THE NAVY AND THE WAR

Lyttelton Times, Volume CIII, Issue 12159, 24 March 1900, Page 4

THE NAVY AND THE WAR

(By SIR JOHN COLOMB, K.C.M.G., M.P.) (Author of “ The Defence of Great and Greater Britain,’’ etc.) [All Rights Rkskhvlu.] I. The naval aspects of the present war do not lie on the surface. Probably a vast number of people do not realise that the fleet is a main factor in the problem our soldiers, far from the sea, are giving up their lives and shedding their blood to solve on the kopjes and in the drifts of South Africa. Greater obliviousness prevailed in the public mind during the Crimean war as regards its naval aspects. A conundrum in “ Punch ” aptly, though unconsciously, hit off the popular misconception of the position. “ What was the difference between our fleet in the Baltic and that in the Black Seal” The answer being, "the fleet in the Baltic was expected to do everything, and it did nothing: the-fleet in the Black Sea was expected to do nothing, and it did it.” As u matter of fact, however, the combined fleets of England and Franco did everything required of maritime supremacy. They made sea-fights on any scale everywhere impossible anti secured absolute and perfect safety for military trans-marine movements anywhere. i'he essence of supreme sea-power lies in moral restraint over opponents, paralysing overt action by the influence of fear. Of naval brigades we heard then as we do now. Then, however, popular interest in things naval was confined to the 68 pr. and 10 inch naval guns in the hands of bluejackets on shore in the trenches, or 13 inch mortars, worked by marine artillery, afloat in bomb vessels; while now, it centres in the 4.7 and 12 pr. guns. In both cases, however, all these things are very minor incidents, or accidents, evolved by the pressure of circumstances natural to the very beginning of a great military undertaking. (Jnforseen military emergencies produced the naval brigade with 68 prs. and 10 inch naval guns on shore before Sebastopol, just as the same cause, some forty-five years later, brought to Ladysmith- Bluejackets with 4.7 and 12 pr. guns. To suppose that under any circumstances military arrangements under all conditions should be so perfect and complete as to be above requiring such extraneous aid as the naval service can temporarily lend to the shore, is to, indulge in a dream of military perfection which never has been and probably never will be attained in any war. The measure of evil from thus applying naval means to purely military purposes largely depends upon the effect produced on the efficiency of the fleet, cr ships, from which the force is temporarily withdrawn. On this particular point I shall offer some observation in a second article. Naval brigades of bluejackets and naval guns up country are things out of their proper place. They are picturesque and striking illustrations of the gallantry and curious adaptibiUty of our sea foices, furnishing proof, if proof were needed, teat the " spirit of our fathers ” remains with us, an active and real element of naval power. The personal question, however, must be left out of account, for the land forces of the Crown, regular, irregular, home and colonial, exhibit the same individual beioism and daring as their comrades from the sea. If our history records noble instances of chivalry and courage shown by seamen and marines in the field, it also tells many a tale, mieh as that of the Birkenhead or the Warren Hastings, of quiet courage and true discipline of soldiers afloat, unsurpassed by any deeds of daring by seamen on their own element. To survey the naval aspects of the present war we must get above the kopjes and drifts, the roar of 'guns, the confusion and smoke of battle, and from a high level look cut upon the world. It is only thus we can appreciate proportion and perspective, and the relation of cause to effect .so far as the navy is concerned. Only by taking a bird seye view of the panorama'" of the world s interests, and the -world’s armaments can we see the true place of the fleet in the present war. To speak this wav may isavour of " spread-eagleism. It is ‘however, a necessity so to speak. We are a “ world state,” and if maritime supremacy means anything it expresses predominant power over all seas, not any particular wmter area. The power of our fleet is the cause of our being- the great “ world state ” we are. In that great agglomeration of states empire's, dominions, dependencies, protectorates, and spheres of- influence, scattered broadcast over the eartu’s surface, South Africa occupies a unique posmon under the flag common to all. Tins is because it forms a ssort of land bastion facing south and dividing the two vast water areas of the globe. In 1796 we seized the Gape for naval reasons. The exigencies of cur maritime operations in the Indian as well ds the Atlantic Ocean rendered that step necessary. At that time-the maritime business of the world east of the Gape was practically confined to interchange with a few ports in the north and north-east corners of the Indian Ocean. The China Sea and Pacific Ocean did not count, as contributors to the world’s trade. On the conculsion of the first act of the great drama of our struggle for “Empire and Liberty ao-ainst great odds, we gave it up again under the Treaty of Amiens, 1800. ihe colony then extended to the Great JJisn River. It was not the territory but the port we valued. Soon war burst out again and a little later the same reasons forced us to act as we had previously, and so again, in 1806, wo took possession, have held it ever since and are fighting for it now. •. . The necessity for our continuing masters in South Africa is primarily naval. The attempts to- sweep us out of it, if successful, might and probably would in process of time produce a, new and independent maritime power in the southern seas, the climatic conditions being favourable and the mineral resources, inpluding coal, being great. Even South Africa derelict, or a maritime independent state in embryo, would be a menace to the maritime peace of the world : a Naboth’s naval vineyard to all maritime powers, a bone of contention for diplomatic wrangles, a fruitful incentive to strife. This war has called forth to a very remarkable and unparalleled degree the interest of all the world. It is shown in two w r avs. By violence and hate- on the Continent of Europe, and by a hurricane of loyalty and spontaneity of action throughout the Empire. The secret source of these two opposite streams of tendency may be an instinctive perception of the greatness of the issue. It is not merely a local quarrel between -two contending parties for territories and- gold, but concerns the interests of humanity, because the issue of the war will determine who shall occupy a land position of first magnitude in relation to maritime power and the world’s peace on the sea. As factors in the naval equation the ports of South Africa differ from such places as Malta, Gibraltar, or Bermuda, Those places and all positions similarly situated

