LETTER TO THE EIGHT HONORABLE LORD LYTTELTON ON THE RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH THE COLONISTS AND ABORIGINES OF NEW ZEALAND.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XX, Issue 1110, 1 July 1863, Page 2

LETTER TO THE EIGHT HONORABLE LORD LYTTELTON ON THE RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH THE COLONISTS AND ABORIGINES OF NEW ZEALAND.

BY CEOBBIE WABD. My Lord, —Yoiir Lordship is probably aware that there is a dispute pending between the Colonial Office and the Government of New Zealand, relative to the expenses of the late Maori war. Your name is identified with the successful foundation, upon sound principles, of a settlement of British colonists in New Zealand ; and it is therefore natural to appeal to you in a matter which, while it affects most deeply the interests of our own colony, may have an important bearing on the general system of the Imperial administration of colonies. It is my desire to recapitulate to your Lordship the circumstances which have led to the present disagreement, and to expound what I may venture to represent as the Colonial view of the rights of the matter. It is a cause of great concern to us all to feel that at present the general impreßsion throughout England, as represented in Parliament and by the Press, is very unfavourable to New Zealand. And I fear that a much closer attention must be bespoken to rectify such an impression than that which was needed to form it. But- I trust at the same time that a statement carefully made on behalf of the colonists will be listened to with the candid hope of arriving at the truth on the one hand, and on the other, of securing that vindication of the character of the colonists which their kinsmen of the mother country must desire to see made. THE CASK AGAINST THE COLONY. An article lately published in the ' Times' * newspaper conveniently iUustrates the injurious impression to which I have alluded, and nowhere else has the general case against the colony been more strongly or more compendiously stated, "i therefore adopt it as representing the darkest picture that can be drawn of our shortcomings; ,uid it is certain that the assertions contained in it, be they true or false, do actually raise all the points in the question. The line of argument taken by the writer may be summarised thus:— That the colonists are responsible for the origin of the native disturbances in New Zealand. That the hostilities which began in the year 1860, and iu which a large force of British troops have been employed, were commenced for the purpose of obtaining land for the benefit of the colonists.

That the troops now quartered in the colony are maintained there for the protection of the settlers. lhat the settlers, being protected by others, are unwilling to exert themselves in their own defence, but desire to throw the whole burden of military operations, conducted for their benefit, on the mother country.

That a state of war is encouraged by the colonists for the sake of the expenditure from the Imperial Treasury which attends it.

That so long as Great Britain at its sole expense supplies the colony with troops the same causes will be in operation and similar effects produced, in the constant outbreak of little wars, to be carried on at the expense of British taxpayers. That with such an association of facts before it, itis the duty of the Imperial Government, in justice both to itself and the colony, to remove its troops as quickly as possible.

I am not aware that any other argument of any force has been employed, or that those which I have stated could be put more fairly. If the premises are true the conclusion must be admitted. But they are entirely untrue; the argument cannot be supported for a moment by any one who will consider the facts, and the conclusion, as it is not fairly arrived at, is mischievous.

TECHNICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOE NATIVE GOVERNMENT.—THEOBY OP SEP ABATE ADMINISTRATION. The first step towards determining who and what caused the native war in New Zealand, and whose the conduct conclusion and cost of it ought to be, will be to consider what has been hitherto the machinery of Government in the colony. To do this I shall venture to trouble you with a brief recapitulation of our political history from the date of the Constitution to the present day. In the course of this recapitulation, I shall Bhew that the colonists themselves have been entrusted with the administration of their own affairs, and their own affairs only; and that the Imperial Government has distinctly and jealously retained all along in its own hands the control of the native population. I shall more especially point out that this haa been no mere theoretical distinction, but a most practical division of administrative government. I shall be the more careful in insisting upon this last point, because I am aware that many persons admit the nominal existence of the distinction, while they slight its importance, and avowedly treat an appeal to it by the colonists as an unhandsome recourse to technicality for the evasion of their legitimate responsibilities. The Constitution Act of 1853 conferred full powers of local self-government upon the settlers of New Zealand. It contains express provisions for the benefit of the Maori race, and treats them as a people apart from those oa whom the rights of self-government were conferred. One provision of the kind, amongst others, reserves to her Majesty the power of declaring at pleasure "native districts," within which the laws and customs of the aborigines shall remain in force, i.e.:—in which the acts of the Legislature shall be inoperative. Further, a property qualification excludes almost every Maori from the franchise. It follows that, though a Maori might qualify himself for the franchise, and though the acts of the Legislature run nominally all over the Colony, practically it was provided that the Maoris should not govern themselves, and intended that they should not be governed by the colonists. Further, by the reservation of a sum of £7000 on the Civil List for native purposes, a separate government of the ra/:e was rendered possible.

But this is not all. It will be said that, whatever may have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, yet, in fact, the whole power of Government was, by consent of the Imperial authorities, assumed and exercised by the colonists. This was by no means the case. All the functions of administration have been carefully reserved and exercised by the Home Government, as I shall proceed to shew. During a period of more than 18 months after the coming into operation of the New Zealand constitution—a period of the greatest importance in the political history of the colony—her Majesty's Government left vacant the office of Governor of the Colony. The administration of all affairs, both European and Maori, was conducted by the senior military officer and the permanent officials of the old regime. The colonists asked for the concession of ministerial responsibility for the management of their own affairs: but this concession Colonel Wynyard found himself without power to make. Without this, the mere existence of an elective legislative body was not, it must be admitted, real local self-government: and if not self-government by the colonists in their own affairs, how much less a government of the native race, for which there was no necessity to take votes of money, and in whose case even laws solemnly enacted might be set aside at pleasure. From the first session of the General Assembly, in 1856, which followed the arrival of Governor Gore Browne in 1855, dates the establishment of complete local self-government by the colonists, three years after the passing of the Constitution Act. The crown officials were then replaced by gentlemen possessing the confidence of the legislature. From this time began the practical application of the theoiy deducible from the Constitution Act—the division of the Government into two branches, one for the administration of European, the other of Maori affairs. As in the mode of creating and carrying out this distinction lie the main feet# of the case now under discussion I will narrate the circumstances somewhat in detail appealing almost exclusively to such sources of information as are readily accessible in this country. Governor Browne found that the claim for the * 'Times/ Monday, January 19, 1869.

establishment of responsible government had been admitted by the Home authorities in a despatch from Sir George Grey, then Secretary of Slate for the Colonies, to the acting Governor, dated Bth Dec., 1854, [Pari. Papers, N.Z., 130 March, 1855, p. 39,]' in which is disclaimed " any desire to propose terms or to lay down restrictions on your assent to the measures which may be necessary for that object, except that of which the necessity appears to be fully recognised by the General Assembly, namely, the making provision for certain officers who have accepted their offices on he equitable understanding of t heir permanence, and who may now be liable to removal." IS'or in any other despatch is a reservation suggested on the subject of native affairs. Governor Browne was therefore not compelled to make any exceptions, when entrusting the administration of the affairs of the Colony to his new advisers. But lie did make an exception. He had time before the meeting of the Assembly to mature his opinions and obtain a personal knowledge of the circumstances of the Colony, by a tour through the provinces. Thereupon, on the 14th of February, 1856, two months before meeting the Assembly, he wrote a general report of the state of the Co'lony, [Pari. Papers, N.Z., July, 1860, pp. 184-7,] and explained his opinions and intended policy on several subjects. After describing the circumstances from which causes of dissatisfaction between the races might at any moment arise, [§ 30-35,] and which would require, as he said, the utmost circumspection and the most careful management, His Excellency added, (§ 37,) " I shall view with apprehension and object to any attempt to alter the provisions of the 73rd Clause of the Constitution Act, or to bring the powers therein entrusted to the Governor, in any way under the control of the Assembly. To this first indication of Governor Browne's policy it is remarkable that the Secretary of State, in a seemingly careful reply to the despatch [ib. pp. 456-8] does not refer by so much as a single word. But soon Her Majesty's Government were asked to be more explicit.

Governor Browne "found that different opinions were entertained as to the meaning of that section of the Constitution Act which reserved to Her Majesty certain exclusive powers in native affairs, As he deemed the subject "of great importance, and one which must affect the relations between the Governor and his responsible advisers," he submitted it for the consideration of the Secretary of State in the following words, on the 12th March 1856 [ib. p. 193] :—

" The view I have taken of the relation which ought to exist between myself and my responsible advisers (when they take office) is, that, as these gentlemen are responsible to the Assembly, I should be guided by their advice in all matters under the control of that body, even when I differ from them in opinion. On matters affecting the Queen's prerogative and imperial interests generally, I should receive their advice; but when I differ from them in opinion, I should, if they desire it, submit their views for your consideration, but adhere to my own until your answer is received.

"Among Imperial subjects I include all dealings with the native tribes, more especially in the negotiation of purchases of land. My responsible advisers would probably fix the amount to be expended in any one year in the purchase of land; but at that point their interference should cease.

" The Governor alone is responsible to Her Majesty's Government for the tranquillity of the colony, which would be endangered even by the ordinary and inevitable change of opinion consequent on a change of my advisers. It is also necessary to observe that, though I might be judiciously advised by gentlemen who have lived among the natives, and had experience of their habits and feelings, I should also be liable to advice from gentlemen of great influence who have never resided among them, and from others whose known opinions would, if acted on, plunge the country into war or inextricable difficulties.

"If my views are correct, it is evident that the Chief Land Commissioner and his subordinates must take their orders from me alone. My late despatches will have satisfied you that in all dealings with the natives the utmost caution and the most careful management are necessary; and if the power of interference with them is confided to gentlemen liable to the pressure of public opinion, and whose tenure of office is dependent op the confidence of a public assembly, it will be impossible to foresee the result." On the meeting of the General Assembly in the following month (April, 1856), the Governor addressed himself at once to the organization of an Executive Council, composed of gentlemen responsible to the Legislature. At once he placed in their hands the following minute, [ib. p. 20t»], which is identical in terms with the despatch last quoted:— MINUTE. April 15, 1856. The view the Governor takes of the relation between himself and his responsible advisers is as follows: — Ist. In all matters under the control of the Assembly, the Governor should be guided by the advice of gentlemen responsible to that body, whether it is or is not in accordance with liis own opinion on the subject in question. 2nd. On matters affecting the Queen's prerogative and imperial interests generally, the Governor will be happy to receive their advice, but when he differs from them in opinion he will (if they desire it) submit their views to the consideration of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, adhering to his own until an answer is received.

