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NOTES ON THE WAR.

The capture of Erzerum has set the correspondents speculating as to the future course of the campaign in Armenia, but it has to be confessed that most of them, are writing very much in the dark. It is suggested by one of them that the Russian advance is not likely to be checked east of Sivas. over two hundred miles away, but obviously the further the Grand Duke marches west the easier it will bo for the Turks to bring reinforcements into action and the better able they will be to prepare defensive lines. Half-way to Sivas is Erzingan. not so important a city as Erzerum, but equally important a.s a. military base, quite capable of supporting a strong defensive campaign. Like. Erzerum. it lies on a river plain, with high mountains shutting it off from the- rest of the country.' It has its own entrenched camp, its regular barracks and military establishments, factories, stores and so forth. Its altitude is nearly 3000 ft less than that of Erzerum—-3900ft as against 6700ft—but the surrounding country is broken and mountainous. The road from Krzcnim. by way of the Kara-su valley, involves difficult marching for an army, and consequently it may be doubted whether the Grand Duke would press an advance in the face of serious opposition. If the "Turkish forces have been as badly defeated as the reports suggest, however, they may be able to offer no great opposition, in which case a Bussinn march westward would have its advantages.

The Turks are bound to bar the road west, if it is at all possible, because if they permit the Russians to occupy the main passes it will be virtually impossible for them to recover Erzerum. A Russian advance of twenty or thirty miles would give the Grand Duke control of all practicable approaches lo the city. Moreover, such an advance would facilitate a movement north to Trebizond or south, to complete the envelopment of the Turks who have been fighting around Lake Van. Trebizond is always a possible objective. Evidently the Turks have been using it 'fairly freely in connection with the maintenance of their eastern forcessea transport being infinitely cheaper and much quicker than land transport —and consequently the Russian cruisers and destroyers have been very ac-

tive along the coast. Trebiznnd is difficult of access from land, but its capture would be a profitable enterprise.

British readers, of course, will look south rather than north for the continuation of the Grand Duke's campaign. But it is just as well that anticipation should not run too far ahead. The capture of lirzcrum was due to n special surprise effort, and. while the demoralisation of the opposition would permit, the Russians to develop their advance rapidly in spite of the adverse weather conditions, it is not yet certain that the Turks have been'demoralised. In any case, the, success in the centre of the Russian front does not necessarily mean that the flanks can keep pace with the advance. It is possible that the Grand Duke will endeavour to move, from Melazgerd, down the valley of the Eastern Euphrates, striking first at Mush and then marching south to Bitlis. The regular trade road from Erzerum to Bitlis runs through Mush, but the country is too broken to be attractive for military operations.

There seems to he an impression in some quarters, doubtless confirmed by quotations from optimistic. German newspapers, that, the opening of direct rail communication between Berlin and Constantinople will bring the Germans abundant supplies of articles of which they are in need, including copper and cotton. One journal mentions the oil of Mesopotamia in this connection. "Land and Water" puts this subject in a, truer perspective by quoting an interview which Herr Meissner, the engineer of the Hedjaz railway and afterwards of the Bagdad line, gave a correspondent two years ago. Speaking of the economic value of Asia Minor to Germany Herr Meissner is reported to have used these words: '"There has been far too much of a tendency in Germany and England to look upon this part of the Ottoman Empire as a great storehouse, the wealth of which would become available to the world immediately the doors were unlocked by means of railways. This is a most erroneous impression. The wealth is here, but it is potential not existent wealth, and will be won at the end of many years of patient preparation. Mesopotamia may be snipping a few foodstuffs five years from now, "but 1 do not look to see the oil of Hitt or the copper of Diarbekir figuring in the world's returns before 1.020."

On the same occasion Herr Meissner discussed the possibility of the Hedjaz line being used to facilitate an attack on Egypt.. Such an attack, ha said, would'involve "many months of preparation, including not only the laying of a light railway across the desert but the practical reconstruction— preferably the double-tracking—of the Hedjaz line to Damascus, of the French-built. line railway from Damascus to Alepp, via Raynk, and of the main trunk of the Bagdad Railway from Aleppo through Asia Minor to the Bosphorus. The completion of the tunnels of the Bagdad Railway through the Taurus' and Amanus mountains would be a. sine qua non to the success of such an expedition. These tunnels are still incomplete, but the German engineers have had a \<,xr to work on the rest of the scheme

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/LT19160221.2.35

Bibliographic details

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17097, 21 February 1916, Page 6

Word Count
906

NOTES ON THE WAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17097, 21 February 1916, Page 6

NOTES ON THE WAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17097, 21 February 1916, Page 6