arm of this war from the standpoint of scientific precision and perfection,” M. Thomas declared. ‘‘ In comparing the French and German ordnance ono must not forget that our shells contain a far higher proportion of explosive. For instance, our 75 shell has as much as their 150, and our 155 is equal to their 210. Apart from its other aspects, the battle of Verdun has been unprecedented as a gunnery combat, and the German effort has been, and still is, simply colossal. In no previous bnttle have batteries on both sides suffoied moio from direct shell-fire of their adversary. Tho Germans had tho superiority at the start, but we’ve caught up with them and yet been ablo to keep many heavy guns in reserve. As regards ammunition, wo were obliged iu tho early days of the offensivo to draw on our reserve stock, but wo have since been ablo not only to make up tho depletion, hut evon add to the reserve. This means that wo are ablo to meet all the Verdun requirements in shells by our daily production, and at the same time our reserve is mounting daily.”