Among imperial subjects the Governor includes all dealings with the native tribes, more especially in the negotiation of purchases of land. He will receive and act on the advice of his responsible advisers in reference to the amount of money they may desire to have expended in any one year in the purchase of land, but beyond this he considers himself bound to act on his own responsibility.

The Governor alone is responsible to her Majesty for the tranquillity of the colony, which would be endangered by the ordinary and inevitable change of opinion consequent on a change in his advisers. It follows as a necessary consequence of these views, that the Chief Land Purchase Commissioner and his subordinates must take their orders from the Governor alone.

Before giving his assent to Acts passed by Provincial Councils and other matters of a legal nature, the Governor will require the annexed certificate from the Colonial Secretary and Attorney-General; and in approving appointments to vacant offices, he will require to be assured that the gentlemen recommended are fit and eligible for their respective situations. (Signed) Thomas Goee Beowne. /(! . A ( Henby Sewell. ( ignea £ f EE d EE ick Whitakeb. MEMORANDUM. (a.) In explanation of paragraph No. 1, the Governor of course reserves to himself the same constitutional rights in relation to his ministers as are in England practically exercised by the Sovereign. (b.) In further explanation of the same paragraph, he intends by the term " matters under the control of the Assembly," all matters whatever relating to the government of the colony not referred to in paragraph No. 2. (c). In explanation of paragraph No. 2, the Governor refers to Clauses 19, 20, and 21 of the Boyal Instructions accompanying his Commission, which oblige him as a general rule to take advice in all matters with his Executive Council. He considers such rule as applying to the subjects referred to in paragraph No. 2, and he will not object (having the Queen's sanction to that effect) to limit the members of the Executive Council to his responsible ministers.

(d.) In explanation of the 4th paragraph, the Governor would observe, that he feels no objection to the House of Hepresentatives defining the specific lands to be purchased, it being, however, understood, that it is not to be compulsory on the Governor to make purchases, if in his opinion political reasons render it inexpedient to do so.

The terms of this minute were assented to by the Assembly. The condition required by the Secretary of State was satisfied by the passing of an Act pensioning the Crown Officials; and the Governor's conditions were accepted by both Houses and by the Ministry, though not willingly or hopefully. I call attention to the reason given by Governor Browne (in par. 3 of his despatch above quoted) for reserving the control of native matters. This reason is reproduced, as the chief among several, by Mr. Secretary Labouchere, in reply [ib. p. 461]. Her Majesty's Government, when for the first and lust time for some years they spoke on the subject, said as follows: —

" After the best consideration which they can give to the subject, Her Majesty's Government approve of the principles by which you propose !o conduct yourself in relation to the affairs of the natives, and whicli they find laid down with sufficient clearness in your Minute of the 15th April last, and the Memorandum annexed. They consider that, notwithstanding till the respect due to the principle of responsible government, the management of native affairs should remain for the present mainly in the hands of a Governor responsible for it to the Crown. They are of opinion that the circumstances which justify this decision are the ternw of the Constitution itaelf, which

withhold this subject m great measure (as regards the land dealings) trom the control of the Local Legislature to winch the Local Executive is responsible; the still subsisting or apprehended danger in certain parts of New Zealand; the necessity arising from this danger for maintaining in the colour a large force at the expense of the mother country, a force of which the discipline control and application must remain in the hands of the Governor, as a servant ot the Crown ; the large amount of the native contributions to t lie local revenue (as shown bv yourself), while, from unavoidable circumstances, ihey remain almost unrepresented in the Legislature; and "(he fact that the mass of the native population is found in one or two provinces only, while I lie greater part of the European community, with preponderating influence in the Legislature, has in reality no direct concern with native aflairs. '• \ou are therefore fully authorised to act. until further instructions, on the principles there laid down, and assented to m April last by your responsible advisers. If you should at any time find it in your power to carry into ellect the provision of the Constitution for setting apart native districts, it is plain that a considerable step would be made towards the solution of this difficulty. But this is not a subject on which her Majesty's Government feel themselves justified in prescribing any course to you, as your conduct must needs depend on local circumstances." The main reason thus urged by the Governor and endorsed by the Secretary of State for reserving some of the most important functions of Government from the control of the colonists, was admitted by the latter to be a sufficient reason, and because of it they submitted to the terms imposed [vide ' Minute of Ministers,' ib. p. 363]. The three parties, therefore— the Secretary of State, the Governor, and the colonists—agreed to the control of native affairs being reserved by the Imperial Government, because tlia" Government held itself responsible for the provision and maintenance of a warlike force, should, as was always possible, the conduct of the natives require the exhibition of force. I am bound to express my conviction, one in whicli a great number, if not all of the colonists have agreed, both before and since the war, that this reservation was a most unfortunate act, highly injurious to all the three parties to it. The action of the Colonial Ministry has been all along a standing protest against its adopt ion and continuance. But this point "mustbe considered separately.

As Mr. Secretary Labouchere had a short time previously (on the 28th November, 1855) written a despatch [ib. p. 451] requiring the colonists to provide such additional means as might be needed for their own defence, and repeated this caution in the later despatch first quoted, it seems evident that he contemplated as possible a necessity for employing additional troops against the natives for other objects than the defence of the settlers. If he did, his foresight has been entirely justified.

Governor Browne s plan of native government was not entirely satisfactory, even at first, to the Legislature. Yery quickly it was found that serious inconveniences arose from the erection of a double government in the colony, and from the ignorance in which the Ministry, who were expected to inform the Legislature, were kept of the proceedings of the Governor's advisers and servants in native affairs. A slight change was accordinglv made. [See Letters and Memoranda, ib. pp. 360, 364]. The papers respecting native affairs were now ordered to pass through the hands of a Minister on then- way from the Native Secretary to the Governor. But this Secretary was not to be appointed or removable by, or subordinate to, the Ministry, and was to communicate personally with the Governor. Ministers, in fact, were informed of what was being done, and that was all.

At this time, also, the office of Native Secretary was combined with that of Chief Commissioner for the Purchase of Native Lands, and the two departments were more or less amalgamated. This combination was made by his Excellency, owing to the high qualities of Mr. McLean, who previously held the latter office only; but it is certain that it resulted injuriously to the cause of law and order among the race, by presenting the Crown to them chiefly as a bargainer for their land. That Governor Browne took every step with deliberate reference to the rule which he had laid down,

is quite evident from the facts. He had fortified him

self with the opinions of a large number of clergvmen and others, long resident among the Maoris, to the effect that it was not safe to trust the government of the race to a changing and indifferent body of men.

Indeed, all through the negotiations with the Legislature, as well as in the practical administration of affairs, he exhibited a firmness of purpose, a careful adherence to his plan, and a consistent reliance, in

native affairs, on liis own opinion and on that of his chosen advisers in preference to that of his responsible Ministers, which contrasts remarkably with his complete acceptance of a constitutional position in all matters relating to the colonists. That Governor Browne planned and carried out most exactly, for several years, this most difficult system of the double government, ought to be a complete refutation of the assertion which has been made, that after all, in the serious matter of going to war, he weakly departed from his principles, and yielded to the solicitations of interested colonists. He listened to the advice of his Executive Council, as he was bound to do, but never deferred to it in native matters. Here he held himself alone responsible, and never sought to throw that responsibility on any other person. He had the firmness which springs from a clear perception of duty.

It is desirable, before closing tliis enquiry as to the theory of native government in New Zealand,

to shew that the opinions of Governor Gore Browne and the Home Government did not change during the period which followed the first few vears of

its practical experiment. After the session" held in 1858, the last whiclx took place before the outbreak at Taranaki, occasion arose (to be hereafter noticed) for a fresh enunciation of the principles of government. Governor Browne, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 14th October, 1858, defines his practice as follows : —" I admit the right of the Assembly to legislate in a manner it thinks proper, reserving to myself the right of veto, as provided for by the Constitution Act. I retain to myself the executive and administrative part of native affairs, admitting my responsible advisers to full information, and granting them the right to advise me, but reserving to myself the right to act upon my own judgment, when I differ from them."—[Pari.' Papers, 27 July, 1860, p. 19.] This is the announcement of the constitutional relations between the Governor and the colonists in native affairs, made by the Representative of Her Majesty's Government in the colony, after two years' experience of the actual working of those relations; and it must be carefully noted that no innovations had crept in during the period. Nor did the Imperial Government yet see reason to alter its mind. Lord Carnarvon, writing for the Secretary of State in reply to the Governor, on the 18th May, 1859, states his conviction to be, not that the colonists had not both the desire and the capacity to advance the well-being of the natives, but that—" circumstances do not yet justify the Imperial Government in abdicating the responsibilities which at present rest upon it with regard to that remarkable race. [Ib. p. 171.] In the same despatch he proceeds :—

