THE DEFENCES OF CANADA.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXIII, Issue 1409, 6 June 1865, Page 2

THE DEFENCES OF CANADA.

House of Commons, Mabch 14

(From tlw Times, March 15.)

Mr. 8. FitzGerald said he was not unaware that the course he was about to take in bringing before the House the important question of the defences of Canada, was one that might be misapprehended and misrepresented. There were those in this House, and there were some out of doors, who thought that such a discussion might possibly in certain events tend rather to precipitate than to avoid any danger, and to induce rather than retard hostilities between this country and the United States. They might say that by constantly discussing the possibility of hostilities between the two countries, the people in both might come to consider such hostilities first as possible, then by degrees as probable, and at last as natural and almost inevitable. Upon this ground, therefore, they might deprecate discussion, and might choose to shut their eyes to existing facts, rather than by discussion and argument to put the public in full possession of the present state of affairs. Now, he was not of that opinion. He believed that the truest policy in tuah a case was that this House and the country should be fully acquainted with the facts. Moreover, if any remonstrance were to be addressed to anybody for provoking discussion, it should be addressed to Her Majesty's Government, who had laid before Parliament a paper not only contemplating the possibility and the probability of hostilities, but considering the possible course which thesehostilities wouldtake, pointingout what probably—or, as they seemed to think, inevitably —would be the result of these hostilities, namely, the defeat and the disgrace of the British arms. By publishing that paper her Majesty's Government had done j as much as in them lay to discourage the friends and to encourage the adversaries of this country. There were some, he knew, by whom either the , effect or the object of this motion might be misrepresented. There were those in this House, or out of it. who, from a persistent partiality for the policy of the Federal States of America, and from a conscientious sympathy for the objects of that policy, would be likely to attribute to him a desire rather to increase than allay irritation on the part of this country against the Federal Government, so as rather to increase than to diminish the probability of hostilities between the two countries. If such an imputation were made nothing could be more unjust or unfounded. He believed there was no man in that House who would vindicate the utterance of a single word which could, by possibility, increase the irritation between the two countries. He was one of those who differed widely from the lion, member for Radnorshire, who seemed to consider, when he spoke on a former occasion, that the step taken by the American Government in reference to the termination of the convention, limiting the naval forces of the two countries on the Lakes, and in reference to the Reciprocity Treaty, was conceived in a spirit of hostility towards this country. It appeared to him that, in regard to the termination of the convention limiting the naval forces on the Lakes, the American Government were justified in that course of proceeding. What were the circumstances under which the notice of termination was given ? An American vessel was seized by a party of sympathizers from Canada m American waters, and it was ouly by accident that a second vessel was not also seized, and then that which was the avowed object of their enterprise might have been carried out—the liberation of a large number of prisoners confined in Johnson's Island, amounting, he believed, to 2,000. After such an attack on Federal property in Federal waters he thought that the United States were justified in having recourse to an increase of force for police purposes in the Lakes. That measure was proposed in the first instance by the Federal Government as a temporary increase during the war, and was so intimated to the Government of this country, but afterwards notice was given for the permanent and total termination of the convention. As regarded this point he thought her Majesty's Government greatly to blame. He thought that the moment those events took place, ami when the Federal Government intimated their intention to adopt some measure ot' a temporary character, the English Government ought at once to have met them in a conciliatory manner and said, "The object that you have in view is as important to us as to you, and we are ready to enter into au arrangement to have a temporary increase of' forces on both sides for the naval police of the Lakes." If such a course had been pursued, it was his conviction that the English Government never would have received from America what might be productive of some complication and embarrassment—the regular notice permanently and completely to terminate the convention. Again, in respect to the Reciprocity Treatv. The notice to terminate that was given in a moment of irritation, and in consequence cf the events in Canada; but he thought that the course which her Majesty's Government ought to have pursued was to say, " Do not precipitately and entirely put an end to that treaty, which has removed from the arena so many causes of difference and quarrel, but point out where it may be amended, and we are willing to meet you and to modify the treaty." If that had been done, he believed that the Reciprocity Treaty would not have been terminated, and that a number of questions with respect to the fisheries, which had before brought the two countries almost to a state of war, would never have been re-opened again. (Hear, hear.) He wished it, therefore, to be understood that in the observations he was about to make he did not desire to attribute to the American Government anything like a feel-

