THE CONFEDERATE STATISH.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXIII, Issue 1408, 3 June 1865, Page 2

THE CONFEDERATE STATISH.

(From the Special Correspondent of tfo Times.)

Charleston. Jan, 2:j

There seemed little reason to think, when I reported, four weeks ago, the impotent conclusion of the bombardment which the forts of Wilmington sustained on the 2Hh and 25th of December, that before 21 days had flown, the attack would be renewed more seriously than before, both by land and water, and that Fort Fisher would succumb to the only danger which, as I then pointed out, it had to fear—to an attack by land. Two years' experience of Secession have taught me that it is vain for any one to attempt truthfully to record any important passage of this war, unless he is on the spot at the time of its occurrence, and witnesses its main features himself. In addition to the vigilance at all timed imposed upon a public writer, lest he should, during the continuance of war, disclose facts or statistics which are injurious to, and may be employed to the prejudice of the weaker belligerent, it is impossible, either from public journals, written passionately and under great excitement, or from private sources, which reveal only that insignificant part of the action in which the narrator participated, to gather more than a glimpse of what has passed. Premising that my sketch of the second attack on Wilmington, unlike that which I attempted of the first, is derived only from participants in the action, who escaped from the fort just before its capture, and spoke with limited knowledge and under strong excitement, aud that it is impossible to arrive at a more accurate narrative, inasmuch as General Whiting, Colonel Lamb, and their associates, are almost, without exception, prisoners, I will proceed to state what is here believed to have happened at Wilmington on the 13th, 14th, and 15th inst.

Late upon the evening of the 12th information reached General Whiting, in Wilmington, that the fleet of the enemy was again drawing up towards Fort Fisher, and that a second attack seemed imminent. It may confidently be asserted that upon this i occasion the feeling in "Wilmington in reference to such an attack was satisfaction and anticipated triumph, rather than alarm or misgiving. Every one believed, aud believed rightly, that Fort Fisher had little to fear from a bombardment by sea, and the presence in the neighbourhood of Wilmington of one of the finest divisions of General Lee's army afforded substantial grounds for thinking that the landing of Federal troops and their anticipated effort to attack the fort by land, would be neither easy nor sate proceedings. Upon the morning of Friday, the 13th, four iron'clad vessels, of which one was the new Ironsides, and the other three were turretted monitors, occupied the same position as they held in the Christmas-day attack, and drew near to the land face ot Fort Fisher; but upon this occasion, instead of lying at from 1600 to 1800 yards from the guns of the land face, they approached within 1200 yards. Your readers will, perhaps, remember that in my account of the last bombardment I stated that Fort Fisher mounted no very heavy guns on the land f.\ce, the largest being au 8-inch smooth-bore or Obpounder, and a 12-pouuder rilled gun. Profiting by his experience of the feebleness of Fort Fsher's fire from the land lace on the 24th and 25th of December. Admiral Porter ordered his iron-clad vessels to stand much closer in on January the 13th and to open fire at not much over 1000 yards. And here 1 may remark that the commentary made by General Shermau, when conversing with a lady in the interior of Georgia some weeks ago, upon the officers of the Northern and those of the Southern armies, seems every day to become truer and truer. General Sherman said, "There is no comparison between the valour of the rank aud file of the two armies; and, as an evidence, the Southern army lias held us back for nearly four years, when the odds have often been five to one against it. But the federals far surpass the Confederates in the industry aud perseverance of their officers. 'Our Generals outwit aud outmaiueuvre yours because they work ten times harder than yours. We spare neither time nor trouble to give effect to our schemes. Your bener&ls, on the contrary, trust to little _nioiv than naked unassisted valour." It 18 im " possible to doubt that if Fort 1 ishcr luu been a Federal aud not a Confederate foi there would, upon the loth of lebruaiy have been two or three large rifled gun* 011 the land face, which would have made it impossible for any vessel possessed by »e Federals to have lain within 1,-00 yard? o their muzzles. But the interval between Christmas-day and the 13th ot January [ spent in a jubilee over tho past triump i, rather than iu active preparations for secu ring another. Those Englishmen who * i maintain that the 68-pouuder is the bes-t gun afloat would perhaps reconsider their had they seen how impotent it proved i upon this occasion to produce any effect upon Monitors at 1,200 yards. It is not uoubted by anybody that at 200 or 300 yards the - pounder smooth-bore is equal to any ri ec gun; but the man who thinks that Mutt actions at sea will be decided by tactics i't Nelson's or Colliugwood's, and that i be possible for an English ship to ge within 200 yards of her antagonist, seems be reckoning without his adversary. large swivel gun carried by all federal s up& on their upper decks, which is never less t ia 100-pounderParrott or rifled gun, and w uc 1 frequently a 200-pounder gun of the sam family, would play upon an English ship » long taw," and decide the action long e the ships got within 200 yards of eac i o i • It is obvious that what our ships requn fewer guns, some rifled and some 6,11100 bore, and those of the heaviest calibre, a future letter I hope to draw atten io