" If, indeed the Imperial Government were prepared (o depart-from the arrangements already Hitncl ioned, and to transfer the management of native affairs from the Governor, acting under instructions from this country, and through a staff of permanent officers, to an officer responsible to the colonists, and changing with the Government, it might be considered that the system of land purchase from the natives was to be decided upon by colonial and not imperial authority. But this view of the subject I am not able to accept. Her Majesty's Government wish to give the fullest effect to the system of responsible government, and to leave all questions of domestic and internal interest to be decided by the Colonial Government; but they cannot, either for the sake of the colonists or for that of the natives, or for imperial interests, surrender the control over native affairs, the administration of which has been, up to the present time, considering the difficulties and intricacies of the subject, crowned with a very remarkable success, and is paving the way towards that complete civilization and consolidation of the native race with the English colonists, which Her Majesty's Government, not less than the local Government, desire to see effected. And while Her Majesty's Government feel themselves constrained to justify to Parliament the large expense which every year is incurred for the maintenance of a military force in New Zealand for the defence of the I colony, and for the better control and regulation of the j

native race, they must retain in their hands the administration of those affairs which at any moment may involve the employment of those troops, and the consequences of ,an expensive conflict." [lb. p. 173.] I have dwell at length on (his period, because here are to be found the main fads which must determine, not only by whom, but how, the natives of New Zealand were governed for some years before the late war, and which therefore can alone fix a real responsibility, whether incurred technically or morally, for the outbreak and its consequences upon anyone. PRACTICE OF AD-M r.N IST RATION IX NATIVK AFFAIRS. Having quoted the repeated enunciations by the Imperial Government itself of tlie doctrine of exclusive responsibility in native affairs, I proceed to illustrate by a few examples the method by which it has carried that doctrine into practice. For that purpose I shall take cases where the Governor and his responsible advisers differed in opinion : not only because they are naturally the only cases which have been worth recording in despatches, but because ro number of instances of agreement of opinion between two powers can place beyond doubt which was the superior, or with which rested the responsibility of action. The course which the administration of affairs practically took after 185(5 agreed exactly witli the special policy of the Governor. Action or inaction was in his hands "in all matters affecting Imperial interests, including all dealings with the native tribes, more especially in the negotiation of the purchase of lands." The system of double government early became irksome to the colonial half of the administration ; yet t here was no perceptible personal irritation between the Governor and his Ministers, or the parly which supported the Ministry in either branch of the Legislature. There was necessarily some antagonism, but no such conflict as to lead the Legislature into deliberate acts of obstruction to the Governor's policy, such as no doubt were at any time within their power. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence of the readiness of both Houses to lend their assistance in a liberal spirit, if not always as approving that policy which was beyond their reach, or in a way to gain His Exccllency's cordial approbation. It has sometimes been asserted that the Government of the natives was in the first instance reserved to the Crown, and the administration of it subsequently impeded, by the illiberally of the colonists in matters of supply. I will not go so far as to say that Governor Gore Browne did not encounter anv difficulties in this respect, but I will proceed to shewthat in the mam his needs for purposes connected with the natives were fairly and even generously provided for by the colonists. I have, stated that the sum of £7000 a year had been reserved on the Civil List for native purposes, and was deducted without question from the Colonial revenues. But as early as 1855-6, I find that an additional sum of £8,762 7s 6d was expended solely for native purposes. A provision for the same purposes for 1856-7 was granted by the Assembly of £14,8/2 in all. In 1858, the Legislature voted a permanent yearly grant of £7,000, to supplement the Civil List, besides removing various native charges, formerly defrayed from the latter fund, on to the list of ordinary appropriations. These grants were exclusive, of course, of such share of the general expenditure as ma-y represent the benefit derived by the Maori population from the ordinary civil govern- | m ent, from roads, posts, jetties, and other public works and undertakings, provided out of common funds, of which the natives make no little use. It must be added that returns of the land purchase operations shew that of the whole outlay at this time about one-third was expended upon the staff, the members of which had become by the amalgamation of the departments, more or less, fox* good or evil, representatives of the Imperial Government among the Maoris.

Governor Browne, in 1856, estimated the contributions of the Maori people towards the general revenues at £51,000 for the ensuing year. For the same year, when it was over, the Colonial Treasurer calculated that those contributions had amounted to a little over £17,000.—[Pari. Papers, N.Z., July, 1860, p. 228, and 27th July, 1860, p. 34.] These two estimates (for they partake of the same character), can as little be reconciled as other contradictory opinions upon native affairs. The grounds of each estimate are given at full length. At least the colonists did not propose to themselves any gain from the taxation of the native race. The Colonial Treasurer, Mr. Richmond, states as the conclusion of an elaborate calculation, from which he educes the result above mentioned" The practical conclusion is, that in those years in which the demand for native produce has brought the Aborigines large profits in the European markets, and in which thev have consequently largely availed themselves of the advantages of a civilized state, their contributions to the revenue have constituted a fair, but not it would seem more than a fair equivalent; whilst in years of slack demand, those contributions do not probably exceed the sum returned to them in direct and exclusive governmental benefit*." [Pari. Papers, 27th July, 1860, p. 35.1

The inportant session of 1858 is the only one by which tie policy of the colonists towards the Aborigines may fairly be judged; for it was the j first seaion after the establishment of a responsible Government, and it was the last that was free from the excitement of civil war. The "native" legislatioi of 1858 consisted of five acts—for the constituton and regulation of "native districts" —for tin administration of justice in those districts —for thesupport and management of native schools —for tin colonization of mixed settlements—and for the recognition of aboriginal title to land in such a manne- as to give to individual natives, under condition., the rights incident to landed propertv. To all oi these but the last the Governor was a consentiig party. But the "Native Territorial Rights Till," as the last was termed, contained provisions t> which he could not agree. Among other objection, and the chief of all was that, not the Governo 1 , but the " Governor in Council," was empowered to act. The Council consisted of the colonial respnsible advisers. It is surely most important to noticethat this attempt by the colonists to obtain power ii the administration of native affairs was promptlj resisted by the Governor, as contrary to the principle which had been accepted on both sides. Because tlso the effect of the bill would be to do away with the pre-emption ot the Crown over native lands,

and to introduce a system of direct purchase by indi viduals, if was deemed in the highest degree dangerous t<j the peace of the country. For other rea-

sons the neasure was considered unjust to the Maori. 'I he Gofrnor was not called upon to exercise his right of 'eto, a provision within the bill itself reserving it forhor Majesty's assent. But a similarly independent ourse was taken ; his Excellency forwarded the bill, wd begged the Secretary of State to advise (he Quern to refuse her assent to it, which was done. [See Deoatches from the Colony, Nos. I—6, with enclosure; and to tho Colony, No. 1; in Pari. Papers, i.Z., 17th July, IB6o], The course taken by Governor Browne arose entirely from his sense of separate issponsibility; it would have been impossible under aip other system than that of the double Govemmnt. It proves both that the Imperial Represent ive carried out the doctrine of exclusive responsibiitv into practice, and that when any act of the colonits seemed to infringe upon that doctrine, lie was alw to defeat the altempt. Die teaptation to enter into the merits of the questions at issue in the "Territorial Rights Bill" must be riisted. It is enough for my present purpose lo slvw that a constitutional conflict arose, and that tho Itperial Government defeated the colonists.

I think fufcher that a perusal of the Blue Book will show thai the contest, was one of argument onlv, temperate ind fail-; and that the colonists attempted to bring lo undue pressure to bear upon the Governor. Another important example of the same kind is on record. I regret that tho Parliamentary Papers which I hae been able to consult do not furnish me with all th documents, and that I must therefore refer to thepriuted papers of the Colonial Assembly, which are i>t so accessible in this country. But the facts whielil wish to recall are too well known to require speific proof. I refer to the policy with which the King" movement among the Waikato tribes was teated in its earlier development. [See Report (jf " Waikato Committee " —Appendix to

Journals, House of Representatives, N.Z., 1860; pp. 11l to 12!).] I his movement was regarded by the Colonial Ministry of the time as indicating a desire for law and order; that is for a stronger government than then ruled those tribes. The Governor's special . advisers in native affairs, on the other hand, considered the movement to be merely one of triflin" local and evanescent consequence, originating in the ambition and restlessness of the young men who desired to rival the older chiefs. At a later date, the movement either assumed or was recognised for the first time as possessing the character of a wide spread organisation for procuring the absolute independence of the Maori race. But in 1858, though there had been already much reason for studying the symptoms of the movement, politicians had not advanced beyond the first two opinions, between which they were divided—the representatives of the colony on one side, those of the Imperial Government on the other. The Resident Magistrate at the head-quarters of the movement, Mr. Fenton, held the first opinion, and •was energetic in his attempts to guide what he thought a movement in favour of law and order to a safe aud legitimate result, by bringing English Government within reach of the natives in a shape adapted to their customs. In these efforts he was supported by the Ministry, who tendered their advice to his Excellency accordingly. The Governor, however, true to his rule, did not suffer himself to be guided by this advice, even though he might at first approve" of it. He sought counsel from the heads of the retire department, whom he wa3 justified in assuming to have a more exact knowledge of the history, and a more intimate understanding of the designs of the Maori people. He acted upon the opinion entertained bv these gentlemen, that Mr. Fenton's policy was alienating the old chiefs, in whom confidence' ought to be placed ; that to treat the movement as important was to make it so; and that to neglect it was the only safe treatment. Mr. Fenton was therefore recalled from the Waikato: the work that he had begun was undone, and the King Movement was left to itself. It is of no importance for the present argument, whether the colonial policy were right or wrong; possibly neither may have been the right one. But every one must confess that no more important question than this could have been presented for solution to those holding the reins of government, even though peace had never afterwards been broken ; and that the positive rejection of the advice tendered on the part of the colony on this occasion, and the deliberate undoing of the work of which the Ministryapproved, remove from the latter any sort of responsibility for whatever consequences may be traceable to the progress of the King Movement." It must now be conceded that both in the theory of native government and in the administration of it's functions, as we'll legislative as executive, the Imperial Government has rigidly reserved from the Colonv, and to itself, all real power. It must be admitted also that Governor Browne, during the period preceding the first indications of a Maori outbreak, shewed no want of firmness in his purpose, suffered no departure from established rule, and exhibited no symptoms of yveakness before an antagonistic legislature. On the other hand he was on excellent terms with his colonial advisers. And he observed what he took to be the spirit and lettter of the Constitution as completely to permit the selfgovernment of the colonists in their own affairs as he did to prevent their interference in matters relating to the native population. Where, in the latter case° he and his advisers differed, as their advice was not put to the test of practice, it is impossible to say that they were more often right than he. And it 'is as little likely that he was ever induced by jealousy of them I to take an opposite view as that lie'submitted to their I view through carelessness. I assert this, not that any words of mine can raise or lower Colonel Gore Bz-owne's character, but because a true view of his relations with his advisers aud the colonists is necessary to a proper understanding of the question at issue. 3IOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAK. It is no doubt sufficient for the purpose of fixing on the Imperial Government complete technical responsibility for the late Maori outbreak and its consequences, to have shewn the complete exclusion of the colonists from control over matters affecting the native race ; an exclusion not more perfect while [New Zealand was a Crown colony than after the rights of self-govern-ment were conferred upon its white inhabitants. But the settlers of Xew Zealand are not so changed bv a few years' absence from the mother country as "to evade any responsibility that may be morally theirs because they can prove it to be technically another's. 1 They hold fast by the docrine that a Government is 1 bound to maintain order among and protect those ( whom it governs, and to provide any force that may ' be required for these purposes. Yet they will not ' shelter themselves under that doctrine if "thev have 1 themselves caused or contributed to a breach of the t