ingof hostility towards this country. On the contrary, during the last two months the communications which had passed between the United States and her Majesty's Government had been, generally speaking, marked br a far greater spirit of consideration, temperance, and conciliation than previously He was happy to acknowledge that this result was, in a great measure, owing to the wise, discreet, and prudent conduct Ihich had marked the course of the American representative in this country, who had done more than any other man in maintain- . peace between the two countries, and Lho had thereby conferred equal obligations his'owu country and on the people of this, ?llear hear.) He would not attribute to the 4nierican people generally a desire to go : W ar with this country. On the contrary, Z believed that the great bulk of the educed ™d intelligent classes in America, j 0 though they might not take a decided latin public affairs, yet had a great infillh O L e in their country, would deprecate as much as any one on this side of the Atlantic Jmvthin" like hostilities between this country nmi the United States. At the same time, Mmvared to him to be worse than folly to mt the eves to what might possibly happen. Tt wn< impossible to say what might have been the result of a chance accident in the course of the last year or year and a half. Wht must have happened it the ill-tempered L'hastv declaration of General Dix, which wl , it once and most honourably disavowed br the American Government, had been fluted on ? Supposing the Canadian frontier Wbeen invaded by American troops, that blood had been shed aud life lost, who could <avi>one moment what would have been the result ? Supposing, again, that the two «**)* in American waters had beeu captured and some ISOO or 2000 Confederate winners set free, would not such an event have agitated the people from one end of the United States to the other? He would point out another reason for takiug this matter fairlv into consideration. It was not long <ince they all read, in one of Mr. Seward's dispatches, an account of what passed in an interview between Federal and Confederate authorities, and Mr. Seward stated:—

What the insurgent party seemed chiefly to favour was a postponement of the question of separation upon which the war is waged, and a mutual d-ection of the efforts of the Government, ns well a< thewe of the insurgents, to some extrinsic policy or scheme for a season, during which passions might be ejected to subside, and the armies be reduced, and trale and intercourse between people of bolh «eetion« be resumed. It was suggested by them that through such postponement we might now have ■'-"miediateVace, with some not very certain prospect of an ultimate satisfactory adjustment of political relations between the Government and the States, section or people, now engaged in conflict with it.

This proposition certainly was not accepted, but be would point out "that when it was communicated to Congress it was unaccompanied by a single word expressing disapprobation or repudiation of it, or denouncing it as a faithless and treacherous proposal against a friendly power. He was aware that the Confederate Government had represented to the French Government, and, no doubt to her Majesty's Government also, that the proposition did not come first from them. It did not matter one farthing from whom it first came, but he wished to point out this, that though the proposition was not accepted or entertained, yet it was not the first time that two conflicting powers had thought that the best thing to do in order to keep down and soften the feeling of animosity between their own people was to turn upon and join in acts of violence against a weak and defenceless neighbour. (Hear, hear.) It was only last year that they had the spectacle of two great military Powers, having each objects of their own to gain, and thinking to establish concord between themselves exactly by that process, turning upon a third and defenceless power, and committing acts of violence and spoliation against it which would ever redound to their shame. (Hear, hear.) "What, therefore, he wished to point out was that, although he did not believe for one moment that a proposal of that kind would be accepted by the Federal Government, yet, at the same time, they had not repudiated it, and it was possible thattberemightbe ciicumstances of such emergency, that such a proposal might be entertained, when the consequences to us might become serious. But what was still more important, was the possible disposition of the American people, supposing the Federal Government to succeed m their conflict with the Confederate States. He would give the American Government the fullest credit for desiring to maintaiu peace ; and he would give the intelligent and educated class of the American people credit lor doing everything in their power for the Mine object. He would also give every weight to the consideration that it might be oj the greatest possible importance to the -federal States to have time to recover their strength and repair the losses they had sustained in their gigantic struggle. But, at the same time, it must be remembered that the Americans were a proud, a high-spirited, and a boastful race ; they might be intoxicated yih their success, and then in what position would they stand ? They would see that "iey had had it impressed upon them by their own Government, and not altogether without reason, that they had causes of complaint against this country (hear, hear) that they had had their commerce swept ™ the seas-that they had been told by their own government that the vital strength w the rebellion, as they termed it, had arisen from England having set the example 01 a precipitate acknowledgment of belligerent rights Exulting in their triumph they would also have before them the paper m* T} heen I ,roflu ced by the Government ot England telling them that they had * ready and easy prey at their very feet. Ana were we to think that they would not aretch forth their hands and seize the prize, niess effectual steps had been taken before'una to protect it ? Therefore, while giving rill tt . Ifc to t,ie Government and people L T P^ ed Sfcates > hesaitl ifc would be the breatest folly 0 f which the House and the wry could be capable to shut their eyes i 0 the possibility of hostilities occurring, nuer certain circumstances, between the •h rl ! °r e f • That bei "g so » the point they aa to look at was very simply and shortly jl them in the report of Colonel jenois wb.ch had been laid on the table by ™ Majesty's Government. Almost the 8t Paraph in that report was this:British i uestion appears to be this-whether the ordertn!l C -i n T in Canatlashoul(l withdrawn in JieceLlrv he rißk of itß dtf eat, or whether the forceT LT Bur( i 8 Bball be tak *n to enable that rce to be of use in defence of the colonies. ow that was the question which he wished to ?h g r^ er the notice of the House. As faring • ?° a 0f thetwo propositions contW „ *¥ alte ™tive he did not believe hS,t n Te ,? enin the House wh ° w ° uld mZ t\ £ dld not believe there were the a m the House or in the country who

