BRITAIN AT WAR

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXXIII, Issue 4804, 30 June 1939, Page 2

BRITAIN AT WAR

ROLE IN A CONFLICT. LESSON OF 1914 LEARNED? The British Prime Minister has put it beyond doubt that any threat to the vital interests of France 'from any quarter must evoke the immediate co-operation of Great Britain, wrote R. A. Scott James in the Christian Science Monitor just before conscription was imposed in Britain. It is now reasonably clear that an attack upon France by . Italy no less than Germany would bring Britain instantly to France’s side. Henceforth that fact must be kept in mind by

Italy or any other country which may make demands on France backed by the threat of war.

There is no ground for any mistake about this. The Times—the last paper likely to exaggerate on this point has said that the reception of the statement by the British Press can leave no foreign observer in doubt that is this country’s (Britain’s) respor.e to any aggressive challenge to the vital interests of France would be immediate, wholehearted, and unsparing.” Such an assurance is an obvious deterrent to aggression and a formidable addition the Frenchman’s sense of security. But just how formidable is another question. What sort of help could the French rely upon if they were attacked upon two, 01 possibly even three, sides?

The Rhine Frontier. Long ago Earl Baldwin (when Prime Minister of Britain) pointed out that Britain’s defensive frontier is on the Rhine. Does this mean that in the event of another European war Britain’s manhood would be found lined up in colossal armies side by side with the French on French soil? Should we be confronted once again with the grim spectacle of the main strength of Britain and France at grips with their enemies on long, heavily fortified lines, engaged in costly futile attack and counterattack until at last attrition did its work and the most exhausted side collapsed.

Or would Britain refuse to commit a great part of its man-power to this sort of warfare on French soil, and

elect to use its resources in another way? In view of that possibility it is idle to deny that there is uneasiness in France lest that country should be left to bear the brunt of the land fighting, and be called upon to make the greater sacrifice. It ought at once to be admitted that France can no longer count upon having millions of Britons fighting on its soil as in the World War. Even then the strategy that was adopted was bitterly criticised, and not least by Mr. David Lloyd George. Record of Stalemate. “The military idea” —to quote his words—“was to force an immediate decision by hitting with the whole strength of their armies at the most formidable but least vulnerable parts

in the enemy’s defensive system." Vain and unproductive attacks, stalemate, attrition—that was the record of four years of war on the western front where Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele should have taught the commanders that mass attacks upon a strong, heavily-fortified enemy were more costly to the attacker than the attacked, and won nothing' but a little barren land. If Britain, instead of insisting on keeping far the greatest part of its strength in France, had been free to act quickly and strongly at Gallipoli, Turkey would soon have been out of the war, and Russia would have been supplied through the Black Sea. If it had been free to assist Serbia, Serbia would have been saved, and Greece would have joined the Allies. By concentrating so much of its

strength in France, Britain lost much of its great natural advantage—its mobility arising from command of the sea, and the power to throw in force wherever the enemy was most vulnerable. British opinion has tended to move away from the western theory practised in the World War; and it must now be accepted as a probability that Britain would not decide to send abroad a very powerful expeditionary force. The Front is Everywhere. But if this decision should be taken, it must not for a moment be supposed that Britain would put anything less than the whole of its power into the prosecution of war. Its aim would be nothing less than to defeat the aggressive purpose of the enemy, by the best if not the most spectacular means. A powerfully-equipped modern army, with the newest weapons, in a fortified position, cannot be successfully attacked except by a force overwhelmingly superior. The task of defending such frontiers against an invader would not be the biggest task of a modern war. One must envisage the whole nation engaged in dangerous war work, devoted to the task of building up a resisting power greater than the enemy’s, and malyng vain its attacks on Britain or that country’s allies. Man-power will count for less than the past; mechanism and national morale will count for more. The front line will be everywhere.