peace which requires force to repress it; or if thev have been the means of inducing the governing power to take steps which have brought about a mischievous result; or even if without their consent or interference any act involving the employment of force has been done either solely or chiefly for their benefit. If the colonists have been partly a cause of the disturbances in Xew Zealand, it is certain that they are proportionately responsible for the consequences; but the burden of proof that this was so lies now with the other side. The common notion that the colonists are answerable because the aflair happened in the colony cannot be sustained. If the Xew Zealand war lias been the result of bad government of the natives, it is onlv one of many excuses for those whose duty it was to govern well to say that the colonists by their acts made government difficult. If it be argued that the Government was overborne by a pressure from without, and so urged into a mistaken policy, that at most is

but an attempt to divide the responsibility. If, again, an injudicious anxiety 011 the part of the Government to benefit the colonists be put forward as a main cause of the war, the suggestion only imputes blame to those who so little understood what was the best wav of performing their peculiar duty. Now the charge against the colonists of complicity in the war takes one or other of these three forms, or is compounded of them in various proportions. Yet it can be shewn

that neither as a body nor through their representatives have the colonists taken sueli a part in bringing about the native disturbances as can east upon them a real responsibility for the consequences. To shew this it is not necessary to go into anv minute detail or to examine any doubtful evidence on the subject. The case of the colonists in this respect, as in the former, rests on broad facts and obvious inferences.

In the year 1853 the Maori tribes were perfectly peaceful throughout the colony. In 1860 the war began. All the progressive symptoms of disaffection as well as its more immediate causes are to be sought for during the intervening period. At the end of the former year Governor Sir George Grey left the colony. His policy towards the natives may be called distinctively one of conciliation, but was not unaccompanied by the operations of active government. Resident magistrates were administering justice in native districts. Anns and warlike stores were denied to the aborigines. Land purchase operations were conducted with great caution. Maori land was oil'eml to Government more freely than funds could be provided for the purchase. And the tribes were in a singular state of peace among themselves. [See Pari. PaDers N.Z., July 1860, p. 28.] P *' At tins time, as before stated, the Colonial Office left New Zealand without a Governor for eighteen months; and then Governor Gore Browne was appointed. Throughout tho seven years which ended with the war, the Papers laid before Parliament shew that no advice as to dealings with the natives Was offered by Her Majesty's Government. There are certain formal despatches expressing a simple approval of the Governor's acts and views as detailed by himself. And there are parts of two despatches, already quoted, commanding him to reserve all control over native affairs to the Crown. But the Colonial Office took no part of this control on itself, and left the government of the natives, which it deemed so delicate and import ant a duty, to the unassisted discretion of its representative in the colony. The task was thrown upon the Governor, but surely all responsibility was not so got rid of. Before Governor Browne's time, serious difficulties had already arisen. Governor Grey's processes of

conciliation and government had been die, >. together. Hostilities had sprung up be-* parties of natives near Taranaki. and" "f-' \ ' been dealt with after a new policy whi.-l/''' distinctively called one of non-interfere-,,,. example among many mav be quoted"v,. J quarrelled with Rawiri, killed him, and the vengeance of tlie murdered man's friend- < ' below, p. 3D). The two men were intimj,'. V ' Europeans, and justice mi<rht en-ilv haw'o f 7 But it had come to be deemed no parr of ','i the Government to do justice betwe,.,', 'n Ht; Z : native. For the origin of this policy "\Z " Governor Wy nyard's despatches. 2nd v.-i-V-i- "- K-" and sth February, 1855. "Paper**. 'ii,i!ZZ Z"'' PP*. f 6 ' 71 -J ThLs policy. and the departine'l-V' which transfveted native affair- were '(■] " c Browne's inheritance. The native governing department with tk' of]"'/; ' chase, which took place in 1 $56, ha, wrf'aK mentioned. Government was le-s e:ficvn>l • V ducted and land purchases were i--. effected after this step. Promises of ho-i' further payments out of the proceed.-' of land ' '' : and other advantages, which had been m... ;,, t' ZZZ' when they ceded their land, were for»o':,.V!! r ; regarded. At the same time tlie re«-ri--tj.,>'. 7 r"

disposal ot arms and ammunition were iv;' : natives became almost absolved from coi.Tn';" ] like to a Government which appeared to bargainer for their property, joined to a dZZ-'Z jealousy of European advancement into roused many to oppose any furth-r Z Z'Z'At the same time the want of anv l'v.. • restraining power from without' u. thoughtful men among them to it stituiion of some authority over tii«a».-i'v. within. Tlie two objects harmonized. and wto a thoroughly natural desire for the iv!->->--;"'" of the race. Though many who ahv.-d V ' " practical objects were far from .-.ZZZ" the Queen's nominal sovereign- within tv-ir >•7.many others of the ambitious and recki—- ,:-Z„ urged on the agitation towards this end. Ti >■ L ■ League first, and then the " Kin*" uiove:r ; .-r. -Z the result. Tim was the movement the ;r-u""

which by the Government has been alrea j - r : It was left alone, in tlie hope that it ZZZ but it spread and grew and soon bore It was at this time, if at all. that ti.e ;e' .• ; be charged with stirring up disc-omen* a;uv->J • natives, making Government diiSculr. t . tributing to the coming outbreak. Bat ■. remarkable that no feeling of hostility -.r ;i , ~7 „ . manifested by the natives towards the col-nx-The two races continued on the most frier/;/, ttrriiiprivately, and even in spite of exceptional rl.oa/:. frequent annoyances from individual Maori;. the law was unable to punish, the settler; in o-.thin; districts remained guiltless of any misconduct. 1 : cannot be maintained, therefore, for an i-stanr. tk: the settlers irritated the natives and provoked to a breach of the peace. But if it be said th: government was rendered difficult by false report, inconsiderate suggestions, and comments injuria--* to the authorities circulating through the press, th-e cannot be altogether denied, thoueh their iniiucr.ee may be doubted. The difficulty is one which constantly besets a free government, and is the price which it pays for at least an equivalent siiprjort and sympathy from its more thoughtfiil subjects* It must be remembered that the agitation called the King movement was attended by no violence, bv no exhibition of forcible resistance to constitute! authority, nor even by the display of any such intention. It was confined to the strong tribes in the "Waikato district, in the interior of the island. TLt natives in other districts were either stili submissive to the Government, or were influenced similarly with the Waikato tribes without their organization. Th? latter state of feeling prevailed in the province Taranaki, where for several years the peace of the country bad been broken by feuds between a minority of natives desirous of selling, aud a majority wiv.sc object was to prevent sales of land to the Government.

Early in the year 1559 Governor Browne visited Taranaki. What happened there is described it: a Parliamentary Blue Book entitled " Papers relating : the recent Disturbances in New Zealand/' presented by command, March, 1861, from which I shall quote. The Governor, finding the settlers at Taranaki very desirous for more land, assured them of iii> earnest desire to meet their views, when he could extyiiruisi: the native title to land satisfactorily, and without compromising the neutrality which he had determined to observe in all native quarrels, "p. 1.~ No could be calmer on one side or more cautious on the other than that which is recorded as having passed between them. There is no evidence that the settlers were as yet unduly urgent upou the Governor, or that he gave way in any degree to solicitations from without. The Governor after meeting the settlers had at: interview with the natives; and here we approve': 1 , the immediate origin of the war. It is necessary ro observe carefully what the opinions and intention; recorded at the time were, for subsequent explanations of motives may be thought open to suspicion as influenced by the event. The Governor savs in his despatch of March 29, 1859, (p.p. 1, 2) as follows •' After this a chief, named Teira. offered some land for sale, which he and his relatives desired to dispose of to tae Government, and which, as being situated at the wourii °f the Waitara river, on the south bank, will be a vaku! itacquisition to the province. He pressed for an immed'.atc answer, and I replied that if he could give a satisfactory title I would accept his otter. Another chief rose to object, but when asked it he had any claim to the land, adiuute-.i that he had not. William King then rose, and wane asserting no claim to it, said he would never p?rnut * land to be sold: then, waving his hand to his people, he and they left the meeting with some want of eouriesv to myself. Since then progress has been made in ascerta.n.Ui Terra's right to dispose of the land (of which there sec.us to be little doubt), and. if proved, the purchase will completed. Should this be the case it will probably to the acquisition ot all the land south of the atiara river, which is essentially necessarv for the n o* ( the province, as well as for the use of the settlers. ''It is also most important to vindicate our ri;iu ; purchase from those who have both the and the d-.-sire to sell. °

' The right to sell land belonging to themselves out interference on the part of other chiefs (not hav::'.i ;i claim to share in it) is fully admitted bv Maori eufwm: any recognition of such a power as that assumed William Kin" 1 would therefore be unjust to both races. wcause it would be the means of keeping millions ot ?•" .1 waste and out of cultivation. I have, however, littts - I that William King will venture to resort to violence \ maintain his assumed right; but I have made evorv paration to enforce obedience should he presume to Jo *'• ' Copies of the instructions I have given to both the civ:! , and military authorities are herewith enclosed. '"I tound the settlers extremely anxious that t'avour should be shown to Ih&iah, the chief with whom W King is at feud, and who has alwavs been a tiriu trieiw to the Lnglish. His quarrel with King is chiefly because the latter has some claim on the land which he desires to sell, and which King will neither yield nor sell. " I have, however, declared my firm determiuar.on remain entirely neutral in this and all other Native t'eiuls. and to purchase no land without the consent of all have a claim on it."

