SIR ALFRED MILNER AND THE AFRIKANDER BOND.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CIII, Issue 12159, 24 March 1900, Page 6

SIR ALFRED MILNER AND THE AFRIKANDER BOND.

The news published this morning that there are indications that Lord Roberts and Sir Alfred Milner arc settling the conditions of peace with the, Free State, reminds us that though the “ South African fog ” has lately lifted with regard to the events of the war, there is still something obscure about the political condition of Cape Colony and the policy of its Governor. That in a British colony a Premier should continue in office after granting permits for the transport of arms to the enemy, and prohibiting British subjects from rejoicing over British victories, suggests that there must be some weakness in’ the constitution itself or in the administration. While crowds of loyalists are cheering in the streets, their official heads, the Ministry, hold sullenly aloof in evident sympathy with the other side. Exhibitions of enthusiasm such as all the other colonics have witnessed are suppressed. The resident colhnists who could have given the most effectual aid at the commencement of hostilities in checking the Boer invasion were forced to remain inactive until the moist critical time was over. A war was going on to decide which of two races was to be predominant in South Africa, but while one of the races involved was straining every nerve to gain the supremacy the ether was told to look on idly while the. rest of the Empire fought its battles. At the outset Mr Schreiner announced, in quite unambiguous terms, the course he intended to adopt. “ If war breaks out,” he declared, “ I shall do my very bast to maintain for this colony the position of standing, apart and aloof from the struggle:” That this policy was natural enough among men of Afrikander birth, does not make Great Britain’s acquiescence in it less remarkable. One would have thought that whatever blame was attached to the representative of the Imperial authority in South Africa, he would not have been charged with any lack of patience o’- moderation. Yet this is the very accusation that is levelled against him by Mr Montague White in the February number of the “North American.” We have to bear in mind the double character of Sir Alfred Milner’s position in order to understand both his difficulties and his responsibilities. As Governor of the Cape he occupies much the same place as Lord Ranfurly docs amongst us, a> position of great personal influence and prestige, but wdth no administrative power. His business is to keep on good terms with

MiiiiyiihiiMtiirifTrtiiiri^^^t his Ministers, to whatever party they may belong. We in the colonies can .imagine more easily than native Britons the difficulty a loyal Governor must find in enforcing his will against a disloyal Government supported by a Parliamentary majority. Hero we have the simple explanation of what looks like rather feeble compliance. But, fortunately, a Gape Governor is also High Commissioner, and as such has care of the Imperial interests in Rhodesia and Basutoland, and the conduct of negotiations with the Transvaal and Free State. It was by virtue of these more substantial powers that Lord Rosmead formerly intervened in the Transvaal after the Raid, and it is through them also, according to Mr Montague White, that Sir Alfred Milner is now establishing his “ personal rule,” and making himself responsible for the present •• tragedy,” Lord Rosmead — the reed that broke in Chamberlain’s hand is of course an ideal High Commissioner to a Boer sympathiser. He publicly declared that there was no longer any permanent future in South Africa for direct Imperial rule on any large scale, and in a private interview is repotted to have said that the only true meanis of governing the country was through the Dutch. These were certainly not the views of his successor, who was not at all inclined to follow the lead of the Afrikander Bond and its Ministry. Sir Alfred Milner saw at once, and it is greatly to his credit that he did so, that there was no real unity or stability in the existing condition of South Africa, and that Lord Rosmead’s conscientious but inexpedient policy of drifting had only pub off the evil day of reckoning. The High Commissioner saw that the hour had come for a definite decision. It is probable enough that ho did stand firm throughout the Bloemfontein Conference, and that ha made himself the champion of the (Jutlanders ; but in stating this his critic has done him the great service of exonerating him from any personal share of responsibility! for the inaction of Cape Colony and the disloyalty of its Ministers. If any further justification its needed, Sir Alfred Milner has provided it himself in a Blue Book that has just been issued. It is scarcely necessary for him to excuse himself for preventing Mr Schreiner’s keeping the colony in a state of “friendly neutrality,” but it is perhaps just as well that he should emphasise tha fact that the success of the Premier’s schema would have amounted to a declaration of independence. On the other hand, he carries moderation as far as it can legitimately be carried in his desire to consider the feelings of those Cape Colonists who are unahla through racial sentiments to judge the case fairly. From the first he discouraged for their sake as much as possible the employment of colonial forces except for the defence of the colony itself, and now, with the same motive, he is doing his best to remove the unhappy racial bitterness that lies ab the bottom of the whole trouble. If any blame attaches to the High Commissioner at all, it is that he did not, as soon as the Boers took up arms, suppress every symptom of disloyalty with the utmost rigour of martial law. But while it is impossible at this distance to understand all the complications of the situation, it is pretty safe to conclude that Sir Alfred Milner did whab was hesb under bhe circumstances to stay the spread of a conflagration which might have easily involved the whole of British South Africa.