MILITARY PROSPECTS IN AMERICA.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XVI, Issue 927, 28 September 1861, Page 3

MILITARY PROSPECTS IN AMERICA.

(FEOJI THE ' SATURDAY KEVIEW.') The prospect of a campaign between the hostile States of' America induces some speculations as to the id an nor in which its details will be conducted and the incidents by which it will probably be characterised. Since the days of chivalry, or the period when feudal service was superseded by standing armies, perhaps no equally important war has begun between two parties without either of them having a regular army at its command. Hitherto the contest, if not between two military nations, has been usually carried on by a disciplined force sent to subdue an insurrectionary population, or by a nucleus of trained soldiers combined with temporary contingents. In the present instance, regiments of militia, hurriedly filled up with untrained and undrilled men, are substituted for the personal retainers or hired mercenaries of early ages, and for the disciplined battalions of modern times. If the difference went no further, it would be scarcely worth notice, but soldiers of the present day have more artificial wants than their predecessors. They are accustomed to better food and clothing at home, therefore they require better supplies in the field. They are armed with delicate weapons, for which ammunition of peculiar and accurate manufacture is indispensable; and they are consequently dependent for their efficiency on a good base of operations and well-organised reserves. In short, the non-combatant departments are becoming more and more important to the welfare of an army, and it is precisely in these departments that an irregular army is most deficient. In the general plan of operations in America, want of military skill will probably not be apparent. There will be time to take counsel about the course to be adopted, and time to arrange the mode of executing any intended movement. The trial will come when large masses of troops are concentrated close to one another, when those masses have to be simultaneously moved to fresh positions, and when probably incompetent brigadiers have to execute the hurried orders of a probably confused com-mander-in-chief. Then the want of professional soldiers will be felt. The embarrassment will be inevitable, though it may be partially concealed and temporarily overlooked. If the results are glaring, or if any writer has an object in exposing them, we shall hear of them through the newspapers. Otherwise, we shall learn them only from the histories and narratives produced when the struggle is over. At the present time, any speculations on military grounds about the comparative chances of success on either side would be premature. Both armies being equally deficient in the same respects, the weakness of one will neutralize that of the other so long as both are similarly circumstanced. Whilst the contest is confined to the frontier, the hostile forces will be on equal terms; but directly one of them attempts an invasion it exposes itself to all the dangers arising from its incomplete organization. If it should find the population hostile, and vigorous in adopting means of defence, all its supplies must be drawn from its own resources, and be guarded with difficulty by a proportion of its force. In any case, a vast quantity of transport will be required for its ammunition and material, and a skilful commissariat will be required for the whole. If either of these departments should prove unequal to the work, the invading force will either waste away as it advances, or will be obliged to sacrifice valuable time by regulating its marches according to its limited means of support. Fifteen years ago, an expedition, composed in the same way as each of the present armies, was sent into an enemy's country, and there its achievements gave full satisfaction to the Federal Government. The President's next message pronounced that the success was glorious and that the voluntary militia system had proved itself perfectly equal to the military requirements of the United States. Military critics, or any other impartial judges, would not rate that performance so highly; but whatever its merits may have been, it can hardly be taken as a criterion for present guidance. To carry the war into the heart of the Northern or the Southern States is a more serious task than to march from Matamoros to Monterey, or from Vera Cruz to Mexico. And if, after long preparation, that army spent six months in advancing two hundred miles, |we must be prepared for still more leisurely movements now. The late operations in North Italy hardly kept pace with public expectation, though the Allies, in face of an enemy, traversed the one hundred miles between Novara and the Mincio in four weeks, and fought two great battles on the way. It is fortunate in this respect that we shall only get news of the American operations at intervals of some days. Besides the greater extent of country to be crossed, there will be more serious resistance to overcome. In their own countrymen, American soldiers will find opponents very different from the puny Mexican infantry. What manner of men the latter were may be judged from the grenadiers of a crack regiment being five feet high; and of the firearms which they carried, some were dcs- ! cribed as having percussion hammers, some flint j locks, and some as being fired by the lighted end of a cigar. Against such enemies as these success might be obtained by a loose, disorderly style of fighting which would be futile against an enemy equal in physical power as well as in equipment. Of this every individual American must be aware, and it will perhaps be some check on their readiness to engage. In any important action ifc will be interesting to remark what tactics are employed by generals so little practised in their profession; how far they are in accordance with received principles; and whether any deviations from military maxims are justified by the peculiarities of the case or redeemed by originality of idea. Volunteer soldiers have sometimes shown themselves more ready to command than to obey, They get tired of inactivity and impatient of delay. They prefer fighting a battle to executing those tedious marches of which every campaign is chiefly composed. If they are thwarted in their wishes they become dissatisfied with the service; and if they are gratified, the commander is embarrassed by the result; for of course they are careless about what effect it may have on his plans. It cannot always happen, as it once did in Texas, that a battle into which a general is reluctantly forced by his soldiers should result in a decisive victory, and put a termination to the whole war. Another of the difficulties with which generals in command of raw troops have to contend, is the careless execution of ordinary outpost duties, trifling in themselves, but very important in the face of an enemy. Regular troops are frequently open to the same reproach. Even the French, with all their military character and general intelligence, were blamed for their ill performance of this duty in Italy. The consequence of outposts not being sufficiently active and observant is, that the army is liable to surprise, or at least to be forced into action without sufficient intelligence of the enemy's strength and movements. We apprehend that an enterprising general with a flying column inured to long and rapid marches might obtain extraordinary successes in America by acting on this principle. Incomplete as the hostile forces are, they confront one another at several places, and a collision between them may occur any day. It is not likely to prove so harmless to those who may be engaged in it as the late cannonade at Fort Su?nter. But if other fortified places are equally deficient in men to work the guns, and in those stores which are necessary to obtain the proper effect from the artillery, their

