NOTES ON THE WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17078, 29 January 1916, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR.

The official statement regarding the defence of London against air raids indicates that the organisation of this important service, is proceeding apace. Some little time ago it was announced that the service was being transferred from the Admiralty to the War Office, hut according to the latest declarations the transfer is not yet, complete, which presumably means that units of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service are co-operating, pending the organisation of a special squadron under the' War Office. It was not until the big raids of last year occurred that the authorities realised tho shortcomings of tho defences, and then the most that could be done was to adopt hasty improvisations. However, the problem was attacked energetically and there is reason to hope that in future the defence of tho great city will bo moro efficient.

The position was explained, not very fully, however, by Mr Balfour, in the course of a debate in the House of Commons early in November. " I quite agree that the defence of London against aircraft attack ought to be, as far as possible, a coast defence," he said. "We ought to catch the Zeppelin as he is approaching our shores. As we get moro and more of the necessary ' appliances for doing so we shall moro and more succeed in that object. We are not limiting our defence by the shore. We cannot have a ring of cruisers round these islands, but ships of war are being used as far as possible to anticipate and prevent tho attacks of Zeppelins. The defence by gun power is limited by what we have got. We are making as hard as we can aeroplanes, pilots and guns. We are behindhand. We have always been behindhand. It las never been denied. I am not responsible for it. The Admiralty have not. been supplied with all the guns they want. There are positions on ships and on land where 1 should like to have guns, but I cannot have them, because the. guns do not exist. The House must accept that as an unfortunate fact which is being remedied, and will, .1 hope, be put right in no very long time."

One of the critics had urged that the British planes should seek the Zeppelins out in their sheltering places and attack them before they could set out on raids over the sea. But Mr Balfour observed that tho Zeppelin raids had never started from Belgium. The raiders, as is well known, arc naval dirigibles and they have invariably come from northern Germany, skirting tho coast of Holland. The difficulty has been that Britain has no fleet of aeroplanes capable of carrying out an extended tour in search of Zeppelin's. Occasional raids into German territory are possible when the conditions are favourable, but the long distance flights are few and far between, and a Zeppelin shed is a small mark to hit from the sky after a flight of two or three hours.

Describing tho organisation for the defence of London. Mr Balfour indicated that it. depended mainly on tho vigilance of a number of aeroplane stations, some under the Royal Naval Air Service and some under the Royal Flying Corps. " These vstations," he said, "are'in the closest telephonic communication. Each knows exactly what is being done at the other stations. These arc flying stations, where training goes on. 1 am very much dissatisfied with the division of stations, so far as the Navy is concerned, and I am very anxious to have a much larger ; training sehool and to unify the training as far as possible in one place. 1 believe it will be a great saving of expenditure, and a great increase in efficiency. That would alter the system no doubt of these flying stations round London, but until the new system can be introduced, the flying stations are there, and they have to be used by the Army and the Navy respectively. If we are to hand over our flying stations to tho Army without having any other stations, we cannot carry on our training. I will therefore say that this division is an almost inevitable element in the present, system. 1 hope in some respects the system will improve, but I do not think all its improvements will produce a closer co-operation and «a greater harmony than now exists l>etwoen tho Naval and the Army Flying Corps engaged in this particular work. I will not enter upon the vexed questigu of whether airplanes, are the best

defence against Zeppelins or whether gunfire is the best defence. I believe the highest authorities on that again differ. It must be remembered that the experience not merely of the British Army or of the Navy, but the experience of mankind generally is exceedingly limited upon this point, and it is quite natural that great authorities should have different opinions. But as far as wo are concerned we desire to bring both to tho highest degree of perfection. "We arc doing all we can to increase the gun defences of London, and wo certainly desire to increase also tho airplane defences of London. But let the House always remember that we have been brought up constantly by this deficiency of material and of trained men. No fairy waving a wand can put that right. It can only ho put right by hard work in the, departments concerned, including, of course, tho Munitions Department. That hard work is being undertaken to the best of our ability, and such deficiencies as exist I hope will bo soon cured."

The later news localises the fighting m Artois as having occurred between Neuville and La Folio farm. Ordinarily tho precise definition of the battle area is perhaps of no consequence, but in the close trench warfare it is interesting to watch the struggle for particular points d'appui. La. Folic farm is well up towards the crest of the Vimy ridge, north-east of Neuville, and it was at this point that the French appeared to have the best prospect of capturing the German crest positions. To understand the situation, of course, one needs a respectable map, but perhaps an intelligible outline can be given. For the sake of convenience a section of the. front, approximately a down kilometres long, may be taken. Its northern limit is the village of Loos, where the British made their forward move, and the southern limit is the village of Thelusi, east of Nenyille. The two villages are about on the same meridian, and if the front were normal it would run south from Loos, between Lievin and Eleu, on the western outskirts of Lens, east of Givenchy and over the ridge at Vimy. Actually the Allied line bends sharply west, skirting the villages, of Lievin and Angres and passing between Souchez and Givenchy, at which point it is three or four kilometres west of the normal line.

The reason why the Allied front has not been "rectified" on this sector is simply that the Germans organised tremendously strong defences in the villages of Lievin, Angres. Souchez and Givenchy. and all along the ridge which runs south-east from Souchez. There are mining works all over the area, and in addition to the pits and tunnels made in time of peace the enemy has constructed miles and miles of underground worlw-the Labyrinth was a particularly elaborate system—with concrete blockhouses and machine-gun posts innumerable. Against these works /the French have striven with little success. When they drove the Germans from the plateau of Notre Dam© do Lorette, above Souchez, it was supposed that their further progress would be less difficult, but actually the task of breaking clown tho defences had to bo begun afresh.

Between Souchez and Givenchy is a hill, numbered 110, which is really Hie northern end of the Vimy ridge. The highest point, Hill 1-10, is just south of Givenchy, and many bitter fights have occurred on its slopes. South of Hill 140, again, is La Folie farm, on the western slope of the ridge, and over the crest is the village of Vimy, on the eastern side of the main road from Arras to I/ens. Extravagant anticipations have been printed of what would happen if the Allies secured possession of the ridge and the village of Vimy, but the most that can be said is that Vimy would be an invaluable point d'appui in connection with the attack on tho German salient west of Lens, and in the event of Lens itself being captured' Vimy might oven prove a sort of entrance to the Douni plain. But the real key to the position in Artois is the great group of defensive works in the villages around Lens, and the points like Loos and Thelus and Vimy have to be considered in relation to Lens. When the Germans launched their attack between La Folie and Neuville they were really endeavouring to extend their salient, and to lift the pressure from its southern flank.