THE EMPEROR AND HIS COUSIN.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XVII, Issue 1000, 11 June 1862, Page 2

THE EMPEROR AND HIS COUSIN.

[fbom 'the times,' mabch 6.]

The Emperor Napoleon I. very often thought his brothers his greatest encumbrances. Their virtues and their vices were equally distasteful to him, for they were always clogging the wheels of his policy. None of them could climb a throne well, or sit.it well when he had been lifted upon it; and the scruples of one, the dissipation of another, and the blunders of a third, were ever ruffling the temper of the hero. But, if Napoleon I. had four brothers who gave him such annoyance that he could not forget it even when making his will, Napoleon 111. has one cousin who seems to combine in himself all the provoking qualities of his father and his three uncles. Machiavelli says of the Emperor Maximilian that he never asked the opinion of others and never acted upon his own. We will not say there is any modern potentate of a similar character; but if there should be one who keeps his own policy so secret that the world never believes his ministers are allowed full knowledge of it, and sometimes doubts whether it exists, nothing can be more provoking than to have a cousin who is always telling Europe that he knows this potentate's mind much better than his ministers know it, and rather better than he knows it himself. Such is very much the position of the present Emperor of the French. His cousin will insist upon being in his confidence and on blurting out this confidence in full Senate. It is vain for the Emperor to disavow all that this pestilent cousin says, and to send his minister down to the Senate to contradict his assertions. The cousin coolly replies that he expects this disavowal, and is prepared for the contradiction, but that he knows the Emperor's mind better than anyone else; and when he goes on to explain what this hidden or growing idea of the Emperor is, he expresses it in words which make the classes whom the Emperor most wishes to tranquillize absolutely furious. What can be a more ridiculous and vexatious infliction than such a cousin as this ? There are many points of aggravation in the character of this persistent self-constituted confidant. He is not a man of action, and has not the enterprise or the tact to pick up a crown for himself, however many the politic Emperor may throw in his way. He has 110 notion of carving out a fortune for himself with his own sword. He will not even give the Emperor the advantage of treating him as a competitor and a rival. He confines himself to staying at home and insisting upon being the repository of all the Emperor's secrets, and assumes as his particular privilege of relationship the pleasure of divulging them. His deficiency of ambition or enterprise exaggerates him as an embarrassment. But, on the other hand, he has great eloquence and boldness in debate. What the Emperor most desires that he should not say he says with great point, pertinacity, and clearness. It is

said so cleverly that it cannot pass unnoticed, and is urged so argumentatively that it spreads conviction among the multitude. He has the further evil quality of making for the Emperor a much more reasonable and logical policy than the Emperor puts forward as his own, and when he insists that it is he, and not the Emperor, who reveals the real Imperial policy, all the disinterested part of the world are very anxious to believe that this may be so. The other day, when the Cousin in the French Senate made his famous speech developing 1 the Imperial policy towards Rome, the demonstration was complete that civilization, peace, humanity, and French interests all required the retreat of the French garrison from Rome. His premises were all true and his conclusions were all logical. Nothing- was left doubtful except his assertion that he was speaking the mind of his imperial cousin. Now we have the disavowal which he then warned us to expect. It is as clear and as complete as Prince Napoleon said it would be; but the provoking part of the affair is, its reasoning is so bad and the avowed Imperial policy is so vague, that every one is compelled to say "if the Emperor does not think what his cousin says he thinks, it would be much better for France and all her allies if the Emperor did think so." The Prince gave most excellent reasons why the French should leave Rome. M. Billault, who is the official depositary of the Imperial policy, gives very bad reasons why they should remain there. M. Billault replies to the speech of the Prince by declaring that if the French garrison should quit Rome there will immediately occur in that city an insurrection and a revolution, accompanied by crimes and bloodshed, and that the best hope in such a case would be that the Pope and his Cardinals could escape safe and sound. M. Billault then asks, amid the applause of the Senate, what Europe would think of France during the convulsion, the Pope or the Cardinals should suffer violence. Of course, Europe, under such circumstances, would think that France had acted very ill; but we fear it must suggest itself to any ordinary mind that, if this be the only objection which weighs upon the Imperial conscience, it would be removed by the simple expedient of handing over the city of Rome to the troops of the Italian Sovereign. If the Prince were to further exercise his power of seeing into the mind of the Emperor, it is not improbable he might find there a distinct recollection of offers made by the Italian Government which would place not only the safety, but the independence of the Pope and all his Cardinals above all possibility of danger. So far the offensive cousin has clearly committed the exaggerated offence of gaining the best of the argument. Again, the cousin had said, that if the Pope should quit Rome, it would but cause some trouble to certain tender catholic consciences, whereas-the unity of Italy in such an event.would come forth triumphant. The Minister has no answer to give but that he doubts the consequence. The cousin seems again to have the argument with him. The evil, therefore, is not only that my cousin will talk for me, but that he will talk for me better than I choose to talk for myself. It is not only that "mon tine parle," but that "meme ilparle Men" If any form of disavowal can put. such a pretender to silence, the Cousin, ought for some time at least to leave Napoleon 111. in possession of his own mind and his own policy. M. Billault has disavowed him with almost the particularity of the curse of Ingulphus. It is impossible however to speculate what effect this will have upon so cool a personage as Prince Napoleon. When the Devil desired Peter Schlemil's shadow he bought it and paid for it like an honest gentleman, but when Prince Napoleon takes a fancy to assume the individuality of Napoleon 111. he takes it perforce, and walks abroad in it and claims his right to it against Emperor and Minister alike. All the Emperor can do is to send his Minister after him to shout "It is my Cousin; it is not I! It is Napoleon the Senator, not Napoleon the Emperor!" According to M. Billault the Emperor has no idea of retiring from Rome until he has found a means to accommodate the spiritual sovereignty of the Pope with the absence of the French troops. M. Billault's information as to the present state of the Emperor's mind is this:—He is profoundly sorry that he was obliged to come back from Yillafranca without executing his programme of liberating Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, but he will give no aid or consent to any further aggression; he is very much displeased with the obstinacy of Cardinal Antonelli, but he will have no force used against him; and he hopes ultimately, by exercising his good offices in negotiation, to obtain Rome for the Italians, but he will not at present give it up to them. Finally, he is still inclinea to think the unity of Italy a very "formidable and difficult problem." This is certainly not the state of mind indicated by the Cousin who volunteers to open the Imperial tablets. Nor have we the least belief that Prince Napoleon knows any more of the Emperor's policy than any private person may gain who studies his character by • the light of his acts. At the same time, we must admit that there is nothing in the speech of M. Billault which should prevent the French Emperor from acting some twelvemonth hence in the'very track of policy designated by the Imperial Cousin.