would say that they would quietly determine to abandon the Canadoa to their own defence, to lend them no assistance, to withdraw our troops for fear they should be defeated or taken prisoners of war. He did not believe there was a single man in the House or out of it who would assent to a course so disastrous and so disgraceful to the British name. (Hear.) If that were so, then they came to the other branch of the alternative—viz., whether the necessary measures should be taken to enable the British force now in the province to be of use in the defence of the colony. It had been urged by members on both Bides of that House, tuat the first thing they should make the colonists understand was that they were, if not to be solely responsible for their own defence, to contribute, to it in by far the greater degroe. (Hear, hear.) He had supported that proposition himself, and he thought it a sound one. But he wished to point out to the House that the position of Canada was very dufereut from that of our other colonies. He could understand that having giveu responßible,government to New Zealand, and the settlers having engaged in contests with the Maoris, it was not fair that we, who had no control over their policy, should be called upon to bear all the burden of a war which that policy had brought about. Again, it was not fair that we should be called upon to engage perpetually in Caflre wars. These were cases in which,

having given responsible government to the colonists, it was for them to exert themselves in their own defence. But what was the position of Canada ? His belief was that if Canada were independent to-morrow, she would not run the slightest danger of a contest. (Hear, hear.) There were impediments, financial, industrial, and political,

which would interfere with any project on the part of the American Government for annexing Canada. His belief was that they would be content to see that colony, if independent, growing up side by side with them. But that was not the position of Canada. She was united to this country, and wished to remain so. They had the authority of Lord Bussell, speaking in another place the other night, for saying that as long as the Canadians chose to stand by us we wore bound to stand by them, and that it would be a disgrace and dishonour for us to allow them to be oppressed by a neighbouring country. More than that, it was not only that if they were independent there would be no cause of quarrel between the United States and the Canadians; but

it must be remembered that the only cause of quarrel, now that they were united with us, which could occur between the United States and the Canadians was their connec-

tion with us. It was only because the Americans thought they could through them strike at us that they could ever have auy cause of quarrel with them; and the only ground of offence which could possibly exist between the Canadians and the Americans was that there might arise questions between the Americans and us in which it would be impossible for the Canadians to do otherwise thau adhere to us. Thus, then, the cause of the quarrel would not be Canadian, but ours; and the only sources of danger to the Canadians were their connexion with this country and the belief on the part of the Americans that they could wound us through Canada. It should be remembered that there was no ground of quarrel at the present moment between Canada and the United States. The Canadians had not permitted the Alabama to escape ; they had not precipitately acknowledged belligerent rights j they had done everything they could, as far as these raids were concerned, to put them down; they had met the American Government half-way in all the measures which had been adopted to secure the peace of the frontier; and it was only the other day that a distinguished American said to him, " I only wish that the conduct of the mother country had been half as loyal to America as that of her colony has been." (Hear.) Therefore, there could be no cause of quarrel between Cauada and the United States, except the fact that she was united to EDgland. Well, then, what were the means and preparations for her defence? He thought it was perfectly clear that if the cause of dispute was au Imperial one,—if we were bound to stand by the Canadians while they were willing to stand by us, it would be impossible for us to do otherwise than exert every means in our power to contribute towards the defence of a country brought into danger wholly by. its connection with us. What were the means of defence that had been proposed by her Majesty's Government? They had had commission after commission sent out to Canada. They had a commission iu 18G2, of which Colonel Gordon was a member; and, although its recommendations were very similar to these, tbey were more extensive, and contemplated an expenditure of money and construction of fortifications so vast that the Government sent out another commission in 18G3. Another commission also was sent out in 1864, and what had been done ? Practically, nothing. He wished to point out to the House°what were the propositions made by the Government. The report of Colonel Jervois proceeded on this ground —that the defence of Canada munt be military, by a union of a certain amount of British force with a large Cana dian force, protected and supported by additional fortifications. Colonel Jervois also pointed out what was of still greater importance—viz., that the great, the real means of defence for Canada must be a defence by the Canadians themselves. What was it that was now proposed in regard to fortifications ? The only fortification to be undertaken was that of Quebec, and this was to proceed at so slow and prudent a rate that only £50,000 was to be spent this year. (Hear, hear.) The first thing, therefore, he ; wished to know was—if they were convinced of the necessity of fortifying Quebec, why did they not do it years ago ? It had been recommended as imperative and inevitable. Colonel Jervois recommended it a year ago. In the letter which had been laid on the table he referred to his report of 180-1 He said " he pointed out in his report, dated February, 1801, as the result of his inspection in Canada, that the construction of certain works of fortification at Montreal and Quebec was essential to enable the British troops and local forces to resist an invasion by the Americans with any prospect of success." Then, as they acknowledged it to be their boundeu duty to assist in the defence of Canada by fortifying Quebec, he asked why did they delay it, why did they not do it long ago ? He was aware that, to a certain extent, Government might find a justification for their proposal to spend only "£50,000 this year on the permanent works to be erected on the right bank of the St. Lawrence. Probably £50,000 was as much

