The Lyttelton Times SATURDAY, NOV. 26, 1881.

Lyttelton Times, Volume LVI, Issue 6474, 26 November 1881, Page 4

The Lyttelton Times SATURDAY, NOV. 26, 1881.

The English law of libel has long been acknowledged to be in an unsatisfactory state. That it has not been reformed ere this has been owing partly to public apathy, but more probably to the good sense of the judges and juries who have been its administrators. These, by their general exercise of tact and moderation, hare made the best of a bad law, as only Englishmen know how to do. They have not pushed the law of libel to its logical harsh conclusions, and consequently the said law has not, on the whole, been found to press harshly in spite of its imperfections. Yet imperfections it possesses, and these of no slight kind. The importance of a libel law, which shall be strong enough to be respected and at the same time light enough to be thoroughly enforced, may be learnt by the lesson now afforded in America. In that country an exaggerated respect for the liberty of the subject has led timid judges so to dilute and water away the stringency of the common law that the Press of the United States has been left practically unchecked, to the detriment of public morality and private comfort, and to the degradation of the Press itself. One main difference between the law as existing in America and England is found in the doctrine of “ Special Damage.” In England this applies only in cases of slander or spoken defamation, where, with certain fixed exceptions, the complainant baa to prove that he or she has suffered direct loss from the words used by the defendant. As a conse* quonoo aotiona for alander are very infrequent both in the United Kingdom Mid the Colonies; and a host of trumpery quarrels are thereby kept out of Court. But in America the same proviso is not insisted on in libel actions. Now, libel is not a trumpery affair, and to deprive sufferers from it of a legal remedy, is to drive quiet and respectable persons to desperation. The law then, in England and America, appears to have erred in opposite extremes : in the former that of severity, in the latter of looseness. Of the two evils, we certainly, judging by results, choose the first. But that is no reason against amendment, nor has the Imperial Parliament apparently so thought, for in its latest session it managed, despite the crush of the Irish Land Bill, to pass a Libel Amendment Act. Of the leading features of this sensible measure, one we have already discussed, two others deserve a few words, as does also one .very important omission. A year or two since, the proprietor of a disreputable London journal ventured to publish some entirely false statements with regard to two well-known fashionable beauties of the day. The man was criminally prosecuted, and not only fined heavily, but sent to the gaol he so richly deserved. The sight of an editor in durance vile was a novel one. Encouraged thereby, the London public turned on some of its literary tormentors, and a crop of libel actions was the result. As often happens, however, all the causes brought before justice were by no means good; many of them, indeed, were exceedingly trivial. To remedy this, and protect newspaper proprietors from needless vexation, it was proposed to oblige would-be prosecutors to first obtain the consent of the Attorney-General before the preferring of their indictments to a Grand Jury. To this, it was objected that the Attorney-General, being a political partisan, was the last person in the kingdom to judge of the fairness or unfairness of words written—os most alleged libels are—in connection with some political or public matter. Accordingly, in the amending Act of this year before alluded to, we find that the consenting party is not, in England, the Attorney-General, but the Director of Public Prosecutions, In Ireland, oddly enough, it is the Attorney-General; a distinction that may possibly be found to add another to the long list of Hibernian grievances. As far as regards England, however, tbearrangementougbt,wofanoy, to work very well, and we shall probably hear* less in the future of newspaper owners being committed to appear in the felon’s dock to answer charges, when in reality no sensible man expects any Grand Jury to find a bill against them. The necessity for some such preliminary authorisation in the case of certain offences other than libel has been admitted in Now Zealand by the “Vexatious Indictments Act.” This, however, allows a Magistrate to commit for trial. Failing such commitment the prosecutor has then to obtain the fiat of the Attorney-General or a Judge. This Act might either be made to embrace prosecutions for libel, or else the English arrangement might be adopted in toto. The latter seems the simpler and better way.

By another section of the English Statute a slight curtailment of the very largo privileges enjoyed by newspapers

in commenting o» public affair* made. Until now it has been *llßlOlOlll m Lugland for an accused journalist to plead the public nature of the matte*’ criticised by him, and to «bow that bo had fair ground* for a belief that hi* charge was based on fact. Now, however, ho i» to bo deprived of thi* defence if tt can bo abown that ho ha* declined to innert an explanation by or on behalf of the per* ion attacked. Thi* seem* only fair, nor would any reasonable new*paper proprietor object to it for a moment. A reftwal to print a reply, would almost argue tbo existence of express malice. Indeed, we ehonld like to «ee added a proviso that the explanation should receive the same prominence, in the way of print and position, a* the newspaper 1 * column* had given to the word* complained of. But what construction i* to bo given to the word* “on behalf of” ? Are they to mean that on Editor is bound to insert an explanation coming from whom you will—-from some selfappointed champion, apparently quite unauthorised by the man attacked? That would hardly do. The principal omission of the Amendment Act—so far, that is, a* we can at present gather, for the text of the Act has not yet reached ns—seems to lie in the position in which it leaves newspaper owners, of being still liable to criminal prosecution for tbo acta of their editors, sub-editors, &c„ with which they may have no immediate concern. It is useless for a proprietor thus arraigned to plead that the writing in question was published without bis knowledge, in his absence, or even in opposition to his express orders. A case beyond even these occurred recently in England. A shareholder in a newspaper company had voted against the appointment of a certain editor. This editor, elected by the votes of the majority, wrote something in the paper which led to a prosecution for libel. Among the accused appeared the unfortunate shareholder, who had by this roundabout process become a libeller in spite of himself. More outrageous still is the possibility of this happening to a newspaper partner, whom the partnership deed, as is often the case, prevents from haring any voice in the management of the business. That proprietors should be always open to a civil action for damages is perfectly just. But to punish a man criminally for an act with which be has, as a matter of absolute fact, no connection whatever, is opposed altogether to the spirit of the English Law. Every registered newspaper ought to have a registered responsible editor, who, with the actual writer of the libellous article, should be alone criminally responsible. The civil liability of the proprietors should, of course, continue ms at present, otherwise, by appointing, as manager, a man financially of straw, a newspaper might evade all pecuniary punishment for its misdeeds.