THE POWERS OF TRADES UNIONS.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXIV, Issue 13890, 26 October 1905, Page 3

THE POWERS OF TRADES UNIONS.

—■—4 .AN IMPORTANT DECISION. In the Lyttelton Magistrate's Court yesterday morning, Mr H. W. Bishop, S.M., gave judgment in the case of C. M. Hansen v. tho Lyttelton Stevedores’ Union.’ Ills 'Worship said:— “ In. this case the claim is as follows; The plaintiff becks to recover from tho defendant the gum of £l2 . damages sustained by tho plaintiff in consequence of tho action, of tho defendant Union in preventing tho plaintiff during tho months of February and March, 1905, from obtaining work as a member c;f tho said Union. Tho whole of tho facts are practically admitted, and hi the main are as follow:—The plaintiff in January last was a ‘ financial ’ member of tho defendant Union. Tins Union is duly registered under tho Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 190 Q, and has made certain rules for the gov am in out of its members, which have been accepted and approved in accordance with tho Act. _ Towards tho end of January tho plaintiff left Lyttelton and went to tho Peninsula grass-seeding. He returned at the end of February. Ho then, found that h© had been, put on the ‘ beach ’ by the Union for a month and fined £l. This meant that ho had been suspended by his Union from all benefits as a. member of the Union for a period of one* month. Tho plaintiff presented himself daily during tho month, of _ March at tho place where engagements for employment wore usually made, but received no work, and on March 30 he-re-signed from tho Union-. An industrial agreement in pursuance of the above Act was entered into between the Canterbury Stevedores’ Association, Limited, and the defendant Union of Workers by which, inter alia, preference. in employment was secured to members of the Union. The clause- is No. 14, under the heading of , ‘ Mutual Agreement as to Employment and Labour,’ and,.was as follows;—' 14. The Association having undertaken not to employ any outside labour whilst members of the Union are available, the Union undertakes that none of its members shall work for any other person or body without the sanction of its committee. If, however, no members of the Union are available, the Association is at liberty to employ outside labour. And, further, the Union undertakes to keep its roll up to 275 members exclusive of those members who are permanently employed by the various companies in the. Association, and these 275 men shall be available for the Association’s work whenever required, and in the event of the _ above 276 men not being available, the Union would undertake «to supply the Association, with- capable ■ substitutes. The plaintiff admits that he was aware of this ‘ preference ’ clause. The defendant Union, apparently recognising the importance of complying in ©very way with tho provisions of the industrial agreement, framed rules to secure such compliance as far as possible. Rule 18 provides as follows: —‘ The Canterbury Stevedoring Association having undertaken not to employ any outside labour whilst members of this industrial Union are available, this industrial Union undertakes not to work for any other body or persons without the consent of the committee.’ Then Rule 20 is as follows: —‘ Any member guilty of insubordination, misconduct, or of any offence calculated to bring discredit upon tho industrial Union, may bo suspended by any member of tbo committee, but such member may bring his case before the committee for its consideration; and its decision shall be final.’ It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff, on becoming aware that lie was suspended, made no appeal under -this rule. Paragraph. 2 of Rule 28 reads as follows :—‘No member shall accept employment from any body or persons outside the Canterbury Stevedoring Association without a permit signed by the president, vice-presi-dent or secretary.’ The plaintiff, before leaving Lyttelton, in January, did not apply to his Union for a. permit. His excuse for going away is that work was slack and that his services w r -ere not likely to be required. As a matter of fact there was considerable shortage of men during the month of February, and very great inconvenience resulted to the Association. It seems that in previous years at grass-seeding time there hat always been a shortage of labour owing to the men persisting in going away at that period, and great inconvenience has resulted. Both the Association and the Union sought to put a stop to this, and the Union rules were specially designed to meet the difficulty. The plaintiff -admitted that he was fully aware of all this. The plaintiff relies, greatly upon the case of Gibbon - v. . National Amalgamated Labourers’ Union, 72 L.J. 1903, C.A. p. 907, , and the principles laid down in the decision therein. This was a case in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the Union on the ground that the secretary and local secretary had combined to prevent him from getting lawful employment, because they wished to compel him to pay a debt lawfully due from him. It was held that the Union was liable on the ground that the plaintiff had on undoubted common law right to dispose of his labour according to his will, and that tho Union in interfering with the exercise of His right, although not acting from spite or -a desire to injure, was guilty of a tort. Th’o legal conditions governing labour are so absolutely and entirely different in’ England from what they are under cur special legislation in New Zealand, that it is very difficult to see that there can bo any real analogy between such a case as that and the present one. No greater proof of the actual difference existing, that I have referred to, could be adduced than that a state of things amongst workmen in England that would bo absolutely unlawful, is not only legalised in this, colony, but is actually encouraged. I • refer, of course, to combination for the furtherance and protection of industrial interests. I must bold as a matter of law, in th© case before mo, that the defendant Union in attempting; to protect the industrial interest® of its members, was not acting in an unlawful manner. The only real question at issue is this; Has the Union the necessary -statutory power to mak© the rules which I have previously quoted at length? I think that the answer must clearly bo in tbo affirmative. Although the amount claimed is a small one, there is a very important principle involved, and I am, I think, bound to strictly decide that principle in accordance with what I conceive to bo the present state of the law. The plaintiff has absolutely no merits whatever on Ids side. Ho was a member of the Union. He was a party to and is fully acquainted with all tb© rules of that Union. He was aware that- those rules had been specially framed to secure the fullest possible benefit to the members of the Union by securing to them from the Stevedores’ Association preference to the members in the matter of employment. Loyalty to the Union was the very esseffee of the whole arrangement. When it suited the convenience of the plaintiff he worked under those rules, and reaped all benefits accruing thereunder. When it- did not suit him he claimed the right to ignore them and to sot’them aside. Ho will get no

assistance from this Court in suoh a repudiation of mutual responsibility. Section 5 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1900, practically defines the powers of the Unions in the matter of making rules, and ib is certainly very wide in its term's. The Union can make rules on £ any matter not contrary to law.’ I do not think that it is contrary to law, as I understand that law to be, for this Union to have mado rales to protect the interests of its members, _ and to secure, as a matter of discipline, that no member should lightly break those rules without suffering some punishment. In the •present case that punishment was by suspension of the plaintiff from the benefits of membership of tne Union for a stated period, and was inflicted under the authority of a rulo, which I hold to be a good and sufficient rule for the purpose. It has not been shown that there was any interference with the plaintiff by the officers of the Union, outside of the particular matter in which there was community of interest between the member _ and Ins Union, and to the rules affecting _ which the plaintiff had to give an unqualified adherence, by bis membership. It was quite open to him to have sought any other employment that was not regulated by his Union. So long as disciplinary, powers a-r© exercised judicially, and strictly in accordance with tb© provisions of a rule which has been practically by all parties, I cannot see that therejs thereby any interference with a man’s common law rights. Judgment will be for .the defendant, with costs £8 Is.”