«s during this year could well be expended at that point. But what had been the course of the American Government where they had fortifications to erect ? Had they been content with spending only the sum necessary for permanent works, and »o consuming a number of years in the completion of permanent fortifications ? -No ; what they did was this—they expended a certain sum on the permanent fortifications; but, side by side witn these, they raised temporary earthworks, which, during the construction of the permanent works, would be sufficient for the defence of the position and contribute to the safety of their army. It was certainly clear that if for the permanent fortifications the sum of £50,000 was as much as they could expend during the present year at this particular point, it was their bounden duty promptly, and without a day's delay, to put Quebec in that state of defence by earthworks that would at least seoure it against attack during the construction of the permanent fortifications. Then he wished to ask what they had been doing as regarded the armament of Quebec P It had, no doubt, been improved. Guns of considerable calibre, but few in number, had been placed there. But there were other guns there of a very inefficient character — guns which would be utterly useless at 100 yards, and even these, according to an account given in a late publication, were placed on carriages so rotten that if stumbled against they would break to pieces. Was that a position in which a great Imperial fortress should be kept ? Government for the last three years had notice of the condition of that fortress, and now, at last, they tardily acknowledged that it was vitally important that it should be put in a perfect state of Then, with regard to the fortifications proposed for Montreal and Kingston. Those for Montreal were estimated at £450,000. He asked whether the Canadian Government were to find the money, and who were to construct the works? Did they mean that the Canadian Government should do it, or did they intend to do it themselves ? They must remember the position of the Canadian Government. They were now put to find suddenly an amount equivalent to very nearly £1,000,000 sterling, at the very time they were carrying out the confederation scheme, and when obviously they could not engage in any financial operation like the raising of a large sum of money by loan; he wanted, therefore, to know from the Government what steps they were taking

in order to carry out the recommendation of Colonel Jervois—whether they were prepared to carry out these recommendations on the understanding that the Canadian Government agreed to repay the amount required by instalments, or whether they were going on shilly-shallying, taking neither one course nor another, but putting ou the Canadian Government the responsibility, and when they were found unprepared at the last moment, to throw on them the blame, because they did not find the money. What did they do in the case of Sardinia ? The Government opposite came down and pro- j posed a loan of £1,000,000. That was for a foreign Power, engaged in a foreign war. Were they prepared to do less for their own honour and for the security of their own brethren in Canada than they had done for Sardinia ? He wanted an answer, in distinct

terms, from the right hem. gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies as to the ability of the Canadian Government to carry out

these works, and whether the British or the Canadian Government was to construct

them ? Another important matter connected with these defences, suggested by Colonel Jervois, had reference to the great works at Kingston ; and these, again, were intimately connected with his recommendation that the defence of Canada should be, not military only, but by means of a naval force on the St. Lawrence and the Lakes. From the sea our most powerful sea-going vessels would have access to Quebec. From Quebec to Montreal the St. Lawrence might be effectively and successfully defended by gunboats, ironplated and heavily armed, drawing 15ft. or 16ft. of water. That was clearly a por-

tion of the defence that must be undertaken by this country and could not be undertaken by Canada. Higher up, from Kingston to the head of the Upper rapids, the defence must again be by gunboats. But it was obvious if they were to have an efficient naval defence of the lakes and St. Lawrence, there must be some place for depots, where their steamers might coal or refit, and where their stores might be in safety. It was, therefore, propsed, for the safety of the vessels engaged in the naval defence of the Lakes and the St. Lawrence, that there should be large depots at Kingston. He now wished to ask some questions with reference to Montreal—what were they doing there ? "Were the Canadian Government to carry out the scheme proposed, or were the British Government to do it, the Canadian Government finding the money ? Or, were they prepared to assist them ? More than that, he wished to know, as the fortifications proposed were of great extent and importance, formidable in their character, what was doing in the way of temporary arrangements by earthworks, in order, for the present, at least, to secure the two positions on which, according to the report of Colonel Jervois, the safety of the British troops entirely depended. Again, what were they doing with reference to gunboats ? As regarded vessels of small size, they had, at present, only two or three. What were they doing to prepare others ? Without them they could not possibly defend the line of the St. Lawrence from Quebec to Montreal. Again, with reference to gunboats on theLakes,whatvvere they doing with the view of placing an increased force on Lake Ontario ? They remembered what the French Government did in Italy. They constructed ironplated vessels at Toulon, and carried them in sections to the Italian lakes, where they were put together, and rendered the most efficieut service to the French army. The same thing was being done at present in the naval yards of America, and he wished to know whether Her Majesty's Government were taking any steps to place a naval force, when the present convention expired, on the Lake Ontario. They had some vessels of the kind, but not any of the most efficient character; were any steps being taken to in» crease that naval force ? It might be aaid all this was premature, but he asked the House to liften for one moment to what the American Government had done. They had notice of what the American feeling was m regard to this country in the affair of the Trent. The American people felt hurailiatod at what then occurred; and what did they do? From that very moment they had spared no expense in putting every vulnera* ble point in a perfect state of defence. They knew in case of a war with this country the points we should attack. He was told that at Portland there was a new granite work completed mounting upwards of 80 guns, and