the different systems of armament which !lvail in the English and American navies, P i w u; c h I may here mention, are determined upon the following principles The Americans take for their models the armaent of the English ships, and make it their "tudy to exceed it; the English think they have no occasion to learn from anybody, bee they have ruled the waves for 60 years, C nd seldom give heed to any experience other than tliat obtained within the British waters A v her Majesty's vessels on foreigu service. The time seems not far distant when we shall be forced to remember those distressing precedents so little heeded by the majority of Englishmen, in which the Guerriere, the Macedonian, and the Java went down before the superior weight of metal thrown by the Constitution, the United States, and other American frigates in the war of ISI2. And it cannot be denied that many Englishmen tvho are best acquainted at this moment with the Federal navy, assert it will be found, tfheu war between America and England breaks out, that the equality between American and English ships of the same class will be found to be apparent rather than veal, that the S-inch or 68-pound smooth bo'ro will find itself confronted by the 9-inch Dahlsreu smooth-bore, throwing a projectile of about 90 pounds; that the 100-pounder Armstrong will fiud' itself opposed to the 900-pounder Parrott, and so forth in regard id smaller calibres.

The four ironsided vessels which I have mentioned, kept up a steady firfc on the land face of Fort Fisher during the whole of the 13th, and about half-past 4 in the afternoon of the same day the entire Federal fleet steamed very leisurely and slowly past the sea face of the fort, and threw a feu d'enfer for about an hour into its open embrasures. Ia the meantime the Federal infantry was beinir lauded, during the whole of the 13th, about Gatlin's Battery, or about five miles to the north of Fort Fisher. No opposition or molestation was offered as they slowly eifected a landing under circumstances singularly favourable to them, and with the sea as smooth as a mill dam. During the whole niffht of the 13th and lith the Monitors kept up° a steady though not rapid fire on the land face, which was continued with more spirit on the morning of the 14th, and in which two large frigates stationed off the sea face took part upon this day. Upon Sunday the loth, the whole fleet resumed thelunette attitude which they wore on Christmas-day, and pelted the fort mercilessly until about 2 o'clock, when the troops which the Federals had now thrown across from the sea to the river drew near along the river bank. At this point the fort is entered by a road or causeway leading from Colonel Lamb's house. There is a proverb in this country to the effect that no earthwork is ever completely finished, and long as the preparations for defending Fort Fisher have been continued, there was no defensive work, or tete depont at the spot where this causeway enters the Fort, 'lhe Federals threw about 2,500 men upon the Fort at this point, and effected an entrance there about $ o'clock. It was in vain that General Whiting and Colonel Lamb threw themselves at the head of such troops as they could rally with the most determined gallantry against the assailants. General Whiting with his own hand, as I am informed, tore down the Federal flag several times until he was severely wounded. By his side fell Colonel Lamb, after displaying the valour which all who are acquainted with him and witnessed his exertions at the close of last month, would have expected him to exhibit. I understand that the wounds of both are serious, but not dangerous. After their fall the resistance seems to have assumed no organized shape. The Federals advanced along the inside of the land face until they had 3 possessed themselves of eight merlons, or the embrasures in which eight guns were mounted. Here they halted for the rest of the afternoon, and did not proceed to accomplish their task until after darkness had fallen. Then they advanced once more, and driving the garrison of the Fort beyond Lamb's Mound, they took the survivors prisoners at the extreme end of Confederate Point. I believe that there were inside the Fort about 2200 men when the 2500 Federals advanced upon it. I am also under the impression that the Federal attack was made without artillery, and that their soldiers gallantly approached a work which mounted not only some 50 heavy guns, but was also defended by several 12-pounder howitzers and light field pieces, with nothing but muskets in their hands. The result might have been different if General Whiting and Colonel Lamb had not been wounded at the outset, but it must be confessed that the general sensation here is that the fight was not one which is creditable to the Confederate arms. It must be remembered that most of the garrison had never been under a serious fire before last Christmas day, and that they were for the first time under a heavy musketry fire upon the 15th inst. The reinforcements hastily thrown into the fort when the attack commenced were, for the moat part, raw troops ; the aggregate was composed of heterogeneous bodies of men without concert; the only two commanding officers of mark and character who were well acquainted with the locale were wounded at an early stage of the fight. Public opinion, which is in America more censorious than anywhere upon earth, and which invariably selects one individual as the mai'k for its Aafts, has in this instance fixed upon General and animadverted severely upon his want of enterprise in not attacking the 1 ederals as they landed at Battery Gatlin, and as they approached to take the fort en severs, I am unable, from want of full and accurate information, to say whether General ■^ ra Ky, who had previously done much to regain public favour, is deserving of censure or not. But it must be confessed that general Bragg has hitherto, to an extraordinary extent, been a lightning-conductor f or bad luck. It seems that Fort Fisher fell because the guns on its land face were too light to cope with iron-clad vessels, because its two ablest leading officers were wounded at the outset, because its garrison was inexperienced, incoherent, and loosely coupled, and finally because the Confederates in 1865 do not tight with the vigour and tilan of 1862 and 1863. There is no reason to think that the * or t, aB a defensive work, was materially injured by the bombardment from the sea,, although that bombardment was maintained y ships at comparatively short range. The othcial reports, both of Confederate and federal officers, should be anxiously watched or information on this head. But it is fair o deduce from the experience of Fort . er > and still more from the exPolice of Fort Sumter, Sullivan's Island, y (most of all) Battery Wagner, before orris Island was evacuated by the Con7?rates, that sand forts are the only works lc h can long resist the tremendous pro*

