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NOTES ON THE WAR.

Tt was not to be expected that the withdrawal of the Allied forces in Macedonia would be accomplished without loss, and according to a Bulgarian claim the British have already been compelled to abandon ten guns. It is evident that the British were falling back south and south-west, to Bogdanitze and Ghevgeli, on the Greek border. At Ghevgeli and Doiran they have a double lino of railway for transport to Salonika, and their position is further improved by the fact that tho two railways are connected by a branch that leaves the main north route at. Karasnlu and joins the Doiran line at Kilindrin. Possibly the British would use the Doiran line while the French kept touch with the Ghevgeli route. The actual position, however, is very obscure. Apparently the Allies held their advanced positions until they were attacked by superior forces iu front, and simultaneously, as previous reports showed, both British and French were threatened with envelopment—tho French by an AustroBulgari'an movement from the. PrilepMonastir road, and the British by a Bulgarian advance from the Struma valley. It is unlikely, however, that the, Bulgarians have any considerable force in the Struma region. Tho valley is difficult, narrowing into deep gorges, and scarcely likely to bo very serviceable at this season.

The weather was not improbably an important factor in retarding the Allied retreat when it commenced, but this movement for safety would seem to have been unduly delayed. The danger of a big enemy attack has long been threatening, and with the collapse of the Serbian resistance virtually the only reason for the maintenance of an advanced force/disappeared, so that on general grounds it would appear that the retreat should have been begun at an earlier stage. There is always tho alternative explanation, however, that preparations are being made for the serious defence of Salonika and that it was necessary to keep the Bulgarians at a distance as long as possible. It is reported that tho Allies' War Council ha.s definitely decided to defend Salonika and that troops will be hurried to the port for that purpose. Whether this is an accurate statement of the council's decision, however, remains to bo seen.

There are manifest arguments in favour of holding Salonika, if it can be done. The complete withdrawal of the Allied troops would leave Rumania and Greece both directly subject to Gorman influence. The friends of the Allies in the Balkans are at present sustained by the hope that in duo course Prance and Britain will open an" offensive campaign, and while the threat of such a movement is maintained the Central Powers will not be able to divert troops from the southeastern theatre. Moreover, the withdrawal of the Allied troops would mean tho abandonment of the Idea of a Russian movement, and with that possibility at an end there would lie a strong temptation with Rumania to make terms with the Germans. Salonika, moreover, would be a convenient port for the Central Powers. If it fell into German hands it would have to be blockaded, and once the Germans and. Austrians were installed they woidd not shift until they were driven out. It would he easier to hold it than to force another landing in face of German, Austrian and Bulgarian opposition.

The Austro-Germau movement into the Balkans has been discussed from many aspects, but there is one possibility that appears to have received little consideration. Germany needs a new recruiting ground. According to tho best available information her resources in the matter of men are Hearing the exhaustion point. From now onwards tho new levies will be barely sufficient, to make good tho wastage of war. and if the rate of casualties should be increased in the spring, ns may reasonably be expected, the crisis will be reached at a not distant date. One French critic lately affirmed, indeed, that the Germans had been using up their human material at such a rate that the wastage could not bo made good beyond May of next year, but this would seem to be an exaggeration. Germany may be looking to Bulgaria and. Turkey to provide recruits for armies operating against Russia and France, but the more pro-

bable prospect is that strenuous efforts will be made to develop offensives against Russia in the Caucasus and against Britain in Egypt, with the object of "fixing"' as many Allied troops as possible in those regions. The increase of Britain's anxieties in Egypt, in Persia, perhaps in India, tends to relieve tbo pressure on the German front in Fiance, and the relief may bo very material if tho Germans can arm. equip and train the armies of men that are said to have been already mobilised in the Turkish Empire.

Acording to reports from Rome, the Italians are busily landing troops at Avlona, on tho Albanian coast opposite Otranto. This old port, the best on the Albanian coast, lies in a fairly sheltered bay. Tt is important as the terminus of the Italian cable, linking Rome—in time of peace—to Constantinople. Cattle and sheep, oil, oats, maize and cotton are grown in the hinterland, mainly in fertilo but isolated valleys and' depressions, and these, in normal times, justify both Italian and Austrian steamers in making Avlona a port of call. Chiefly the trade inland is with the Berat district, but the practicable road up the Viosa Valley gives access to the Janina district, and it is therefore plain that the presence of Italians at Avlona cannot be entirely acceptable to Greece.

Possibly the Serbs from the southern district planned to fall back towards Avlona. in which case the Italians would have an additional reason for selecting this port. But reports suggested that Ochrida was the rallying poiuf, and the port of easiest access from Ochrida is Durazzo. A famous Roman road, the Via Egnatia, led from Durazzo up the Skumbi Valley to Ochrida, and on to Monastir and Salonika, and the Romans built by the natural routes. It is to Durazzo therefore that the Serbs from Monastir and Ochrida would press. ' The alternative road, from Monastir. through Geritza, to Berat, and so to Avlona, is longer and more difficult.

But really in Albania all routes are difficult. Russian engineers planned a railway from San Giovanni di Medua up tho Drin valley to Prisrend and on to Nish. and a preliminary survey was made of the route. It was found that a bridge of 250 feet on the average would have to be constructed every 6000 yards and a tunnel of 450 feet every 1800 yards, so that as a commercial undertaking the idea was dismissed as quite impracticable. But it gives one an idea of the character of tho countrv. Tho Italians have talked of another "commercial" lino, starting from Durazzo, and paying the Roman engineers the compliment of following the route they selected Tor their ancient road. They proposed to reach Avlona, of course, but it is significant that the best scheme they could devise nrovided for a branch striking south along tho coast, -thus leaving Durazzo, with its inferior port, the principal terminus.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/LT19151213.2.33

Bibliographic details

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVI, Issue 17038, 13 December 1915, Page 6

Word Count
1,188

NOTES ON THE WAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVI, Issue 17038, 13 December 1915, Page 6

NOTES ON THE WAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVI, Issue 17038, 13 December 1915, Page 6