that all the earthworks previously existing had been strengthened, in addition to the construction of other permanent works, and these fortifications were amply armed with the heaviest artillery that the United States could produce. The old forts at Boston had nearly been renewed and strengthened, but the most formidable artillery that could be obtained placedin tbem; andat the entrance to Boston therewerenewbatteriesandearthworks thrown up in anticipation of more permanent works, and there were mounted on these and other places, at the present time, 100 guns of the most formidable character. With regard to New York, a naval officer who had lately seen it, and who had also seen Cronstadt and Sebastopol, said he believed the fortifications at New York were far more formidable than at those places, and were absolutely invulnerable. He did not believe that the American people desired hostilities with this country; but they were wise enough to know that the most economical and wise plan waß, at the earliest possible moment, and by degrees, to establish the most perfect system of defence that modern science could give. The noble lord at the head of the Government and his friends had been spending fabulous sums upon the fortifications of England, but in case of a war with America, our vulnerable point would be the frontier of Canada. The Government had been warned of the danger three years ago, and yet they had taken no steps whatever to avert it. Even the works which they now possessed were not armed with such weapons as the United States possessed, but with the most inefficient, antiquated pieces of artillery, utterly insufficient for the purpose of defence. (Hear, hear.) What had the Government done with reference to gunnery ? While the United States Government was busy at ISew York, the English Government was content to take the chance of the chapter of accidents. He hoped there would be no cause for quarrelling with the American people, but if war should not arise, it would not be from any feeling on the part of the Americans that the English had put themselves in a state of effective defence; but it would be from their forbearance in not taking up arms at the moment any particular question arose which could excuse or justify .them in declaring war. He had received another letter stating some facts of which he had every reason to believe Her Majesty's Government had been made aware. He read an extract of a letter dated New York, Feb. 20, 1865, stating that he might not, perhaps, be aware that the Federal Government were now actively, but quietly, preparing for a conflict with Canada, and to which all were now looking forward with some apprehension. He (Mr. S. Fitzgerald) did not agree in the slightest with the views of the writer. He did not believe the steps the Federal Government were now taking were in any degree in a spirit of hostility to tin's country, but they were perfectly justified in taking those steps in their own defence. The letter stated, also, as a fact that was not generally known, that a portion of a fleet of gun boats for the Canadian lakes was actually in the course of construction in London, and that an American firm who had settled in London had received the order from the Federal Government. These gunboats, which were to be 40 in -number, were to measure 45ft. in length, and 15ft. in depth, and were to be constructed on the diagonal principle, and to have great strength and speed. They were to carry one large gun, and it was unnecessary to point out how mischievous they would be in shallow water. Five of these powerful " wasps" as they were called had already arrived out there, having been shipped in segments on board large packets from one of the docks in London, and were afterwards easily transported on trucks up the country, where they would lie till wanted for active use. He (Mr. S. Fitzgerald believed that the attention of Her Majesty's Government had been drawn to this. He was perfectly aware that under the existing state of the law they could not interfere, but he wanted to know—not why they did not interfere, but what they were doing under the circumstances, and whether they were not preparing in the dockyards of this country something which might compete with these boats on the lakes. Colonel Jervois said the only resource left to the British troops if no fortifications were to be provided, would be to retire to their ships as quickly as possible in order to avoid being taken prisoners of war. He had spoken thus long upon the subject from an earnest conviction that it was one of vital, pressing, and paramount importance. (Hear, hear.) During the last few years war might at any moment have broken out between this country and the United States, arising either from a raid on Canada set on foot, perhaps, by Confederate sympathizers, or through the rashness of some injudicious commander, and if war should at any time commence, who could say where it would end ? They had in Canada the Guards, the flower of the army, troops who had not only the prdstige of being specially attached to the person of the Sovereign, but among their numbers were scions who had won still nobler fame in fields of battle; and what would have been the position of these regiments if war had unexpectedly broken out? They would have scorned to have fled to their ships and left Canada to be taken and ruined, aud there was nothing left for them but hopeless and certain destruction. No one could say for certain that hostilities would not break out between this country and the United States, but they could say'for certain that if this country did not act promptly and vigorously our best blood might be sacrificed and the honour of the arms of England tarnished. He hoped he had said enough to induce the House and the country to press upon the Government the necessity of altering the system which they had adopted for the last two or three years. They were bound at once to put in force the whole moans at their command to make Canada what it ought to be—capable of defence. He hoped that the American people when intoxicated with success, would not make war with this country; but if Canada were put in a proper state of defence this would strengthen the friends of peace both hero and in Canada, and remove a great source of temptation from those who would be disposed to make war. If, unfortunately, hostilities should break out between the two countries, he should have the satisfaction of knowiug that he had done his duty in pressing upon the Government and that House the adoption of those measures which should remove the danger to our arms. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. W. E. Forster did not rise to deprecate a discussion of the questions which the hon gentleman, the member forllorsham, |iad brought forward, and still less did he object to the tone in which those questions had been submitted to the House. His reason for rising was to express an earnest desire that when a reply to the hon. member should be