And that portion of his address to the natives inclosed in the despatch) which bears oil the subject was as follows:—

" The Governor then said, he had but two subject# cn which he desired to speak particularly to the tribe# li vl,1 » near Tarauaki, and they were, —First in reference to criminal offences; second, in reference to land. He these subjects to be considered separately, and as havuitT no sort ot reference to each other. He observed that the tribes in the vicinity of Taranaki have greater advantage? than most others, as they arc much intermixed with t!i<' Pakeha, aud ought to profit by their intercourse with them. If they chose to live peaceably and cultivate thei r lands they would grow rich and multiplv. instead ot which they were constantly at war with each other, and their numbers were decreasing. Their disputes were almost always about matters of little or no importance, or about .land which was not worth quarrelling for. The Governor then said that had ho been in New Zealand when -Katatori slew Rawiri, he would have had hiiu arrested and brougl l ' before the Judge, and, if the Judge had sentenced hiiu !l ' be hanged, he would have caused him to be hanged: thaf he had not thought proper to arrest Ihaiali, because thoUi,'' 1 the murders to which he was a party were horrible ;l,u disgraceful, yet they admitted of some extenuation, ifljj-' much as they were committed in retribution tor the murder

t T iwivi Vll this, however, now belongs to the past.; w 'for the future, he had determined that every man (whether he be Maori or Pakeha) who may commit any 1 Mice or outrage within the European boundaries shall VI Ivrested mid taken before the Judge, and the sentence ' t i l( , jmKre, whatever it may he, shall be carried into \fvt 11^was determined that the peace of the settlers nild no louder be disturbed bv evil-doers, and that those Al'ioi'N who aiv not content to live in peace among tho p'Liw had better go elsewhere. In reference to the inil "subject the Governor said he thought the Maoris Muld be wi*e to sell the land they cannot use themselves, it would mike what thev could use more valuable than whole- but that lie never would consent to buy land without an undisputed title. He would not permit any u , interfere in the sale of land unless he owned part of it; and. on the other hand, he would buy no man's laud 'without his consent." [pp. 3, 4]

Governor Browne evidently had the circumstances of the then late native feud in that district strongly impressed on his mind at the time of this address. These circumstances are sufficiently remarkable to be briefly mentioned; the more so, that they illustrate the case that, was just about to arise. In the time of Acting-G-overnor Wynyard, a piece of land at Taranaki had been offered to the Land Purchase Department by a native named Rawiri and his friends. Preliminaries being arranged, and it beino- known that another party of natives would oppose the sale, the Government officer did not undertake the survey, but sent the sellers themselves to lav out the block. When the survey party went about their work, the opposing natives, headed by their chief Katatore, fired upon them and killed Rawiri. The Government refused to interfere. A bitter feud sprang up between the two parties, lasting several years; during which, among other atrocities. Ihaia, the friend of the deceased Rawiri, plotted and effected the death of the murderer Katatore. [Pari. Papers, July, 1860, pp. 41, 72, et seq.] The Governor as we have seen expressed las views upon Teira's offer at once. He placed first on record an opinion on the point, whether the land was worth purchasing at a price for general purposes: secondly, a desire that as much land as possible should be removed from being the subject of native quarrels : and thirdlv, a determination that, if Teira should prove the real owner, no self-constituted authority should interfere to rob him of his right to sell and receive the value. Therefore the investigation was ordered to

proceed. , . With the nature of the investigation and the decision arrived at I have no concern, further than that the colonists, from the Ministry downwards, had nothing to say to it; they could not control the officers of the "department- nor interfere in any way with their work. The decision was to be arrived at

on the responsibility of the Imperial Government alone, and therefore the enquiry was _ left in the hands of its owu officers. The investigation was completed by January 1860, and resulted in favor of Teira's claim. By this time the intentions of the Governor had been submitted to and approved of by the Secretary of State (p. 259). The settlers had made no demonstration whatever. If they wanted the land thev had at least self-control enough to leave

the Governor and the department to the execution of their duties. If it be asserted that any pressure was brought by the settlers to have the title to the land at the Waitara declared good for purchasing,

the assertion is not true. The Governor then, satisfied of Teira s right, paid part of the purchase money and ordered a survey (p. 5). Even at that time he so far expected opposition as to prepare for the display of force. It is most important to note that in this very first mention of force the Governor gives his reason for proposing to employ it. He says —" Though always ready to consider every reasonable objection, I am not the less determined to enforce her Majesty's right to deal with her own subjects without hindrance from any one not having a legitimate interest in the transaction." The' desirability of obtaining a good bit of land, which was a good reason amongst others for entering upon the negotiation, was no reason, actual or professed, for the employment of force. Governor Browne henceforth stated his motive to be the assertion of her Majesty's authority. The bit of land might have been the occasion but it was not to be the cause of Having satisfied himself of the correctness of Teira s title to the land, and believing that the right to sell would be opposed by the chief, Wiremu Kingi, Governor Browne consulted tlie Executive Council, which included the members of the Colonial Ministry. The minutes of the meeting are on record (p. 6), and shew that the views of the Governor were fully con-

curred in by the Council. The determination was taken to survey the land ; to support the survey by a military force if necessary; to hold the land in the same way; and in the event of serious opposition to call out the militia and volunteers, and to proclaim martial law in the district.

It is not necessary to explain the concurrence of the Ministry in this determination. The facts speak for themselves. The Governor had in his own person, a year previously, taken the first steps m the matter, foreseeing the issue which had now come about. He now took the opinion of his Council, as he was bound to do, and it agreed with his own. There is no doubt about what his own opinion had been all along; and there is as little doubt that had his own opinion been otherwise, and had his Council recommended this course, ' e mero motu,' he would have been as little induced to give way to them as he had been on all former occasions. This was one ot many instances, no doubt, of unanimity m opinion. In the present instance it was clearly arrived at by the acquiescence of the Ministry and not by any yielding of the Governor. Whether the determination thus taken was the wisest possible, or an error 01 judgment on both sides, does not alter their relative positions in any degree. There is no evidence that the Colonial Ministry did more than adopt the Governor's plan. They cordially supported his Excellency in asserting the Queen's authority; hoping that the question of sovereignty might be determined once for all, and order restored and maintained to the ultimate advantage of both races. That I am not imagining motives for the Ministry is shewn by the Mowing passages from Mr. C. W Richmond s minute of May 25, 1860, the whole of which is worth reading:— " The insinuation that the war is one of aggrandisement, that it is undertaken for the sake of acquiring territory, is quite untrue. The proceedings which have led to it were under the immediate superintendence and control ot the Governor. His Excellency will confirm the statement that those proceedings were not, at any stage, urged upon him, or so much as suggested to him, by his responsible Ministers. Nor was there, previously to the commencement of the war, any manifestation of public feeling on the subject of the dispute between the Governor and Wm. Kino-. It would be absurd to suppose that His Excellency could be actuated by the motive imputed. And it must appear almost equally improbable, to any person whe calmly reflects on the matter, that the colonists, or then representatives, should willingly incur mit to the sacrifices of a Maori war for the sake of a fe* hundreds of acres in the least important province ot JNefl Zealand. Other motives must be sought for to expla i the general support which his Excellency has recened u the colony upon the present occasion. " On behalf of their fellow settlers, his Excellency Ministers would represent to Her Majesty s Imperia Government, that the grand desire of the Brlt . lsl^ Col T!f in respect to the natives is, not tte appropriation of th( native territory, still less the destruction of the raee bu it is to see the Maori people rendered amenable m the dealings with the settlers, to British law. The restles instinct of progress, the love of wealth, the hatied of racc are all no doubt motives at work in the country, against the indulgence or the excess of es i passions the Government is bound to be upon its guar But stronger, and more universal, and more .meyitabl than all these feelings, is the desire which onuna ;es th public mind, that all the inhabitants of New Zealan should he subjected, in their mutual dealings, to tl control of one equal law. This is a natural i an p worthy desire, and, if duly regulated, must be to the good as much of the natives as colonists." * * * * . _ li n , t\ " It is because the decisive action of his Exceilen j Governor appears to the colonists adapted ultimate y secure this great and happy result, that they arc < merely reconciled to the heavy present sacrifices it entai upon them, but prepared to give the Imperial Goveri ment their most active support in suppressing the existu rebellion. His Excellency's responsible Ministers conci in this general opinion and determination, and now expre their expectation that his Excellency's policy, th°u£ beset with unavoidable and accumulated difficulty, will 1

recognized and supported as neither unwise nor unjust, nor likely to prove disastrous to either race, but that it will be seen to have been, on the contrary, dictated by a due regard to the welfare of New Zealand and the dignity of the Crown, and of necessity to have been in strict accordance with those just principles which have hitherto regulated the conduct of the British Government in these islands." [pp. 52, 53.] The rest of the story may be briefly told. On the 20th of February, 1860, the survey of Teira's land was attempted by a small unarmed party, under the orders of the District Land Purchase Commissioner, but was put a stop to by a crowd of Kingi's people. The Governor himself oamo to Taranaki in consequence. He warned Kingi and all the natives not to attempt to oppose his orders. He finally determined to carry the survey by a military force, and on the stli of March troops were moved down to the spot from the town of New Plymouth. The next day a smn.ll pa (fortification of palisades) was erected by the opposing natives, and some carts carrying supplies were stopped by them on tlie road. But on summons the pa was evacuated, and the carts were allowed to pass. The survey was completed, and the bouudarie3 marked out. On the night of the 15tli of March, another pa was erected by the insurgents on the purchased land, and the survey sticks pulled up and burnt. On the 17th a summons was sent to the occupants of the new pa, but it was not listened to. Fire was accordingly opened by the troops, and on the 18th the pa was evacuated by the insurgents (p.p. 21, 22), This was the actual beginning of the war. Kingi obtained reinforcements, and so did the troops; the fighting went on with little advantage, if any, on the side of the military. Further reinforcements quickly came over from Australia, and Kingi sought and obtained the help of the powerful Waikato tribes, by joining the King movement and handing over the land in dispute to be dealt with by the Maori Confederation. The war now became a national con-

test, and soon there was scarcely a district in the island where the natives could be relied upon as cer-

