NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXIII, Issue 1363, 21 February 1865, Page 3

NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

(From the Times, Dec. 16.) AH questions between the British colonists of New Zealand and the Maori tribes are now merged [ in a war of sovereignty,—probably of extermina- , tion. There is much to be said about the past, and, [ no doubt, both sides will find historians anxious to do them more than justice. Nor can there be any I doubt that we might have done more wisely on ( many occasions. What vre have to deal with are i very practical questions. In the first place, are we prepared to relinquish the Northern Island altogether, and leave it at the mercy of the causes daily diminishing the native population, and of th« foreigners who are busily trafficking in their natural taste for war and their acquired love of ardent spirits ? It is evident that we must either advance or retreat. The settlement about Auckland, small , as it is, and insufficient for the maintenance of a self-supporting colony, is, from the nature of the country, open to continual plunder; and even th« streets of Auckland .have very recently been the scene of native outrages. There is no part of the soil over which some native right is not asserted, and which some tribe or some chief is not ready to claim. The natives—at least, the survivors, for we found them wasting away, and they have wasted faster since—have learnt from us everything that was wanting to their art of war, and, what is worse, everything to make them dissatisfied with peace. We attempted to obtain from them a submission to British sovereignty; they dispute the deed, but have borrowed the idea, and set up a Sovereign of their own. They have picked out from the Bible a religion, a morality, and a political system as grotesque as that of the Taepings, and as convenient for their purpose. They have solemnly travestied our courts, our trials, and our sentences. In the presence of the foreigner they have become united, and are ready to exterminate the friendly tribes, if necessary. Meanwhile, they understand that their interest lies in rendering the country a desert, in destroying bridges and roads, blocking up passes, throwing back oncejfiourishing settlements into their original solitude, and converting the island into a natural fortification, of which they alone have the key. So there comes the old question, "What is to be

done?" The question is answered by the Home Government very promptly and decidedly:—"Finish the war as quickly as you can; make peace, if possible, on any decent terms; and let us hear ho more about it." No wonder that should be the language of Downing street. There are difficulties here as well as in New Zealand, and if the.natives, the mountains, the fern thickets, and the swamps are very troublesome out there, the British Minister has to make his way through a much worse place—the House of Commons—every night of the session. With 10,000 British soldiers out there, and an expenditure of not less than a million a year, on the usual computation of £100 a man, a Government which cannot finish the war is liable any night to a hostile vote, and, even without that, suffers daily loss of credit. It is idle to suppose that we can go on with such an expenditure, and such a standing shame in the eyes of the world. ,The shame, indeed, is hardly appreciated. At the ratio of one fighting man to five souls, there are probably not more than 10,000 Maori warriors in the whole Northern Island, and we are not a match for them, man against man. But the truth is, the impenetrable nature of the country, its natural productions, the dress and habits of the natives, enable 10,000 men, standing on their defence, and only making occasional forays, to do the work of ten times their number. Our habits of warfare are out of place there, and the natives laugh at our tactics as much as they do at our maxims of government. But a greater difficulty still remains to be stated. Who is to deal with the natives, and conduct the present war ? We are not doing it here, for we could not if we wished ever so much. Even an electric wire from London to Auckland would not enable us to do this. The colony is represented by its Legislature, and its successive Administrations disclaim most indignantly having either caused the war, or, had anything to do with its management, or anything to do with j our policy towards the natives. We have read long arguments to prove, by undeniable figures and facts, that the colonists have always persistently thrown upon the Governor the responsibility of the native question, whether in peace or in war. It is not necessary that we should attempt to fix the blame, and we should be very sorry indeed to suspect Sir G. Grey, or any of his predecessors, of unfriendly feelings to the natives, or indifference to the calamities of war. But here is the great difficulty of all, and that which must first be met before we can hope for an improvement. Who is now dealing with the natives and conducting the war ? If we look to the past, so far as it can be exhibited by the careful culling of documents, we must conclude that the colony has been most grossly calumniated, and that peace and quiet at any price has been its standing maxim. If we look to the present crisis, this is not so apparent. We find the Governor ready to make almost any concession to the natives, and to renounce confiscation of territory. The colonists, by their Ministry, would rather ship off their Governor at once than agree to this. Yet they are men of peace, and have always been for a peaceful policy. One thing is evident. In the present state of things there is no one who thinks himself, or is really thought, responsible for the conduct of the war. Many hundreds of printed pages are on their way to this country to prove, on the one hand that the Governor, on the other hand, that the Ministry, is not in fault for the escape of the two hundred Maoris, who, after being safe under lock and key, are now the centre of a new rebellion in the north part of the island. Yet two hundred men are carefully restored to health and strength, placed in an island under the guard of one warder, supplied with boats and spades, and then permitted to paddle themselves ashore, to establish themselves with their spades in an impregnable position, provision themselves at the cost of the neighbouring settlers, arm themselves, and organize a general revolt within sight of several British ships of war, 10,000 British soldiers, and as many more armed civilians, and it is impossible to say who is answerable for it. Indeed, the controversy takes the place of actual operations, and several British authorities are attacking each other on paper before they attempt to do anything on the field. They are negociating or, rather, had been negociating, with the escaped prisoners, it is true, but their negotiations had answered no other purpose than to gain time for the enemy. Now, whatever other difficulties there may be, or whatever other faults there ma y be—and no doubt there are plenty of both—it is quite certain that we must despair of any satisfactory result so long as there is leally no one personally responsible for the conduct of the war. Sir George Grey is a most excellent and amiable man. The colony loves him and respects him. Knowing him well, it hailed his return with hope and joy. It is not denied that, ever since that return, he has done his best under the most difficult circumstances. Between the Home Government and the colony, the natives, the army, and a multitude of advisers on all sides, he has had no easy post. But we submit that the post requires a soldier accustomed to deal with difficult countries and with savage warfare, vested with the fullest powers, supplied with the amplest means, and only instructed to bring the war to the speediest possible end, and make some good arrangement with the natives that shall promise a lasting peace. We have already protested against any re-opening of the past that shall move the question whether we ought to be at war or who has caused the war. There are those who will naturally take the native side, and others who as naturally, and with quite as much to say tor themselves, will take the side of the settlers. What we have now to deal with is war, which on the side of the natives is a war to abolish the British sovereignty and drive the British out of the island. That is enough for us. Such a state of things must be met by the strong arm. It is the question, Who is the stronger ? That must be met by arms, and, as in all wars, the more vigorously, unflinchingly, and unhesitatingly this is fought, the better for All parties. But we cannot, for the life of us, see how a war is to be fought or brought to a conclusion under a state of things which admits of a controversy who put two hundred j prisoners on an island and allowed them to escape from it.