given from the Treasury Bench, that reply should be moet full, most frank, and meeting all the questions that had been raised— (hear, hear) —not merely questions relating to any duty that we might owe to Canada or Canada to us, but questions affecting the relations between the United States and Canada and between the United States and ourselves. The hon. member had started two or three distinct questions. Ono was how Canada could best be defended against a possible attack on her borders, but upon that, being an engineering question, he should not trouble the House. He would only observe that if the hon. gentleman wished this country to place the whole length of the border of Canada in a state of perfect defence he was suggesting one of the most costly undertakings ever thought #f, and the hon. gentleman would go down to posterity as an extravagant imitator of the fortification scheme which had immortalized "the noble lord. (" Hear," and laughter.) Then there was a question raised as to the respective shares of expense to be borne by this country and by Canada, for defending the latter. Into that question he was not disposed to enter, because the principle was becoming every day more established that the relations* between this country and the colonists of British Norfch America were very much on the basis of an offensive and defensive alliance between two self-governing communities united together by allegiance to ono legitimate Sovereign. Therefore we had a right to call upon the North American colonies by organization and union to assist in their own defence, and to prove their patriotism by a willing contribution of money and of men. There was, however, another question referred to by the hon. gentleman which had a more immediate interest to all in that House. That question was whether there was any urgent necessity that those two allies should at once enter into arrangements for the defence of Canada against a possible invasion by her powerful neighbour. No one could object to the tone of the hon. member for Horsham, but was it clear that there was such danger as he seemed to apprehend ? Was there reason to fear that peace between the two sections of the North American States now contending with each other would mean war by them against this country, with Canada and the ocean for battlefields ? He knew that fear did prevail extensively, but he need hardly say that he did not entertain it, as he believed it to be utterly groundless. Still that fear did prevail; it kept down the funds and affected all the calculations of commerce. A contest between the United States and ourselves would be a disgrace to civilization, and might almost be called one civil war taking the place of another. (Hear, hear.) Still, though he believed the fear to be utterly groundless, yet he was not surprised at its existence; because, certainly, men in high position and exercising great influence in the country had done their best, honestly no doubt, to create it. The conciliatory tone of the hon. member for Horsham had not been adopted by members of his party occupying even more distinguished positions before the country. He would only refer to a speech delivered in another place by a noble earl who was regarded with the greatest respect by hon. gentlemen opposite, and for whom those who sat on his (Mr. Forster's) side of the House also entertained great respect. That noble earl, on the occasion of dispatches being produced, took an opportunity of expressing his fears of a war with the United States, in a man-

ner more urgent and less conciliatory than the hon. member had done. Those remarks of the Earl of Derby—(" Order! ")—he begged pardon, the remarks which were made elsewhere, on a late occasion, were to

the effect that very great danger existed, owing to the hostile feeling of the American people towards us. The speaker on that occasion dwelt upon what he considered the menacing symptoms of hostility on the part of the United States, and said that he regarded the danger as immediately impending. Of course when a statesman holding so high a position uttered such words their effect was felt throughout the country. The temperate tone of the hon member to-night might, to some extent, undo the harm which the speech of the noble earl had done. Still, the very fact of such discussions made it imperative upon the Government to give the fullest information, aud the House ought to

know whether the state of our relations with the United States was such as would warrant the language that had been held elsewhere. It was not right, perhaps, to use the word "fear," because a brave and high-spirited nation like this did not fear any other Power. It would be better to say that suspicions were entertained which might be very irritating andunreasonable; but, because of their unreason, were exceedingly dangerous. Let the House look back for three or four years, and he thought that all who were afflicted with the French panic of that time now felt ashamed for the fears they then expressed. (" No!") In the case of America it was still worse, because the very reason which should make a war with the United States a thing to be dreaded was also a reason why the danger of a fulfilment of our own apprehensions was greater,—the similarity of language which caused every expression of suspicion and anger to reach the American people. A few days since there was a leader in the most influential organ of public opinion in this country, The Times, in which, in the strongest language, it was asserted that there could be no question but that the Federals would go to war with us whenever a prospect of success presented itself. (Hear, hear.) Some gentlemen in that House seemed to be of the same opinion (hear, hear), but would they agree with the concluding paragraph of that article, in which a hope was expressed that the present terrible contest would continue to devastate America and to decimate the population, so that the Northern people, to whom were imputed hostile iutentions against us, might become exhausted ? If there were, such hostile feelings entertained towards us it was important to ascertain the fact. True there had been articles in American newspapers of a hostile character, but articles of a similar tendency towards America had been published in newspapers here. True there had been unwise speeches in the American Congress, but had there not been unwise speeches made in the English Parliament ? (Hear, hear.) A nation could, however, only be responsible for the acts of its rulers, and he would accordingly refer for a moment or two to what had been done by the American Government. He did not understand that the notice given by Mr. Adams of the discontinuance of the arrangement with regard to the Lakes was final, and h§ believed that the interpretation which had been given to that notice by his lion, friend was a wrong one. Mr. Adams, in the dispatch containing that notice, after mentioning the reasons for

adopting such a course—reasons which had been dwelt upon by his hon. friend—proceeded to say:— r

I am therefore with regret instructed to give this formal notice to your Lordship, that, in conformity with the treaty reservation of the right, at the exDirution of six months from the date of this note the United States will deem themselves at liberty to increase the naval armament upon the Lakes, if jn their judgment, the condition of affairs in that quarter shall then require it.