defence will depend upon the physical obstacles to be overcome by the assailants, and will be little assisted by the guns they contain. Without proper fuzes to burst shell*, or the proper materials for giving direction and elevation, the most formidable Dahlgrens and ' Columbiads' will be indebted to good fortune, rather than to any excellence in their construction, for the effect they produce. At 'Fort feumtor, the garrison Buffered just as little injury as they inflicted, and the only excuso for their surrender must be the contracted space in which they were compelled to tight. Had they n,,t been exposed to heat from which they could not escape, and which threatened their total destruction by exploding the magazine, they might at least have awaited 3 the issue of an assault; and against this event, Major Anderson or some one under him, seems to have taken good and ingenious precautions. Of course, such a fort should have contained nothing combustible in such quantity that its taking fire would render the post untenable. But other forts may have the same fault, and if their interior space is equally confined, a bombardment of them will ensure their capture. At Port Piekens the necessary precautions have, we are told, been taken; but in cases where the wooden erections are. indispensable for sheltering men or stores, they will not be easily replaced by buildings of proper material. This place in the south, with Harper's Ferry in the north, and Fort Monroe on the eastern side, offer equal prospects of being distinguished by the next engagement. It is curious that the respective positions of | the federalists and secessionists at the first two points are the reverse of what the situations would render likely. Harper's Ferry is of such importance to the federalists that their allowing it to be surprised and occupied by the enemy was a serious mistake. Fort Pickens, on the contrary, being in the extreme south, might have been expected to fall, like Fort Pulaski and others, into the hands of the secessionists. Indeed, we are led to wonder at its escaping that fate on reading how unprepared it was, when hostilities began, to withstand a sudden assault. _ Even now it is wanting in a certain description of ordnance, without which its armament is incomplete. Until it is provided with heavy mortars or rifled guns, the navy yard at Warrington, though subject to annoyance, will be comparatively safe. Smooth-bored guns can, no doubt, throw their projectiles three thousand yards if sufficient deviation is given to them; but that distance is beyond their really effective range, and ordinary carriages are not adapted for such use. They must be favoured by chance circumstances if they are to lay in ruins so remote an establishment. The same letter which describes the federalist officers as uttering this boastful threat, mentions also, in another place, the unsatisfactory practice made by a heavy ! gun at a target placed 2500 yards off.

Sooner or later, the struggle so long dreaded and so much deprecated W enlightened men will assume all its horrors. Wlrcan only hope that, whatever may happen, the conduct on either side will not exhibit any cruelty or be stained by any ferocity. In war, the slightest excess onone^ide is sure to be followed by retaliation on the other; and men, thinking they do justice, take vengeance on an enemy after his resistance has ceased. We fear that the laws of war may not be sufficiently regarded by men who habitually carry weapons in time of peace, and think little of making a deadly assault on an unprepared antagonist. The unmilitary part of the population have also to learn, that if they commit hostile acts whilst they wear the garb and profess the character of peaceful citizens, they can claim the benefit of no law, and may expect no mercy. When persons in a crowd are guilty of firing on the rear of passing troops, as was lately the case at Baltimore, they expose all the inhabitants to the severity of martial law—they furnish to soldiers the excuse of self-defence for future acts of crueltj, and, by evoking angry passions on both sides, give occasion for deeds which history is ashamed to record.