:ain to remain friendly. The consequences exist to

this (lay. The proceedings of Governor Browne in going to war and in prosecuting it were approved of by the Secretary of State. [See Despatches, 23 May, 26 June, 26 Sept., 27 Nov., 1860, amongst others.] The policy of the war and the conduct of the Governor have never been objected to : but the expense was condemned as soon as it was felt. Summing up the results obtained, I assert: — First, that the colonists are not technically responsible for the war and its consequences. 1. Because the Imperial Government reserved to itself the management of native affairs. 2. Because the Governor strictly carried into practice the exclusion of the colonists from the control of the native race. 3. Because the war was commenced by the Governor in person on behalf of the Imperial Government : and the only share in it taken by the Colonial Government was one of loyal and subsequent co-operation. Secondly, That the colonists are not morally responsible for the war and its consequences. 1. Because their plans for the better government of the natives were rejected. 2. Because they in 110 way provoked the war, or induced a breach of the peace leading to it. 3. Because they brought no pressure to bear upon the Governor in the matter. 4. Because the war was not begun for their sole or special benefit. THE MINOR CHARGES AGAINST THE COLONISTS. Having now refuted at length the fundamental charge brought against the Colonists of New Zealand of having brought about the war, the subsidiary accusations against them may be more easily disposed of. As the war was not begun for the special benefit of the Colonists, still less was it meant for their defence. In fact there was no danger to defend them against:

there was no such prospect of invasion as is commonly supposed to attend settlers on the frontiers of savage tribes. Wliat the settlers did feel was the want of power in the law to punish individual native offenders who acted from time to time as evil disposed persons among even civilized nations will act where the law cannot reach them. A policeman and a magistrate were all the force wanted'to repress the sort of crime that was committed in the place. The Government nevertheless would have been blamable had they counted upon this good disposition of the natives as sufficient protection for the country. A small force had been maintained accordingly at Taranaki, and at each of the chief settlements in the North Island; but it was never made use of. And even before Taranaki was furnished with a regular force, the settlers were required to organize themselves as volunteers, and were rendered liable to be

called out as militia. "When the war began, the ■volunteers and militia of T&vanaki were at once called out for active service. Some who have spoken of the colonists with a sneer may perhaps be surprised into a compliment when they learn that these settlers—the whole active male population of the province—flew to arms at the call, and fought side by side with the Queen's troops, not for the defence of their property or their families, but for the support of her Majesty's authority. Compelled to abandon their homes m the country, to send their women and children away to another province, to serve in the field and in garrison along with but as subservient to the troops of the line, they behaved gallantly throughout, endured danger and hardship willingly, even after their whole property had been sacrificed, and spilled their blood freely with no prospect of better reward than to be turned adrift paupers into the wilderness when the war should end. I cannot resist the temptation to quote here the words of an independent eye-witness,_ Captain Cracroft, R.N., who, being in command of her Majesty's ship Niger throughout the war, distinguished himself by leading the attack on the Waireka pa, one of the few successes of the British arms during the campaign. In an address to a body ot English volunteers, after his return from the Colony, the newspapers report that: — " Captain Cracroft, K.N., said he could not express to tliem the pleasure he felt in meeting the Volunteers ot England, and this was the first time he had had that honor. He had met Volunteers elsewhere, for wherever the English flag was planted there the noble spirit that had actuated the Volunteers of England was found to exist. There was now no colony which owned England for its parent without its Volunteers. _ It'had been his privilege to see them brought into action on a late occasion in New Zealand, and when he said they were the first, in the field, and the first to face the enemy, and had shown the way to the Regulars and the Militia, he felt he need sav no more-that he could award them no highei praise. When called upon they were m their places, as those before him would be, should their hour of trial cvei arrive. He (Captain Cracroft) had been brought side bj side with the Volunteers in New Zealand, and had founr as much honor and bravery among them as among his own men, who regarded them as brothers, and woulc have done anything for them."

It is absolutely true not only that the New Zealand war was not for the defence or the special benefit of the settlers, but that it converted the settlement where it was carried on into a battle-field held by i the enemy: and brought upon the colonists, who for l twenty years had been struggling to build up their fortunes there, the total destruction of their hardj earned property. Whatever annoyance might have I been anticipated from the lawless character of indi- * vidual natives, it is certain that nothing short of the ! declaration of war could have brought such a catask trophe as this upon the settlement. Nor can it be P urged that the colonists of Taranaki entered upon the 3 war without foreseeing its consequences. Before its i declaration, but expecting it, they had already rer moved their families from the country to the town; and when they applauded and supported with all their e vigor Governor Browne's attempt to maintain the G Queen's sovereignty, they had already made up their d minds to the coming sacrifice. [Pari. Papers, March, e 1861 pp. 8-10.] Three weeks before the first shot was fired the settlers had left their homes, and pree sented themselves for enrolment as militia and volunteers. . , ~ ie In Auckland the. settlers were charged with the o entire defence of the town and settlement. ey )t mustered in great strength, and were quickly avai--18 able for active scrvice in the field. But throughout l ' the campaign, though the war raged in a neighboring £ province, and the ranks of the rebels were recruitcc II from the borders of Auckland, the citizen forces were never called upon to strike a single blow. With reje markable forbearance, the insurgents, savages tliougu

they were, and engaged in a bloody and desperate struggle with the Government, left unhurt the persons and property even of the outlying settlers who were all the time completely at their mercy. Only in Taranaki, the authorised battle-field, where martial law (the "law of fighting" as it was translated to them) had been proclaimed, did the natives think themselves privileged to pillage and kill. The settlements of Napier, Wellington, and Wanganui, on the eastern and southern shores of the North Island, were similarly exposed to danger, similarly defended, and in the same manner left unattacked. Though it would have been madness to calculate on such immunity, yet the result proves the

truth of the feeling often expressed by the natives that tlieir hostility was against the Government and not against the settlers. Evea the most savage and dastardly of the tribes shewed this feeling. [See amongst other passages, Pari. Papers, March 1861,

p. 14.] As soon as the pressure of probable danger ceased, the movement for self-defence naturally lapsed into

that state which it has assumed in other countries under similar conditions. Its vitality would be aroused at the first note of warning, and in real danger it would resume at least its first appearance of vigour. But a whole population in a colony, as elsewhere, cannot always remain under arms. The smallness of their numbers, and the difficulty of mustering any force of consequence at a central point, hinder their general employment as an offensive force. Readiness on the part of the New Zealand colonists to enrol and train themselves cannot be questioned.

And with the case of Taranaki as evidence, their willingness and ability to fight even for other purposes than self-defence is well established. It is absurd therefore to assert that the settlers wish to shirk the duty of defending themselves. So far from the settlers demanding the help of the British troops for their purposes, it is the fact that they gave their assistance to the Imperial Government in the furtherance of its objects. And the Government, having got their help, would not let. it go. Their houses might burn, tlieir families might starve or go into exile, all they were worth in the world might be swept away before their eyes ; but they were soldiers of the Crown and might not stir. They were not permitted to take measures for defending their pro-

perty: they were prevented from disposing of the produce of their lands while it was still removable; and down to the date of the last news from the colonv, they have even been forbidden to go upon their own lands, for fear of embarrassing the Imperial military policy ! By which side then is a debt due to the other for assistance rendered during the war? To the assertion that troops are now quartered in New Zealand and maintained there at the expense of the British tax-payer, for the protection of the settlers, the reply is simple. In time of peace their protection is not wanted; and in time of war the troops, judging from the past, are otherwise fully employed. A slender garrison is all that can be alleged to have ever been even intended for defensive purposes. It will probably be asked, why then are the troops kept there, since now the war is over ? First, because the exhibition of force is needed for the restoration of government among the natives by pacific measures, of which I shall say more hereafter: secondly, because the war begun in 1860 is not yet ended. The practical result of the first campaign is that the rebels took possession ot the lands of the°Crown and the settlers, and still hold them. Even supposing that it is not thought convenient to punish the rebels, the Imperial Government at least knows that they cannot be permitted to maintain a claim to possession by conquest of part of her Majesty s dominions. As it has been put in the colony —if the war were for the assertion of her Majesty's sovereignty, it

has weakened her authority : if it were for the acquisition of land, land has instead been surrendered. The war will not be at an end till the obvious loss sustained in both these respects shall have been retrieved. The Ngatiruanui tribe hold the district of Tataraimaka, in the province of Taranaki, by right, as they say, of conquest from the Crown, effected in 1860. It is impossible that the Imperial Government can allow this to continue until the natives die off the

land. And though the Governor may devise means for recovering the territory without appealing to arms, the greater probability is that the force which must be employed in some shape for ejecting the rebel occupants will light up the flame of war afresh throughout the island. While I write, the problem is very piobably in course of solution ; solved it must be sooner or later; and if the result should prove to be a recourse to arms on both sides, it must not be called a fresh war, but a renewal and direct consequence of the former. These are the reasons why a force is quar-

tered and maintained in the colony. To the assertion that the colony desires to throw the whole burden of the war upon the mother country, I reply that New Zealand has undertaken a separate war liability of about £650,000 ; besides an annual payment of about £25,000 for the troops to be employed, and a further annual .sum of £20,000 for pacific means of restoring order. These amounts are exclusive of appropriations for self-defence. In proportion to population (one hundred thousand to thirty millions), the corresponding charges upon Great Britain would be about two hundred millions of debt, and fifteen millions of annual grants from revenue. Reference will be made presently to the condition which the Legislature of the colony has attached to these large grants. Of the assertion that a state war is encouraged by the colonists for the sake of the expenditur from the Imperial Treasury which accompanies it, I will not speak with the indignation it deserves. Such a calumny is easily uttered, and is generally hard of disnroof. It is commonly repeated without consideration, and comes to be believed on no evidence of facts, but merely because it is probable. Whoever utters such a charge against the people of New Zealand shews not only a want of charity towards the absent, but an ignorance of plain facts. The war, I have shewn, was most warmly supported by those who had everything to lose by it, and who undertook to lose all, even to life itself. It was also strongly approved of, from its commencement to the present time, by the great majority of the settlers in the Middle Island, who had nothing to gain by land purchases, and derived as little benefit from commissariat expenditure in the north as if they had been in Australia. The settlers of Auckland Wellington, and Napier, to whom alone it could be imputed that they profited by a war which did not touch themselves, furnished the whole strength ot what was called the "peace party," which vehemently opposed G-overnor Browne's fighting policy. In the foremost ranks of this party were the leading members of the commercial class. Those, therefore, against whom a prima facie charge might perhaps be said to lie are an insignificant minority. In t-lic addresses to the Governor from the people of the Northern Island, [pp. 53-57], it is observable that a state of war is declared to be extremely prejudicial to the material interests of the colony, llns feeling has, so far as I can judge, strengthened with the progress of the war. A true explanation ot the views of the colonists is to be found, not in the suggestion contained in the charge now made against them, but more probably in one exactly its opposite. The British public may therefore be quite satisfied that little wars will not be excited bv their iellow subjects in New Zealand, for any gain to accrue to them from fighting. If the colonists are found again supporting the prosecution of a war witliin their ordors, it will be because they feel as Englishmen, that a timely exhibition of strength is sometimes neccasarj for upholding the right and punishing tne wrong.

