RUSSIA AND POLAND.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXI, Issue 1194, 9 February 1864, Page 3

RUSSIA AND POLAND.

The partners in an unsuccessful enterprise seldom part at its conclusion as good friends as they were when they entered into it. One has been too hot, and another too cold, one too quick, and the other too slow. People forget, in the bitterness of disappointment and the anxiety to shift the responsibility of ill success from themselves, the calculations on which they acted and the appearance which things presented. They view each other's conduct by the light of subsequent events, aud have, therefore, no difficulty in finding materials for the most damaging criticism. This inevitable tendency of human nature ought to discourage us from entering on doubtful adventures, since the alternative is not merely between success and failure, but between success and failure aggravated by more or less mutual recrimination and ill-will.

France, Austria, and England have just met with a very mortifying repulse at the hands of the Emperor of Russia. They flattered themselves, and not without some reason, that the material force which they can command and the moral weight ot their opinion would enable them, without trouble, without danger, and without expense, to obtain a peaceful triumph which might redress a crying injustice and put an end to a question which has now for 90 years racked the conscience and disturbed the diplomacy of Europe. In these agreeable anticipations the three Powers have found themselves entirely mistaken. With a polished irony which thinly concealed the consciousness that she had nothing more to dread than a few loud words Russia refused to allow the interference of a foreign Power with her domestic concerns, denied the right of the parties to the Treaty of 1815 to enforce its stipulation, and went on steadily flogging, plundering, shooting, and hanging in her own traditional manner. The three Powers have not lightened by a single feather the weight which presses on Poland; they have not dried a single tear, or prevented the flowing of single drop of blood. Yet it would be doinc injustice to them to say that they have done° absolutely nothing. We do not doubt that by their interference they have made it a point of honor with Russia to put down the rebellion with the utmost severity. They have made mercy appear in the light of a concession to foreign dictation, and enlisted the pride of a susceptible and patriotic people on the side of cruelty and violence. Nor has their intervention been without effect on the Poles. We do, indeed, remember that the original outbreak of rebellion was quite independent of any foreign intervention: but, had no foreign intervention followed it, would the distresses of Poland have suffered the aggravation which they are now undergoing? The hope of achieving any permanent success by the S e/ertion., of the Polish nat.on, always faint and remote, has now become utterly desperate. Time has been given to the Russian Empire to bring up Ito troops from the remote provinces m which they were dispersed ; the circle of iron is closing around the devoted land; every day makes its ruin more certain, and its resistance a more prodigal waste of life. Yet .till Poland struggles on; the leaves on which the insurgents rely to give them shelter from the eves of a numerous and übiquitous enemy are gone; the terrors of a northern winter « upon them; they must fight agamst incalculable odds, almost without the neceslife Yet the insurrection is to continue till next spring, because the Poles cannot believe that the three powers who cannot dbi remonstrance against havemadesovigorou"-. wUhout KSSqatiS during five more months of fruitless and pro tracted warfare. funded? Will JJZ SKSI&SSS the oldest nation of the great *"> 1

family ? Wo have no difficulty in answering for England. The power of England to assist Poland is exceedingly small, and, small as it is, she never had the least intention of employing it. She had no objection to see what could be done by pacific means, but failing these she had no intention to appeal to forco. Wo have frequently expressed the opinion that it would have been far better if our words had beeu more consistent with our actions. We predicted that we should have one day to choose between going to war and putting up with insult. The alternative has arisen, and we have very wisely chosen the less of two evils —the insult rather than the war. There are, no doubt, many reasons which might induce Austria to take a more active part than ourselves in favour of the Poles. She is on the spot; she is herself a Polish Power; she is deeply interested in checking the ambition of Russia; she aspires to the leadership of the Liberal party in Germany. Yet, notwithstanding all this, in the present state of her finances, and with so much discontent ready to break out on the first opportunity in so many of her provinces, Austria can hardly venture to take any very decided step. The whole hopes of Poland therefore repose entirely on the prospect of assistance from France, and the speculations of mankind are eagerly directed to know what course she is likely to take. Are we about to enter ou a period like that which preceded the campaign of 1859—a period of pamphlets and assurances of peace, interspersed with active preparations for war—a period of uncertainty and of boundless diplomatic activity, of vast expenditure and of breathless expectation; or will France, with her 600,000 soldiers, with her Continental position, and with the mission she has so chivalrously taken upon herself of redressing injustice all over the world, forfeit the reputation she has acquired, and sink down to the same level of commonplace and business-like expediency of England herself? This is the question for the solution of which not merely Poland but every country on the Continent is anxiously waiting. How keenly its probabilities are discussed may be gathered from the letters of our correspondent on the spot. There is no doubt, according to him, that a war for the sake of Poland would be popular in France. It unites in its behalf the two powers by whose favour it used to be said the Imperial dynasty occupies the throne. The Republican party are ready to fight for liberty; the clergy are ready to preach a crusade in favour of Catholic Poland against schismatic Russia. The voice of the army, like that of Sempronius, is always given for war. The Opposition in the Assembly are very powerful in talents and eloquence, and, since they have been multiplied sixfold, not utterly contemptible in numbers. They have an excellent text for declamation in the conduct of the late elections, and no diversion could be more effectual than to involve the nation in the perils, the anxieties, and the glories of war. These are, doubtless, very powerful elements, and it may be, that even in Imperial France so vast a mass of opinion brought to bear on a single point may be found at the moment of trial irresistible. Perhaps the Emperor may find that it is a lesser evil to embark alone on all the uncertainties of a great European war than to incur the disapprobation of so large and influential a portion of his subjects. Whatever be the result, we are quite certain that this country will come in for no inconsiderable amount of censure. If France decide not to fight, the blam j of the decision will be thrown exclusively on the hardhearted policy of England, who, though willing to take her chance of success so long as that success was to be obtained by words, betrays the common cause the moment there appears a ehance of anything more serious than a diplomatic defeat. If, on the other hand, France should decide on going to war, we must expect to hear all the same taunts pointed by comparisons between the chivalrous vigor of our neighbors and our own cold and calculated inactivity. We have no compliments to expect from any quarter, and though our intentions have been certainly good we can hardly avoid feeling that we have no right to complain. We trust for the future we shall learn that the pleasure of interposing can hardly be indulged in with dignity by those who are not prepared for something more than verbal mediation, and that those who are determined to do nothing will act wisely if they say nothing.—Times, Nov. 2.