THE LIBERAL SPLIT.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CVI, Issue 12587, 23 August 1901, Page 6

THE LIBERAL SPLIT.

SIR S. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN'S NEW POLICY. SWORD IN ONE HAND OLIVE BRANCH IN OTHER. [From Our Correspondent.] LONDON, July 5. Tie Liberal party at its meeting at the Reform Club, on Tuesday afternoon, at last found something to agree- upon. Alter a resolution of confidence m Sir Jienry Oampbell-Bannerman and! many expressions of "mutual admiration and esteem tney agreed to differ. Ho* a party can, have confidence- in a leader who has backed and filled veered and jibed, tacked and gone about instead of steering a steady course is as great a-mystery to us in London, asit must be to you in the colonies. Oamp-fcell-Bannerman will never give us a clear statement of to policy. He delights, m Sphinx-like generalities that may be interpreted whichever way the Liberal ■eems blowing for the moment. His very B peech at the Reform Club was an excellent example of his futility. He asserted that lie had from, first to fast endeavoured "to save the Liberal party from any,share in responsibility" for the ™'d&™P on OctVl7, 1899, lie said, as of the Opposition: "A message has been received from the Government of the South African Republic, couched in such, language as to reiser it impossible for her Majesty s government; or any self-respecting country, even to take it into consideration. J-wo British colonies have been invaded by an armed force and: actual [hostilities have commenced; an aggression which it s the plain;duty of us. aU-Mrnisters, Fairbment, and people—;to resist." What a position for the leader of a creat party to take up, to shirk responsibility for a war in- which the Empires very existence- -was endangered. Thisi was the ' programme he put forward as that upon - which the Liberal party was agreed. (1) Make every effort to bring the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion. (2) Make known the reasonable -terms ot peace we are willing to grant. Hold out the olive-branch with one hand, while we lave the sword in the other. (3) Avoid any actions in military operations likely to leave behind it a sense of unnecessary harshness. ■ (4) Announce a general amnesty ot all British subjects who .have taken up arms. (5) Promise ifchat so soon as ordinary social conditions are re-established on the ending of the war, after a short interval of irregular gcwranenib, the free, independent ' system of colonial self-government shall be set up, leading ultimately, if the several States so desire, to a federal constitution in South Africa. That very day the negotiations between Botha and Lord Kitchener were published in all the papers, and! proved beyond a shadow of a doubt nob only now futile, but how ill-advised was the offer of any terms of peace to the Boers. Botha, in his address to bis burghers, shows.that on the Boer side there was no intention of accepting our terms. They only wanted us to •how our hand. And as the open letter of De Koek, the peace delegate executed by the Boers, shows, our offer was looked upon as a sign of weakness. Both Botha and De Web declare that the only object fox which they>are fighting is the complete independence of the Republics. What, therefore, is the use of offering them something else? We have already Offered the Boers ncit only' reasonable,' but generous terms of peace. The result was only the prolongation of (hostilities owing to the Boer belief that we were weakening. What possible sense is there, therefore, in talking about holding out the olive-branch.' What the- nation fears is that all this vague talk about conciliating the Boers would only be a prelude to the repetition of the events ■of 1881 if the Liberal party came into power again. If the Liberal party is agreed ' that independence cannot be restored to the Boers, and if Campbell-Ban-nerman really assents to what (with the exception of an amnesty to.the rebels) is the' Government programme, why doesn't he make it plain ,£h»b the whole nation, Conservative and Liberal alike is of one mind as-to 'the-future of South Africa, give ;' the Government every possible assistance to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, and then let the Liberal party "turn its attention to those domestic reforms which are peculiarly its province. This would be a patriotic and statesmanlike policy. But he cannot - comprehend! the difference between Patriot and pro-Boer, and declared at the "Reform Club that whaifc divided the Liberal party was nclb real and essential divergences of opinion, but personal antagonisms. This idea Mr- Asquith and Sir Edward Grey boldly repudiated. They pointed out that the split in the party ■was due to deep difference of opinion about the war. Mr Asquith put the point tersely: "It is no good, when honest differences of opinion do exist, to say that they , do not, or to fancy that you can get rid of them by resorting to ambiguous formula." Both claimed unfettered liberty to express and act Upon their convictions without any imputation of party disloyalty. The pro-Boers lay low and said nothing, which at least was something gained. Sir Edward Reed pointed out that "it would be a very disastrous encouragement to disloyalty at the Cape if it were given out that, however many of them may rebel, they will be all amnestied at the end of the war. I think amnesty is ai most excellent tiring at the end of the war, but, under existing circumstances, it seems to me to be fraught with very great peril to announce such a thing." He asked for an explanation of Sir Henrv'a speech on this point, but did not get it, for Sir Edward Grey suggested that they should not go into details. They did mot. To have done so would have exposed at once the vital division between the patriots and the pro-Boers. Peace was patched up until the next pro-Boer outburst. The party is still tainted with and the. country .-withholds its confidence.