jecticles of modern times, and especially the ugh 2001b or 3001b shells from rifiled guns which constitute so prominent a feature of this war. It seems to me still an open question whether it would be not be possible to casemate the embrasures of such work as xort lisher; but General Whiting seemed to be of opinion that such casements, if n vetted with wood, would not last more than from nine to twelve months, before the wood rotted, and allowed the superincumbent mass or sand to drop into the gun chamber. In addition, it any other wood than palmetto logs were used, the splinters, when the revetment was struck by a shot, would do more damage than any amount of hostile, missiles falling into an open embrasure. It remains for those military engineers who have to convert an earth or sand work into a fortification destined to stand for a dozen years, to consider whether it would not be possible to casemate such a work with revetments of iron, and thus to attain security and protection for the guns and gunners, without employing wood, which is either subject to rapid decay or objectionable by reason of the splinters. The fall of Fort Fisher, supervening upon a previously despondent condition of the public mind, has produced in all the States to the south of Wilmington a mingled feeling of dismay and indignation against President Davis and the Administration at Richmond. It is felt that all the disasters of the

last two months have been occasioned by the policy which permitted Sherman to march unopposed and unmolested through Georgia, and which sent Hood across the Tennessee river upon his bootless expedition. It is believed here that Sherman's infantry left Atlanta on their march into Georgia with only 40 rounds of ammunition in the car-