They all knew, however, that a great deal might happen in Bix months. It was his belief—and m that belief many persons coincided—that before that time had elapsed, it was by no means impossible that the war itself, and with it the very state of things which had led to this notice, might be at an end. Mr. Adams went on to say :-—

In taking this step, I am desired to assure your Lordship that it is resorted to only as an indispensable measure to the national defence, and, so far from being in a spirit of hostility, that it springs from a wish, no less earnest than heretofore, to preserve the most friendly relations with Great Britain. I take pleasure in adding that it ia the fixed purpose of my Government, in every cafe, to direct its energies to the prevention of all attempts to invade the British territory, whether by waj of retaliation or otherwise.

If words expressed any meaning at all, that dispatch conveyed the impression that that arrangement was not regarded as a bad one by the American Government, but that it was simply thought necessary to depart from it on grounds of self-defence, and that as soon as the causes which had led to the departure had ceased, the desire for its termination would no longer remain. His hon. friend evidently laboured under a misapprehension with respect to the Reciprocity Treaty, because, as yet, no notice had been given for its termination. There was undoubtedly a party in America whose interests were injured by that treaty, but when the causes of'irritation at present in existence had ceased, he believed that the great majority of the American people would feel that that treaty, in its main principles at all events, had been of great advantage to both countries; in reality, he believed, even more advantageous to the Americans than to the Canadians. This feeling would, he believed, prevent that treaty from being repealed, though it might possibly undergo some slight modification. His hon. friend had also severely blamed the American Government for the efforts which they had made to fortify their towns. He felt sure, however, that his hon. friend would not for a moment attribute such an obvious act of self-defence to any desire on the part of the American Government to commence hostilities against this country. It should not be forgotten that, although our Government had preserved the strictest neutrality during this unhappy conflict, attempts had been made for the purpose of procuring a departure from that policy ; and, not unnaturally, a fear was excited in America lest those attempts should prove successful. The Government of that country, therefore, would have beeu remiss in their duty if they had taken no step 3 to provide against the emergency which a war with a foreign Power would have created. He would allude, also, to an impression which existed in the minds of many persons, that it was the intention of the American Government to enforce a claim on account of the disasters caused by the Alabama aud similar ships which had issued from our ports. He trusted the House would allow him to refer to the words in which that claim had been urged. After giving the reasons on which the claim was

ibuuded, such as the destruction of property, and accusing us of a want of promptitude in our attempts to hinder the departure of these vessels from our shores, Mr. Adams said:—

Upon these principles of law and these assumptions of fact, resting upon the evidence in the case, I am instructed to say that my Government must continue to insist that Great Britain has made itself responsible for the damaees which the peaceful, lawabiding citizens of the United States sustain by the depredations of the vessel called the Alabama. In repeating this conclusion, however, it is not to be understood that the United States incline to act dogmatically or in a spirit of litigation. They desire to maintain amity as well as peace. They fully comprehend how unavoidably reciprocal grievances must spring up from the divergence in the policy of the two countries in regard to the present insurrection. They cannot but appreciate the difficulties under which her Majesty's Government is labouring from the pressure of interests and combinations of British subjects, apparently bent upon compromising, by their unlawful acts, the neutrality which her Majesty has proclaimed and desires to preserve, even to the extent of involving the two nations in the horrors of a maritime war. For these reasous lam instructed to say, that they frankly confess themselves unwilling to regard the present hour as the most favourable to a calm and candid examination by either party of the facts or the principles involved in cases like the one now in question. Though indulging a firm conviction of the correctness of their position in regard to this and other claims, they declare themselves disposed at all time?, hereafter as well as now, to consider in the fullest manner all the evidence and the arguments which her Majesty's Government may incline to proffer in refutation of it; and, in case of an impossibility to arrive at any common conclusion, I am directed to say there is no fair and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference to which they will not be willing to submit.

(Hear, hear.) He did not believe that any Government, impressed with the conviction that they had a right to make such a claim, could possibly have urged that claim in a more conciliatory spirit. (Hear, hear.) He perceived by a Parliamentary paper of the 31st of March, 1861, that there were 451 claims by British subjects against the American Government, Many of those claims were, no doubt, valid, and would not be disputed by the Americau Government; but any American who believed that wo should enforce those claims without negotiation would be labouring under a strong delusion. Ho would, therefore, ask the Treasury Bench to inform the House during the progress of the debate whether any dispatch had been received from America altering the principle upon which the claim had been urged by Mr. Adams -whether, in fact, any claim had been made except on account of the destruction of the Sea Bride by the Alabama ? No conduct of the Americans would warrant the extraordinary suspicion which many people entertained 'of the intention of the inhabitants of that country. It could not reasonably be imagined that a peace so ardently longed for by those upon whom the present disastrous conflict had entailed so much expense and suffering would be inaugurated by the commencement of an unprovoked war upon a nation, at all events, more powerful than the South, a war which, though it might possibly be successful in Canada, would be attended with an expense as great, if not greater, than the one which would be just concluded. He believed that the British public had been misled by Confederate agents, or sympathizers with the South, and by disappointed prophets. ("Hear, bear, and laughter) His W. friend the member for Horsham had, he was afraid, permitted the too near approach of the first class, and the gunboat story alluded to by his hon. friend might, he believed, be traced to a