muse go with the command of the sea. Their supplies and resources must be seadrawn, they are not and cannot be ‘elfcontained and self-sustained independently of sea power. I On the other hand booth African ports are outlets of vast territories with unlimited resources lying behind them. Strategic ports are often described as “ commanding ” a water area or sea route. It is to be feared that this way of describing them has encouraged a populai delusion that the possession of a port, it fortified and locally secured, commands a contiguous water area or a trade route in its vicinity. It was this misapprehension that sent a. portion of the Press and public into a state of almost alarm when Russia hoisted her Hag at Port Arthur. The truth is that a, port though armed to the teeth with fixed defences, commands nothing at all beyond the lew thousand yards of gun range. Beyond that distance "the port is simply in a naval sense a Ladysmith, a Kimberley, or a Matching in a state of siege. Outside its gun range rim command is. and can only be, -exercised by ships. For all practical purposes of war or commerce a port ceases to be able to discharge the functions of a port if outside the limits of its gnu range its flag has no freedom, because its ships dare not show owing to the influence of superior naval mobile power. The value of fortified ports to inferior naval power corresponds to the value of. a fire proof, thief proof safe in a bank or office. In them, fleets and ships driven from the sea by force or restrained from putting to sea by fear are safe from naval deUruction. They can only be “ dug out or bolted ’ by the application of military force —as at Santiago. To the superior naval Power all its ports are useful and available. Those only approachable by sea require a certain amount of -sea-face protection from a raiding or minor attackif they contain docks, means of ’repair, or, are naval coal depots. If, however, they can be marched upon by an army, or are open to purely land assault, they may need extensive and complete landward defence. ■ So far as maritime war is concerned, naval ports of the tupeiior seaPower are not liable to great sea-attacks delivered in force. Naval bases are of two classes, those that can create ships and armaments, and those that can help to sustain and maintain -ships and armaments produced elsewhere. It is a want of recognition of these teachings of sea strategy, proved by all experience, that now exhibits the phenomenon of great military forces locked up at our naval bases which are only approachable by sea, in various parts of the world, while our army in South Africa cannot be reinforced without calling in the nation from outside its ranks to come over the sea and Help it. Garrison artillery are kicking their heels and tumbling over each other at Aden, Hongkong, Bermuda and other naval bases, while naval officers and seamen are taken out of ships to do their work up country in South Africa. Naval necessity placed the British flag atCapetown in the past, time and developments make it still more important it should there remain. The ports of South Africa are few, but they rather gain than lose importance from that fact. It is not merely their geographical situation with reference to two oceans which makes them so valuable. It is other considerations which can best be explained by comparing the Cape with Cape Horn. Both divide the same two great water divisions of the world, but that is all they have in common. People from all nations might conceivably rush to Cape Horn to seek gold, but no nation would deliberately go there in pursuit of potentialities of maritime strength. Climatic conditions and territorial resources make the real difference in their relative maritime value. The Falkland Islands, storm - swept and lonely, offer such shelter for naval stores and supplies as are required by ships engaged in watching the junction passage between- two oceans. Like Bermuda, Malta and Hongkong, these islands will remain with the strongest sea Power. , It is the enormous territory, rich in all natural resources, lying behind South . African •ports, which assures their importance now and still more so in days to come. Our political blundering and shortsightedness lost us Delagoa Bay. We would at this moment cheerfully give a huge price, even for its temporary possession now. The climate, however, of Delagoa Bay is far less favourable to the establishment of means necessary for the production of ships and armaments- than some of our own parts further south. It is the natural conditions •lying behind these ports which in days of steam and railways give to them a possible naval future which cannot now be measured. Thus British military forces gathered from all quarters of the world are fighting in support, unwittingly it may be, for a .continuity of that naval policy to which the Empire owes everything in the past, and on which its future existence depends. The United Kingdom is denuded of troops; the Indian garrison has been reduced; the self-governing colonies have all. suddenly and spontaneously abandoned the cardinal principle of their policy—passive defence. It- -is a bloody struggle and the Empire is engaged, so far as numbers are concerned, in the greatest war it has ever waged 'in this or any other generation. In the prosecution of that war we have arrayed against us the declared ill-will of all the maritime Powers except America, But no one is the least uneasy, nowhere is it thought that the animosity- displayed by the foreign Press will go beyond empty words, though a belief is general that the papers do but express the secret views of governments controlling fleets and armies. We may well ask why we are so calm, so unhaunted by apprehension? It is the possession of a powerful fleet, believed by us and by foreign Powers to he adequate to preventing any attempt to contest its power. We and they are no- -longer under the influence of a delusion ; the product of a confusion of thought caused’ by the revolution of navies by steam. It was, therefore, imagined that the principles and practice of naval warfare had changed. This was expressed by fears of invasion and in claptrap formulas of false military doctrine, such as “steam has bridged the Channel” —“the fleet might be absent or decoyed away.”