touche box of each soldier. It is obvious that if Sherman could have been stopped and compelled to fight a battle in the neighbourhood of Millen (about 70 miles from Savannah) his position, merely from the expenditure of ammunition, which would have been inevitable, could not but have been precarious. But it is amusing to me to find how ill-in-formed the Administration at Kichmond was in regard to the troops in Georgia, who were supposed likely to check Sherman at the head of the' finest Federal army which has ever been in the field. Neither is there at Eichmond a right comprehension of the sentiment which prevails in South Carolina and Georgia, and to a less degree in North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, and which is mildly described when I call it disaffection to Mr. Davis and his Administration. It is impossible to be blind to the fact that the backbone of these Southern States has always been weaker than that of noble old Virginia, and that much of the querulousness which abounds in this town and in Augusta springs from the inferior persistency of these semitropical States when compared with the robust manhood of the Virginians. But there is in all the Cotton States a deepseated conviction, which it is in vain to wrestle with, that Mr. Davis thinks of nothing but the safety of Eichmond, that he will give heed to no warning or representations, and that he is unable to see that, while Charlestown and Branchville may be held without Eichmond, Eichmond cannot be held without Charleston or Branchville. If, profiting by the want of harmony prevailing between Virginia and Georgia, Sherman had struck boldly for Branchville immediately after his occupation of Savannah, there can be little doubt that, to use his own words, he would have brushed aside the opposition of South Carolina like a cobweb, and would have bisected the sole remaining artery which connects Eichmond with Augusta. As matters now stand, Sherman has, for reasons which may possibly be guessed, but which are on the surface inexplicable, betrayed an inactivity at a most critical moment which is strangely at variance with his eager, enthusiastic character. Your readers may amuse themselves by finding such an explanation of thisseemiuginconsistencyas their fancy suggests; but, if I am not mistaken, in the explanation sought lies the key to the future policy of the Washington Government. The indications are so many and so irresistible, that everywhere in the South slavery is looked upon as doomed, and that the only question for determination is whether its extinction is to be accomplished within ten years, or is to be spread over a space of from 50 to 100; that neither Mr. Bright nor Professor Goldwin Smith, will hereafter be able to persuade an English audience that the North are fighting for the abolition, the South for the maintenance of slavery. The issue between the two sections is more and more unequivocally narrowing down to the definition of it which all Englishmen who have watched the contest closely from the outset, have never ceased to assign to it; that is to say, the North is fighting for empire, the South for self-government, or independence. If Sherman had advanced upon Branchville and Augusta, all the cotton in the latter place (which is everywhere known and spoken of in the Northern papers as being a large amount), would undoubtedly have been burnt. To get hold of this cotton quocunque modo is more important to Sherman than to take Augusta. Possibly, when a large portion of Southern cotton is on its way, or already in New York, the screw may be applied to South Carolina and other States, in compliance with the threats of Sherman, and the attempt may be made to torture them back into the Union. In th<? meantime I believe that diplomatic agency, which Sherman boasts he is employing vyith admirable success in Georgia, will be tried; that even if Sherman moves towards Augusta it will only be a feint; and that every effort will be made to prevent, or rather not to necessitate, the destruction of the Augusta cotton. But this delay will be employed by the Confederate Government to organize renewed resistance to Sherman whenever he really advances again in hostile array. What with the negotiations now proceeding overtly or secretly between Charleston or Augusta, on the one hand, and Sherman and Foster at Savannah or Beaufort, on the other, and also (as for some time past has been the case) overtlv or secretly between Eichmond and Washington, it is doubtful to me at his moment whether another large battle will ever be fought. If ever such a battle is fought it will inevitably lead to the arming and emanSpatfon by Southerners of the negro; and if fas £ everywhere here asserted) a spirit of (as is J , rpm'stance continues to T°Sed •«* W »? k8 dike it >» hard tO , know W" 1 wha £ auK<?, " TTpderal sympathizers of End will then base their sympathy. It a fcngianaw . f terms are now en t er ed easy to or ■ two sec tions, the Southupon betw . e f or independence, will ern f't, 'filter into an offensive and defenprobably ent Northerneraj will possive alliance un if 0 rmity of tariff over KTa™ ° ld StateB '

will perhaps agree to assist in enforcing the Monroe doctrine when called upon by the North, and will adopt some articles in the new-born treaty which will rather startle England and those English admirers and advocates whom Messrs. Seward, Adams, and Sumner know so well how to manipulate. At any rate, it seems probable that the events of the next few months will be such as will be felt throughout the whole civilized .world for the next century, for they will determine in what shape one of the most powerful nations on earth is to meet the future; whether North America is still to be an unit in its antagonism to Europe, and whether the season of restlessness and bloodshed which was inaugurated by the war between Western Europe and Russia is to continue until the end of this century, and until Jeremy Bentham's theory that war is the natural condition of mankind is accepted without demur or contradiction -throughout the civilized globe.