THE BRITISH NAVY.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXIX, Issue 14682, 13 May 1908, Page 9

THE BRITISH NAVY.

(By W. T. STEAD, in the London "Daily Mail.") Thfc time has como Avhen, to clear the air. we need to speak out quite plainly on the subject of the Navy. Whether from sheer stupidity or from perversity the true position of the qreftton has been so obscured by exaggeration and misrepresentation that a simple restatement of the A B C of the subject may be useful. " The British Empire floats upon, the eea." Thi> command of the sea is the condition of its existence as an independent State. The maintenance of an irresistible superiority at sea is the absolute sine qua non of our' national life. On this subject there is no difference of opinion among us. There are, it is true, two schools. One relies almost exclusively for safety upon the strength of the Navy. The other insists that it is necessary, to safeguard the realm from invasion by the adoption, of universal compulsory military service.

It is obvious that to the former school tho maintenance of our naval sup'eniacy must be much more important than to tho latter. For as it puts all its eggs into one basket it is a mattor of life and death that the basket is Btrong enough to hold tho eggs. But even if the peace party and tho Jingoes regard with equal abhorrence and dread the prospect of an invasion, and therefore both equally desire to maintain a supreme Navy, the peace party has an additional motive in its detestation of conscription, which the Jingo regards with complacency or positive npnroval. INVASION OR CONSCRIPTION. To weaken the Navy is not merely to* increase the danger of foreign invasion; it is enormously to strengthen the case in favour of conscription. As the peace party relies upon the Navy to shield it from two devils, whereas the Jingo only asks it to protect from one, the zeal of the peace party for the maintenance of a supreme Navy ought to be at least double that of the zeal of the Jingoes. And so as a matter of fact it is. There may be her© and there professing and professional friends of peace who blind themselves to these truisms. They are so engrossed with their laudable desire to cut down the intolerable burdens of armaments that they ignore the fundamental and indispensable condition that must precede, or at least accompany, any such reduction. They ara however, but the conies of politics —few in number and so feeble in influence fts to be without a single representative in the strongest Radical Cabinet Britain has ever had. MUDDLE-HEADED CRITICS. The muddle-headed people who never grasp tho central facts of any question have been talking and scribbling even more than their ordinary quantum of nonsense about what they are pleased to describe as my inconsistency in advocating in July an arrest of armaments at the Hague and in December declaring tho necessity for an increase of armaments in London. I should hava thought it w T as plain enough even to the man in tho street that so far from those two things being inconsistent, one follows as the inevitable cirollary of the other. It was in order to avert the

need for increasing armaments in London in December that I Avas so zealous in advocating an arrest of armaments at the Hagu iin July. When the conference refused to cry "Haiti" the question whether or not we had to increase armaments in London passed out of our hands. We should certainly not have increased them if our neighbours had not challenged us to a begga>Miiyneighbour competition. It compelled us to increase our armaments in order to preserve the status quo. The essential question is th© maintenance of the supremacy of th© Pritisn Navy, the irresistible superiority of the British Navy Avithout which Ave siiould exist only by sufferance of our neighbours and Avould inevitably be driven to conscription. What Ave tried to do in 1899 and in 1907 Avas to secure an international guarantee for the naval and military status quo for a term of years. As I had occasion to explain la6t February to the heads of the German Foreign Office, such an agreement Avas equivalent, so long as it lasted 2 to an international guarantee of the naval supremacy of Great Britain. But as it Avas also equivalent to an international guarantee of the military supremacy of Germany over France, and of Austria over Italy, it was fair all round. RACE OF EXPENDITURE. Besides, as I pointed out with painstaking emphasis, however much Germany or any other naval Power might dislike to recognise our naval supremacy, it existed as a matter of fact, and in Britain aa'© regarded its maintenance as a matter so absolutely essential to our national existence that av© were—especially the pacificists—prepared to spend millions rather than see it impaired. Hence I said:

You cannot help yourselves. British naval supremacy exists, and will continue to exist. Wo prefer that its maintenance should bo secured by an agreement that neither Power should exceed its present expenditure on naval armaments. But if you refuse to guarantee our supremacy by agreement, and challenge us to maintain it by competition, then it will still be maintained ooute que coute.