Confederate source. (Mr. S. Fitzgerald.— No.) There were many Confederate sympathizers—and lie did not blame them—who, now that the rebellion appeared to be in its last stage, were straining every nerve to induce us to attempt the rescue from defeat of the cause to which they were devoted. There were men, too, of great literary fame in this country who must be vexed at the shortcomings of their prophecies, and who, after having foretold from day to day the miserable Mure of the Federal Power, deemed it convenient to hide their fallacies, or, at all events, divert attention from their mistakes, by continually urging upon their countrymen that success in the North would only be the herald of a war with this country. These were the men who said that, whatever the American Government might Bay or do, we were not to trust to it, because, however friendly the Government might be, the people were unfriendly. That charge against the people was quite as baseless as the charge against the Government. It was to be traced to three ideas, each of which was based on a fallacy-first, that the Federal Power and the Federal people were greedy of empire and dominion; next, that they were vindictive and eager for revenge ; and, thirdly, that the Government was unable to control the feelings of the people.' There was a fallacy under each of those ideas. To take the last first. The member for Horsham himself seemed to suppose that the American Government- would not be able to contend against a demand for war which might be made by the American people under a feeling of temporary irritation ; but there was no Government in the world of which such a thing could be said with less foundation. (Hear, hear.) The American Government was a Government of the people; it had never yet been a government of the mob. He challenged any hon. gentleman to produce a case in which the mob had controlled the Government. (Hear, hear.) There might be dangerous mobs in New York and other cities, for which, perhaps, the American Government was not so much responsible as England and Ireland, who had sent there the people who constituted them ; but they had no influence over the Government. (Hear, hear.) There was no one city in the United States which had any power over the American Government. The real body who had influence over the Government was the great body of the country farmers, who cared nothing for any mob in New York or elsewhere. (Hear, hear.) There were checks, too, in the form of the American Government which prevented any yielding to temporary imitation mu<# stronger than any we bad. If there was a fault in the American Government it was that it.was less liable to public feeling, because the Executive was much more independent of the feeliug of the country than ours. The President had far more power than * our Prime Minister, and the fact which seemed to us so strange, that the members of the House of Legislature sat for months after they were virtually turned out was a proof that it was thought necessary to provide some check against temporary influences. What had happened during the war showed it. If an English Ministry had made the failures which had occurred in the conduct of the American armies and of American policy the English people would not have shown the same long-forbearing patience, but we should have had change after change of Administra-.. tion. (Hear, hear.) Therefore the fear thatr the American Government was likely to plunge into war through any temporary irritation on the part of the people was totally unreasonable. (Hear, hear.) Then, again, as to their being eager for revenge. No doubt, as the hon. gentleman opposite had admitted, there had been some things done in England at which the American people might feel some bitterness; but they had not been done by the Government, nor by the great body of the people. The Americans knew that, and the adherence to the cause of the Lancashire operatives throughout all their sufferings would far outweigh any attack made upon them by any men of great station. (Hear, hear.) They knew well that if there was one man in this country who, deluding himself into the belief that this greatest experiment of modern times was a failure, had hailed the accomplishment of his hope with premature joy, there were a hundred who, like the noble lord who had conducted our Foreign Affairs, had hoped from the first that the great republic would pass unscathed through its trial, and rejoiced now that it seemed likely that she would emerge purified from that slavery which had been her weakness and shame, because it had been her sin. (Hear, hear.) Then, as to the idea that the American people were greedy of dominion and empire, for that the noble lord at the head of the Foreign-office was in some degree responsible. In one of his speeches the noble lord said that the North were fighting for empire, and the South for independence, and then said how that if the American people would fight for empire in the South they would also fight for empire in the North. (Hear.) He would not say whether the North had been fighting for empire or not, but it certainly had not been conscious of it. The Northern people believed that they were fighting to prevent the destruction of their country; and in any attack upon Canada they could not feel that they were fighting in anything but an unprovoked war for empire, and that would be a very different feeling from that which now animated them. (Hear, hear.) This idea, therefore, was as unfounded as the others. Surely, then, we might consider how these fortifications were to be raised with coldness and calmness, and without rushing into any enormous expenditure which might affect the Budget for years. Whatever wo could do would not be the true defence of Canada. These fortifications would avail little for the defence of Canada; the matter would have to be fought out by the possibility of our inflicting injury on the Americans in other quarters. If Canada was to be defended at all, it must be by the continuance of that determination to uphold the principle of neutrality which the Canadians had evinced; and the best thing we could do, either in this country or in islands far away subject to our rule, was to endeavour, by every action and every thought, to hasten the time when—this great struggle over, and America once more in the enjoyment of that prosperity assured to her by her fruitful soil and boundless resources—the great Englishspeaking people, whether subjects of her Majesty or members of independent communities, or citizens of the United States, should feel themselves bound together by the tie of a common language, a common blood, faith, and freedom, and should deem a war between each other aa horrible and revolting as a civil war within their own territories. (Loud cheers.)

[to be continued.]