OUR LOST SUPREMACY.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CVI, Issue 12570, 3 August 1901, Page 6

OUR LOST SUPREMACY.

When tie Russian, armoured cruiser Gromoboi was in Australian waters a few. weeks ago, comments were frequently made or. 'her wonderful fighting strength and her splendid armament; yet few people realised how serious a menace that single vessel would constitute to these colonics in time of war. She has a speed cf twenty knots, and with her four Sin quick-firing guns, sixteen 6in, six 4.Tin, and twenty Sin, she could easily, to quote a competent authority, “ mop hp the obsolete and underarmed Royal Arthur and her consorts, the Archer, Katoomba, Mildura, Porpoise, Pylacks, Ilingareoma and Torch.” ' On paper the Royal Arthur may -be very little inferior in • speed and equipment to the Russian visitor, but the Gromoboi belongs to •> absolutely the most modern type of war vessel. Her guns are modern and effective, and her general equipment has bebn carried out according to the latest ideas. The British ember, on the other hand, is nearly ten years old, and as yet she docs not seem to have been supplied even with smokeless' powder. Ho one could seriously contend that the Australasian squadron is a sulSt dent protection for these colonics against, for instance, the Russian China fleet. It is quite true that before it could make an effective descent upon these islands the Russian fleet would have to provide , for. the British China squadron, but what guarantee have we that that division is more nearly sufficient and efficient than our own? In truth, 1 the condition of lie Australasian squadron seems to be typical of that, of the, whole British Navy. The Navy League has long since ceased to warn Britain that she' is losing the command of the sea, and devotes almost the whole ■ cf its: attention now. to .the.effort of rousing her, to regain the command of at least a portion. But the general public simply will not be convinced that their fleets are not mere than sufficient to deal with any possible foreign combination, and 'the miralty is allowed to drift along in its indifferent, conservative style. A- little naval war would' probably reveal in the organisation of the fleets of the Empire weaknesses and blunders as stupid and far more fatal than those which the 80-er war has discovered in the War Office plans. This,, at least, is the view taken by Mr Arnold White in ' his “ Message from the Mediterranean,” contributed to the ..July number-of the “ National Review,” and strongly, endorsed by the Nary- League. Mr Whitt remarks, with perfect justice, that, compared, with the Anny, -the Navy is css’&ntially a silent service. Its officers are not to be„found criticising their superiors on the slightest provocation. It has few representatives in Parliament, and it has little influence with the Press. When there is trouble in the Army a thousand pens' are immediately at work.; trouble in a ship leads directly to a court-martial of which the world hears nothing. And the Navy is intensely loyal to Its political chitf. In its personnel the country has its closest approach to absolute efficiency. In the Army a man'is rewarded for doing his duty; in the Navy he is punished if he neglects it.. Mr "White’s general contention is that the. Navy is everywhere "weak and nowhere actually supreme. In each of the nine stations it has been allowed to fall behind. In Chinese waters, for instance. Admiral Seymour has to face a, superior maritime combination. In the Mediterranean, again, Admiral ' Fisher has ten battleships, as. against fourteen French vessels of the same class, and Russia has nine battleships in the Black Sea and one in, the Levant. During his second term of office at the Admiralty Lord Gosehen pledged his word that the sums asked for on behalf of, the Navy were “the least compatible with safety.” In three years he had £4,500,000 of the votes unspent, so that on his own shewing the Empire is something less than safe, to-day. But it is to the Mediterranean fleet that Mr Arnold White directs special attention. Ho declares that when the inevitable great war occurs it will be, fought in the Mediterranean, for there Britain is surrounded by enemies, and her only possible ally is too weak to render her assistance. France to-day has 76,000 troops in Algiers, and her fleets, stretching from Tangier to Toulon, hold the western Mediterranean. Russia has practical control, at Constantinople. "When the Lords of the Admiralty visited Malta recently they must have seen for themselves,

says Mr Waite, Low deplorable . was the British position in the great sea. Malta, the base of the fleet, is within 210 miles of a foreign torpedo station, yet it has no breakwater. Egypt is undefended. Tho fleet, compared with its rivals, is numerically and qualitatively deficient in all classes, from battleships to destroyers. There are none of the usual and necessary auxiliaries, hospital ships, repairing ships, frozen meat stores, colliers and telegraph ships; and the vessels in commission are not supplied with such equipment as telescopic sights, gyroscopes, smokeless powder for the great guns, armour-piercing shells, breech-loading field guns and wireless telegraphic apparatus. Black powder and blunt-nosed shells are still in use even on battleships. The dietary scale for the men is deplorably both in quality and in quantity', comparing more than unfavourably with that in use in London

poorhouses. This indictment, as the cablegrams showed a few weeks ago, was not without its effect. Lord Charles Beresford had already declared that the Mediterranean fleet was not fit for war sendee, and the Admiralty must have experienced a rude shock when the Navy League succeeded at length in rousing something like a popular agitation concerning the weakness and unpreparedness of the fleets. In the House of Commons Air Arnold Poster admitted that construction was not keeping pace with requirements, and that the Mediterranean fleet could not be .strengthened without weakening the home station. Lord Selberne, First Lord of the Admiralty, promised that the former standard cf strength, which required that the Imperial Navy should be more than equal to the combined navies of any two foreign Powers, would be maintained, and that the rate of construction would be increased. In addition to six first-class battleships and three armoured cruisers which would be completed by the end of the year, eight other heavy vessels were building, and the new programme provided for a further expenditure of £2,000,000 on three battleships and six armoured cruisers, besides numerous destroyers. The deficiencies of ammunition, he said, were being rapidly made good, and the flagships and cruisers would be fitted with wireless telegraphic apparatus. - On the face of it, this seemed a satisfactory reply to the criticisms, bub we must remember that Air Go s chen’s promises were quite as comprehensive. The efficiency of the Navy is a question of the very greatest moment to the colonies, and we would willingly see our contributions to the cost of maintenance increased, if we could be satisfied that an improvement would result in the strength' of our own squadron and of the whole Navy. It is possible, as we have seen, to retrieve the blunders of War Office administration even during the progress of hostilities. No such amendment would -be possible during a. naval war, and Is is therefore essential that the first line of Imperial defence should bf maintained always on a war footing.