At the end of five or ten years thn relative superiority of the British and German navies will be exactly the same The only difference will be that each of .us will have wasted many millions in an absolutely useless struggle, tho result of which could be foreseen from tho beginning. We hate 6uch a prospect. We want to avert it. We offer you the status quo. based on agreement to spend no more than wo ar 6 spending now. But if you reject our offer and challenge us to maintain our position, we shall accept your challenge. Even if it is necessary to*, expend our last penny, the relative superiority of the British Navy will he maintained.

So far, therefore, from there being the least inconsistency in the attitude of tho British Government it is obvious that the proposal at the Hague to arrest the increase of armaments was made in order to prevent the evil which has now arisen. In a time of profound peace, when Anglo-German relations are more friendly than ever before, the German Government proposes to in-

crease its naval and military expenditure by seven millions a year. I GERMANY'S AMBITION. < We need not worry over their mili- ' tary expenditure. But their naval programme is avowedly intended to alter tlie relative positions of the German and British navies—to the detriment of Great Britain.

We shall maintain the status quo, no matter what it costs. We cannot do otherwise unless we acquiesce in our i extinction as an independent state. | Wo make no complaint against the German Government. _ The Germans are entirely within their rights if they decide to challenge the naval suprem- j acy of Great Britain. Wo can, indeed, i sympathise with them in their dissatisfaction with the status quo. So ■ far from having strengthened their . position in the world hy building a fleet, : they havo weakened it, and until they can mako their fleet as strong as ours or stronger the whole > German' Navy is virtually a hostage in the hands of . thr> stronger, naval Power. ! For any Power to have a fleet on tho high seas which is not the strongest fleet afloat is an increase not of strength, but of vulnerability. Take, I for instance, the American Armada that is now on its way to the Pacific. It is supposed to be a menace to Japan. : In reality, if it ventures ■ into the Northern Pacific. Uncle Sam will he bound over to good behaviour bv the whole value of that fleet. The United States, invulnerable on land, is venturing her head into the jaws of the Japanese lion, and while tbe_ fleet remains in the Pacific the Americans will , bo very civil to Japan. i

TWO DREADNOUGHTS FOR ONE. In like manner, so long as the German Navy is inferior to our own, so long the German head is within the jaws of the British lion. Tt is natural they should wish to reverse the position, but we naturally wish to preserve the status quo. It i* not a question of a phip more or less. Th e new German navr.l programme with its three million increased expenditure in a tim» of profound peace is avowedly a proclamation to all the world that Germany means to depose us, if she can. from the position of' relative superiority at sea which we now possess.." We-regret that she should give way to the" temptation of such an impossible ambition. But, that is her business. Our business is to see to itthat the status quo ifi maintained.

T regret that in commenting upon what T oair! in the last number of_ tho " Review •of Reviews" some writers have imputed to me a desire to duplicate every new shin built in Germany. T meant mv remark to apply so'eiy to' Dreadnoughts. Our lend in other craft is fairly secure. But the margin in Drendnrratrhts is so small that the two' keels for one is the formula of safety. RTR TORN FISHER.

I would also repudiate with the utmost emphasis the assumption that I am supporting the Navy League or in any wav aiding or abetting what seems to me the almost traitorous conspiracy against the present administration of the Admiralty. It is not so often that Providence spares us a-man of genius that wo can afford to thwart and cripple Admiral Fisher. I have known him for more then twenty years. In 1884 h 6 rendered mo. invaluable service in preparing "The Truth about the Navy." Since then I have watched his steady rise to a. position of unexampled influence. The chiefs of both political parties, having worked with him and tested him, repose in him a confidence more complete than that bestowed upon any previous Sea Lord. He is somewhat incontinent of his brilliant and incisive Epeech, and, like all other human beings, ho is not immortal. But take him all round, judge him by what he is and what ho has done, and compare him with the Tite Barnacles and circus admirals by whom he is assailed, I cannot hesitate for a moment in declaring myself for Fisher first, for Fisher second, and for Fisher all the time^ As for those who call me panicmonger because I refuse to ignore facts as plain as the sun at midheaven, I content myself with reminding them that Cobden, who was a specialist in denouncing panics, wrote on August 2, 1860. to Lord John Russell : " So far am I from wishing that ' we should be unarmed, and so little am I disposed to put my country at the mercy of France,' that I would, if necessary, spend one hundred million sterling, to maintain an irresistible superiority over France at sea."