IMPEItIAL POLICY TOWARDS THE COLONY. It may be said, if the war was not for the benefit of the colonists, it was certainly not for that ot tlic English people, ancl the tax-payers of the three Kingdoms should therefore not be more heavily taxed to carry it on. This is a very natural observation to make, but the time to make it has gone y 01 ie The philosophy of English statesmen and the phi lanthropy of the people were early enlisted on behalf of the Maori race. England had become ashamed of (hose pages in her history which describe the destruction of the aborigines in those counties iei ° her earlier colonics have been planted ; and she determined to save the Maori race from a simi ar fate. The Maori was a fit subject for the attempt. Mis-

sionaries had been very successful in christianizing the race, and a readiness to adopt the habits of civilization had long been perceived among them.

The work of preserving and elevating a savage race demanded the resources of a powerful nation and the careful observance of a plan. Haphazard intercourse with white men would spoil the race rather than improve it. A small body of colonists might succeed in gradually killing off the aborigines, as had often been done before, but not in administering a strong government among them. Such was the accepted doctrine at the foundation of New Zealand as a colony. Influenced by these views, the British nation, through its government, deliberately accepted the protectorship of the Maori people, confirmed them by treaty in the enjoyment of their existing rights, and undertook so to govern the colony that the two races should grow up together for the benefit of each other. This noble policy has always enlisted the intelligent approval of the colonists, though at times the wisdom of the methods adopted for carrying the intention into effect has been doubted by them. They would have been willing at one time to take upon themselves, without, any hesitation, the duty of governing the native tribes, in the hope of carrying out the same policy with closer attention and greater success. Though tlioy never in terms offered to do so, the Imperial Government having always treated the surrender of its protectorate as an impossibility, yet the impatience of the settlers under the system of double government which has been described would doubtless have led them to accept the duty, had it been tendered to them while its performance seemed within their power. But. the protectorate was jealously maintained, and no offer to abandon it was even hinted till last year, two years after the outbreak of war. The transfer of power was then tendered in a despatch from the Secretary of State, dated May 26, 1862,

[Pari. Papers, N.Z., August, 1862, p. 70,] in a way which was not deemed satisfactory by the colony. The Duke of Newcastle said to the Governor in this despatch [p. 80], " I am ready to sanction the important step you have taken hi placing the management of the natives under the control of the Assembly." He did so, both because he thought the Governor's views correct, and because " the endeavour to keep the management of the natives under the control of the Home Government has failed."

If the Secretary of State supposed as he appears to have done, that his " readiness to sanction " this important step settled the matter he was mistaken. It is clear that such a step, intended as it was to shift the responsibility of native government from the Home G-overnment to the Colonial Assembly, required the acquiescence of the latter body to render it complete. It is not possible, even in the small matters of private life, for one man to ease himself of a duty by transferring it to another without the latter's consent. No doubt his Grace misapprehended the meaning of the Governor's despatch to which he was replying [ib. p. 27], and finding that the separate native department in the colony had been done away with, and the agency of the Colonial Ministry employed in its place, assumed that the colony had already acquiesced in an entire change of plan. But this was not the case. The Crown was of course at liberty to perform its own work through and by whom it might choose; but all its servants are not necessarily " Responsible Ministers." Sir George Grey found it better to transact native affairs through the ordinary heads of departments than through a separate staff. He did this because he agreed with his colonial advisers, who, acting upon a resolution of the Legislature, pointed out the difficulties of a double government in the colony [ib. p. 3]. But it did not follow that the two sets of affairs were to be conducted on the same

terms. It would have been idle, indeed, to think of such a thing. To nave brought Sir George Grey from the Cape of Good Hope to an inferior Government, because he was the most able Governor of aborigines the British Empire could produce, and then"to make him merely a constitutional ruler, leaving the colonial representatives to direct and be responsible for all native as they were for all colonial affairs, would have been an extravagant mockery. It is only necessary to suppose the case of a difference on an important question between the Governor and advisers having the support of a strong party in Parliament; or that of a hostile vote in the Assembly against a Ministry supported by the Governor. If the Assembly was to be responsible for the consequences, the Governor must give way. Nobody except Sir George Grey himself would have ventured to recommend a plan treating so lightly the Governor selected for a special emergency. The suggestion of a responsible government in native affairs was at the time not feasible. His Excellency's colonial advisers could not undertake their part in such a scheme; and

even had they done so temporarily, the Assembly when it met could not and would not have sanctioned the arrangement. The plan will be possible when the Governor can consent to follow whatever policy in native affairs may be approved of by any set of advisers in whom the Legislature of the may have confidence. This has been the bugbear in the

way of Responsible Government in native affairs hitherto. It will be well for the Imperial Government to assure itself that in this way only will complete responsibility for the management of the New Zealand aborigines be fixed upon the colony.

The Secretary of State, then, seems to have forgotten that the acquiescence of the colony in a transfer of duties and responsibilities was necessary, and that it had not been obtained. It seems, indeed, very like the truth that the Colonial Office had come in the course of years to forget that the Governor was the representative of the Crown, and to look upon him only as the chief and mouthpiece of the colonists. In New Zealand native affairs, as has been shewn, the Governor was only the former, and not the latter at all. This supposed erroneous view would account for the absence which has been noticed of any instructions to the Governor on matters of policy; for the belief which has grown up in colonial responsibility for the war; and for the assumption just now mentioned of an acquiesence on the part of the colony in the Governor s proposals. And though the words of the Secretary of State acknowledging failure, quoted above, seem to oppose this view, they may bear a different meaning. In the same despatch, the Duke Newcastle claims prompt payment of colonial contributions to military expenditure arising out of the war ; throws all past and future expense for militia -and volunteers upon the colony; condemns the Zealand Government for " ignorance of the obligation under which the colonists themselves lie to exert themselves in their own defence, and to submit to those sacrifices which are necessary from persons whose lives and property are in danger;" calls for the imposition of additional taxes: announces, " though not an immediate, yet a speedy and considerable diminution of the force now employed;' and consents finally, as a concession, "in consideration of the present difficulties of the colony, to remit from the colonial contribution to the forces, for three years and no more, about one-half the cost of rerestoring the machinery of Government among the natives by pacific measures, —to an amount not exceeding £25,000 a year. The colonists had been somewhat prepared for language such as this. About fifl'een months before, in the session of 1861, when the Governor had determined that the proper course to restore order and assert the Queen's sovereignty was to attack the lieac quarters of the King movement in Waikato, he was compelled to tell the Assembly that unless the colony would undertake some additional liability, demanded by the Imperial Government, he could not employ the forces in the manner proposed. [Journals ot House of Rep. N. Z. 1861, p. 37-J A. despatch from Sir G. C. Lewis, of 26th July, 1860, seems to have been the first and chief instruction to the Governor to take a step such as this. [Appendix to Journals, House of Rep. N.Z. v- No. 3 b., 1861, pp. 6, 7. J Iho occasion was too serious to hesitate; refusal wouli have thrown the blame of inaction on the colony, and the Assembly then undertook to furnish meu ant means, to the extent of the resources of the colony. [Journals, &e., 1861, p. 47.] The fulfilment of this pledge was never exacted, for the threatened invasion of the Waikato country was suspended from ot lei causes; but the colonists had felt for the first tune the horns of the dilemma—to submit to a hard bargain, or to be condemned as indifferent to the weliaie of their country.

Nevertheless, the terms of the Duke's despatch of May 2G, 18(32, grated harshly on the ears of the Colonial representatives, who at the time of its arrival were assembled in session. On further consideration the propositions contained in it were universally condemned. If the acknowledgment, of failure in the words already quoted really meant that the Imperial policy had broken down, and that the attempts to govern the natives had failed; if it was admitted that the mis-govern-ment of the aborigines had resulted in war, or if it was maintained, that the government had been rightly conducted up to the outbreak, but that the war was a mistake ; in either case the Duke ought at least to have acknowledged the lavge assistance already given by the colony both in men and means, and to have admitted the sacrifices which the settlers gone. Had the colonists been met in this spirit, they might have been content not to urge their opinion that their revenues and their property and the lives of many of their number had been sacrificed to Imperial mistakes. They would have been satisfied as citizens of the Empire to take a share of that liability which they contended was one resting on the Empire at large; and, remembering their approval of the war from its beginning, they would not have disputed the amount to be contributed by them, as that share, up to the limit of their estimated resources. But to be told that all that had been done was in their defence, when their protection alone had never brought a single soldier into action; that they did not exert themselves for their own protection, when they had not only been ready to do this if necessary, but had actually fought from loyal sentiment as though they had been paid soldiers of the Crown; that they ought to make sacrifices to save their property, when the act of the Government alone had swept away much of that property, and might at any time cause the destruction of all that remained in the North Island ; to be told these things was to be grossly insulted. I regret that I have not at my command a milder expression to describe the fact. That these insults should be the introduction to a plan to leave on the colony the task of governing the native population who were still for the most part in a state of determined rebellion —a task involving, as a recent resolution of the House of Commons told them, the cost of repressing all disturbance—and that the whole should be accompanied by an intimation that tho troops would shortly be withdrawn while the prospects of further war were still imminent, left tho colonists in such a state of blank amazement, as might have been that of the Israelites when ordered to make bricks without straw. The subject occupied many long days of debate, and called forth every variety of opinion. It seemed at last hopeless to leave the answer to a despatch so full of misconceptions to be conveyed in a mere formal reply; and it was resolved accordingly to embody a statement of the case in the form of an address to the Queen. This remonstrance, as it may properly be called, has been recently published. I quote it at length in an appendix to this letter * Tho mam points in the reply of the colonists are — a disclaimer of responsibility for the past; a statement of the reasons which render it impossible for the colony alone to take up the government of the natives at the present crisis; a remonstrance against the seeming intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw from engagements to which they are honorably bound; a recapitulation of the losses and sufferings which have been entailed upon the colonists by no misconduct or imprudence of their own ; an undertaking to carry on the Government of the natives, if it be offered to them under possible conditions; and a consent to bear the burden of expense under any circumstances, to the extent of their means.