The grand lesson taught by the present Avar is the supreme power of moral effect exercised by a fleet “in being.” We do not show it —Ave need not sHoav it. Our Channel and Mediterranean fleets are of normal strength, so are our squadrons on distant seas. Thera are a ferv extra ships in commission—so feAA r as to be Ainnoticeable. The real “ fleet in being ” does not now promenade the sea, need not parade ostentatiously before the Avorld. It flies no flag, its ships are empty of men, but all else is on board. Those avlio desire to see it- can do so by visiting our great home dockyards. Under the courteous guidance of a Metropolitan policeman, they will be shown toavs upon roAVs of apparently endless length, battleships, cruisers, and multitudinous small craft, packed in steam basins and great docks, like cattle in trucks. They are silent and solemn as if conscious of the fact that they are the grim custodians of the Avorld’s maritime peace even to the uttermost

pans of the sea. The yearly practice of mobilising these ships, complete in all inspects, answers a two-fold purpose, one purely naval, the other purely political. It is a- practical method of testing our otvn preparedness as well as a polite intimation to all nations that we are "ready aye ready.These ships and these arrangements overAvlielm foreign editors Avit.h a sense of national impotence to do us harm. Ihey find their sole consolation in putting more ■vitriol into their ink. We have double compensation for the huge cost of these tilings. Though engaged in tlie southern heiuisphero in a war of great diftieultv and danger, oui trade and commerce, sensitive though it be, is unaffected thereby. Exports go and imports come as though the era of uim-ersal peace and brotherhood of nations hud at last appeared. Home and colonial soldiers engaged in, the bloody work of Avar, whileAvatehing wistfully the dawn breaking over the Drakensberg mountains, remember Unit oceans roll hetAveeu them and their homes ; thev have their consolation in Lie asstllarre giver by "the fleet In being’ soaiu thousand miles aAvay and silent as the uiffht just gone. It is that their rations, letters, and supplies, though drawn from all quarters of the globe, Avill be delivered at Hmi-h African ports as regularly and as certain.a as at. the railway stations at Aldershot or the Curragh of Kildare.