THE SOMALI WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CV, Issue 12538, 27 June 1901, Page 4

THE SOMALI WAR.

The Somali "incident," as it -was officially termed, is not yet closed. The first expedition against the Mad Mullah was an unqualified failure, partly because of the difficulty of transport, partly because the fore© -was too small, and included' few mounted men. The Mad Mullah, Mohammed Bin Abdullah, is described as a Somali De Wet, and ifc -was sheer folly to suppose that fifteen hundred infantry could 1 crush his force of twenty or thirty thousand' Somalis, many of whom were well mounted. Colonel Swayne's expedition, which must not ba confused with the punitive expedition- under Colonel Ternan, sent to punish the Ogaden Somalia for the murder of Mr Jenner, consisted almost entirely of loyal Somalis, commanded by British officers. By enlisting the aid of loyal tribes, Colonel Swayne seems to have "cornered" Abdullah, and to have inflicted a severe, though, not crushing, defeat upon his forces. Abdullah, we learn now, has fled 1 into Italian Somaliland, and Colonel Swayne is endeavouring to pacify the tribes who had joined the rebel standard. Mudug, Abdullah's new headquarters, is in the midst of the desert, and no doubt when he has collected his scattered army we shall hear of his descent upon the villages near the coast. Hitherto the operations have been confined to Abyssinia and the British frontier, and when order is restored among the Ogadens and their neighbours Abdullah may -safely bo left to tha tender- mercies of the Italians. The prospects of his "movement" for the pi-esent are far from bright. The Somalis are said to make, excellent fighters. They are intrepid hunters and indefatigable marchers, perhaps the finest in the world. They can cover, without difficulty, from forty to sixty miles a day, requiring . only' a little water and a few dates. Colonel Swayne found the inland tribes surprisingly well armed. For years past the French colonial authorities have countenanced the sale of rifles to the> natives at Jibutil, on the. Red Sea, and the town is used as a base for the supply of arms to all the tribes of the hinterland, a contraband traffic, largely carried on by slave-dealers." The Abyssinians have made suoh good use of this opportunity that they are to-day the strongest native power in. Africa, and modern rifles and ammunition are plentiful among the semiindependent tribes along the various frontiers. The danger to France is not serious, because French interests aw insignificant compared with those of Britain and Italy in the same quarter of Africa. Representations to the French Government have presumably failed to check the traffic, and in the circumstances British officials at Aden and in Somlal^iand , are questioning th© wisdom of i preventing the loyal tribes from acquiring arms. It ds true that tie arming of natives in the British sphiere might cause trouble, but these tribes, which are said to 'be thoroughly loyal, are ■at present left at the mercy of their enemies. Against this view it is urged th&t Britain has never had serious cause to iregrei the adoption of the "safe" policy, because when friendly natives are threatened, a punitive expedition can b£ promptly sent/out, while the arming-of loyal motives would lead to. constant fighting on the' frontier. The present affair is only a "little war," as Mr Chamberlain describes it, but it is costing th© country no m-eaa sum.