This remonstrance has been read as if. it were a mere evasion of responsibility. It would undoubtedly appear to be mainly so to any one possessed with the belief that the colonists have been the authors of all Maori troubles. But whoever is willing to listen to and examine into the real facts must acknowledge that the New Zealand settlers, who had innocently suffered as individuals, and were willing to drain their public resources to pay a debt which they had no share in incurring, were fully justified in drawing the line there, and refusing to acknowledge a liability of indefinite amount in the future.

FUTURE PKOSPKCTS. The following circumstances —that the colonists already pay taxes, in the shape of Customs duties alone, to the amount of about £4 per head, being double the rate of contribution from all sources to the revenue by the population of the United Kingdom; that a comparison of probable cost with produce puts the idea of the direct taxation of 100,000 people scattered over a large territory quite out of the question, even if their actual taxation through the Customs were not already heavy enough ; that a few ( thousand adult males in detached settlements round a coast more extensive than that of England cannot provide a combined force to move on the offensive against a central enemy; that the Maori people are intelligent, active and courageous in war, and their country peculiarly impenetrable; that the interests of a colony are urgently opposed to unremunerative war, from the mere fact that its prosperity depends upon its power not only to retain a popidation not yet firmly rooted in its territory but to attract others from abroad;—these circumstances are worth stating, though they may not bear directly upon the present argument. The question is not so much what the colony can do, as what it ought to do. Yet two considerations are suggested by these facts which it is important to notice. First, what would the colony do if lelfc without assistance in the management of native affairs? I am sure that the colonists of New Zealand would not swerve from the doctrine which teaches humanity to the inferior race and a recognition of the rights of aborigines. They would endeavour to the best of their "ability to civilize, elevate and preserve the race by judicious measures of government. Tliey would restrain and punish members of their own body who should attempt to injure their Maori neighbours. In short, all that intelligence and philanthropy might prompt they would try to do. Many indications already suffice to prove that this is not an empty boast. But they could not exhibit to the natives the other equally necessary side of government—the strong arm of the law—the power to restrain as well as to encourage—to punish as well as reward. For a generation yet to come there will be no means in the colony adequate to such a purpose. A policy upheld by no force, and a force which upholds no true policy, are equally impotent for the redemption of the savage. Justice there, as elsewhere, needs the sword as well as the balance. Against turbulencc, anarchy, or overt rebellion within the Maori border, the Government would be helpless. A timid, temporizing, cajoling and procrastinating policy must be employed in any such Could it succeed in preserving, elevating, and civilizing the race? Certainly not. On the other hand, it is evident that an attempt to maintain such a system ot government among the white population must fail. The policy, though begun in the best spirit, would, m the very probable event supposed, break down utterly. No body of settlers would endure long the pains and penalties of a partial law, not receiving any ndvant a ires from it in the shape of protection; which, it the law failed for many years to give them, would be sought in some other way. Against the urgency ot this°feeling no Government could continue to carry on a confessedly futile policy. In short, government without force to back it would be thoroughly unreal; and the attempt which would doubtless be made to establish it, on the basis of an enlightened policy would result in the subversion of government and policy together. And the case supposed is already ill existence" Anarchy and lawlessness prevail among the interior tribes. The consequences which might follow the unaided efforts of the colonists under favorable circumstances must follow any such efforts if now begun. Secondly, on what terms could the colonists carry on an efficient Government? Yery easily and very profitably for themselves, if they were careless of British engagenfents to the aborigines, or of any end but their own interests. To declare the wide and ferlile lands of the natives the property of the State, to invite an army of determined men, to pay them in the soil they should conquer, and to reduce the sur- ['* We need not here republish the well-known address. —Ed. L. T.]

riving natives to the occupation of no more territory than they could use, would be a very cheap and most effectual plan for pacifying the country and opening it to the influences of civilization and good government. The end might even be achieved without much cruelty or bloodshed; though from the character of the natives and their country, it is more probable that the loss of life would be great 011 both sides. New Zealand is not too large for such an experiment. There are plenty of men in Europe and elsewhere who would be glad enough to serve in the New Zealand army on such terms, even though the best settlers of to-day should quit the country in disgust. Nothing forbids the attempt but British honor, involved in the promise that has been pledged in solemn treaty by the superior to the inferior race.

The alternatives of principle before the Imperial Government are perfectly plain. Either such a force aa a great nation only can supply must be maintained to support a system of real government among the aborigines until it be fairly established; or, if that force is to be saved, treaty obligations must be cast off, and a less honorable if simpler process adopted. If the latter alternative be preferred, the colony has a right to demand that the shame of repudiating obligations, breaking promises, and abandoning a philanthropic undertaking for the sake of economy shall be borne by the English nation itself through its Government-; and that the disgraceful task shall not be left to be performed, unwillingly and under the pressure of adversity, by the colony. The first step may be taken now most conveniently. England complains that" the government of the New Zealand natives has cost such and such sums of mongy—" a very appreciable item," says the Duke of Newcastle, " among those which fix on the British tax-payer the burden of an income-tax." The burden is sought to be thrown upon the settlers in the colony. But they are not the body in whose government this money lias been spent. The rule is that the subjects of a Government should pay its expenses. In this case those subjects are the Maori people. Let them r be called on for the cost. If thev have not money, as they have not, let their land, which is the only equivalent, be taken And then it will be known for the future that consideration for aborigines is no longer to stand in the way of a proper adjustment of the burden of expenditure. ■FINANCIAL QUESTIONS. Besides the very important question between the mother country and the colony of the future government of the natives, there is the question of payment for what has been and is being done in the colony in consequence of the outbreak ot war. What the colony has to set down as the cost of the war to itself may be stated in round numbers as follows :— Destruction of property at Taranaki, to be made good by the whole colony, say £200,000 Cost of militia and volunteers called out for active service ... ... ... ••• ••• 150,000 Cost of arms, stores, transport and works of defence... ... ••• ••• ••• ••• 100,000 Contribution to pay and expenses of H.M.'s troops ... ... ... ••• ••• 150,000 Eoads for military purposes ... 50,000 £050,000

The total amount is that which the colony calls its war liability up to the middle of last year. If the settlers were altogether responsible for the war, the above account shows that they have already been severely punished. If they are, on the other hand, not at all responsible, their offer to take on themselves this liability is generous in the extreme. Perhaps it would have shewn more worldly wisdom to promise much and pay nothing than to pay and remonstrate as they have done. The former course could not have brought upon them greater discredit than the latter has by some perversion been made to bring. The only condition which the colony attaches to its promise to pay what the Imperial Government demands, a sum of about £200,000 out of the amount above stated, is that it shall not be obliged to go into the money market to raise a loan in its own name. It is willing to offer its revenues as security, and to charge them with the payment of interest and principal. The Imperial Government may make use of this offer instead of adding to the burden of the British tax-payer. But if it does, it must relieve the colony of that difference of interest which exists between an Imperial and a Colonial debt. In other words the colony requests that the Imperial Government will guarantee the requisite loan, and so save to the colony one-third of the amount of interest each year. It is but a little matter to ask assistance wliich can be so easily rendered when the colony is endeavoring on its own side to do all that it can do without considering whether it might not avoid the claim. As the settlers of New Zealand call the war an Imperial one, they, not forgetting that they are a part of the Empire, have shown their willingness to bear at least their share of the cost and loss; and m the same way they ask for their share of the benefit of common citizenship. CONCLUSIOK. The Imperial Government have now three courses practically open to them, one of which they must follow. They may retain the management of New Zealand native affairs in their own hands, supplying the force required to retrieve past failures and to give effect to their administration in future, and depending 011 the liberality of the colonists for the continuance ot a contribution from them to the extent of their means. Or they may insist upon abandoning a work which, in their hands, has got into a state of serious entanglement to the colonists adhering to the terms last propounded by the Secretary of State, and so alienating the colonists, and dooming the aborigines to anarchy and degradation. Or they may eflect an honorable transfer of their troublesome duty, offering as the basis of an arrangement with the colonists efficient aid for a term of years in money if not in men. That I may not be misunderstood I distinctly assert that the colonists would now as ever undertake the labour and responsibility of native affairs, confident in being able to conduct them satisfactorily, it only the expense seemed to be within their means. But if the Imperial Government prefer to follow the first named course, the colonists will be content wlnle an able Governor remains in thfe colony, if he be supported and not thwarted from home, that the execution of his plans may be rendered possible. .The gist ox then* demand is reasonable: that the Imperial Government should see the colony through the great trouble which has been brought upon them and should render the natives thoroughly subdued and obedient before liauding over the liabilities of government to the colonists. And they declare that the policy of the Secretary of State if adhered to will force* them into either a breach of faith to the natives or a military expenditure beyond their means. I have now endeavoured so to narrate the history of the relations between the mother country and its colony of New Zealand in native aflairs as to render the case of the colonists intelligible; to prove the falsity of the charges commonly brought against them; and to indicate generally the course which events must take for the future. I need not say that the broad question of Imperial and Colonial relations, m reference to external defence and such other mat! era as concern the oolony proper, has not been touched upon, and is not at all affected by the subject un ei notice. But I venture to observe that many considerations which I have pointed oiit 1,1 Ai c case 0 New Zealand affect also the Cape of Good Hope and any other colonies of Great Britain where an aboriginal race exists in any strength, anc vv lere expense is involved by an enlightened regard for their interests Excluding this class of cases, the British colonies as a whole hardly cost the mother country so much money in proportion to tlieir value as to render necessary an entire change of plan for their management. Tt mav be proper to acid that I was personally a close spectator and attentive observer of the events which I have tried to narrate, but a participator in them only to a very small extent. As a colonist of the Southern Island, I have been able to speak freely about native affairs without fearing to be accused of interested motives. And being permit ed to be on terms of personal friendship with Colonel Gore Browne, for whom I have always ente.tained a sincere respect and esteem, there has been nothing further from my desire than to make him a scapegoat for the absolution of the colonists.