STRENGTH IN THE AIR

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXXIII, Issue 4802, 26 June 1939, Page 6

STRENGTH IN THE AIR

GERMANY’S POSITION. RATIO TO BRITAIN. SUPPLY OF FUEL. At the end of 1938 the German Air Force appears to have consisted of about 280 squadrons, says the Economist. The full strength of a squadron is nine machines, with three more planes on the station reserve. If all the squadrons were up to full strength, the total number of firstline fighting planes would be about 3400. To these must be added about 500 planes of first-line qaulity employed by the police, about the same number of transport planes and a number (said to be 700) of single-seater aircraft for training fighting pilots. The total of fighting planes of first-line quality that could be mobilised in time of war would probably be from 5500 to 6000, in addition to the second line and third-line reserves, which are numerous but of unknown fighting value.

To these must be added the spoils of Czechoslovakia: 76 squadrons of a first-line strength of about 750 machines. But these machines are, of course, of types quite different from the rest of the German Air Force.

By the usual methods of calculation, however, the front-line strength of the German Air Force appears to he about 4200 planes, of which about 2500 are bombers. This figure is confirmed by such statements as have been made as coming from the German authorities.

Thus the “Essener NationalZeitung,” which is closely connected with Field-Marshal Goering, the Air Minister, printed, with approval, on October 26, 1938, an Italian estimate that at the time of the Munich Conference Germany’s first-line strength was 3000 machines. The editor of an American aeronautical journal has reported that he was informed by the German authorities that the monthly output was 800 planes of all kinds, which would suffice to replace the whole first-line strength in four months.

This would give a figure of 3200 planes. The last precise British programme was for a first-line strength of 2370 machines in the metropolitan force by March 31, 1939, and this programme has been achieved, and probably exceeded. The conclusion appears to be that some months ago Germanys’ air force was little more than half as large again as the British.

The figure of 800 machines a month is probably an exaggeration of the actual output, certainly in the last quarter of 1938, unless it is intended to refer to possible output. It seems probable that the actual output in the last few months of 1938 was no more than 500 machines a month, and it may be 600 a month now. Here again the current ratio between Britan and Germany appears to be 2:3, as British production is believed at the beginning of this year to have been 400 machines a month. But the rate of increase is almost certainly greater in Great Britain than in Germany. In Czecho-Slovakia Germany has gained skilled workmen and well-equipped factories. But the factories will not be of direct use to the Reich until they have been reorganised for the production of German types.

Much larger figures than these have been published in many places, especially in America. But it is quite clearly advantageous to Germany’s propaganda to have larger figures in circulation.

Perhaps the weakest point in Germany’s air armaments is the supply of fuel. According to the Four-Year Plan, Germany’s Peace-time requirements of fuel of all kinds will be 6.3 million tons in 1940. Of this amount, only 1.2 million tons are being produced in Germany at present. Moreover, the war-time requirement has been assessed at as much as 15 or 20 million tons a year. The expansion of domestic production would be limited by the time required to construct the plant, by the difficulty of mining the enormous quantities of coal that would be required and the impossibility of providing workers. The daily consumption of a first-line air force of 6000 planes (of which 50 per cent, are twin-engined bombers) with engines of an average output of 800 h.p. and an average consumption of 200 grams of fuel per h.p. per flying hour, and with an average flying time of two hours a day, will amount to over 3000 tons a day or 1,000,000 tons a year. All these figures are extremely conservative, and make no allowance for training or transport or the manifold other requirements of an air force. Germany’s Air Force alone would consume at least twice as much oil as is now being produced there.