EUROPEAN CRISIS

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXX, Issue 4873, 21 July 1936, Page 7

EUROPEAN CRISIS

BRITAIN’S UNCERTAINTY. DUE TO PUBLIC OPINION. PLEDGES REFUSED. Mr. Sisley Huddleston, in a Contemporary Review article on “France Faces Germany,” says: — From the official point of view the real gravity of the present crisis lies in the threat of a German fortification of Rhineland. It is not a direct threat to France; it is a threat to Russia —which France has chosen to regard as a threat against itself. Fortifications are necessarily immobile and defensive. Without minimising their significance as a jumping-off place, it may rightly be said that the French fortifications—known as the Maginot Line —and the eventual German fortifications, will neutralise each other. If the Maginot Line is as strong as it is claimed to be, Germany will find it difficult to invade France. But a demilitarised Rhineland would have permitted France to carry out its duties to Russia by invading Germany. A remilitarised Rhineland means that France will be confined in its own territory. It will be “contained.” It can no longer effectively go to the assistance of Russia. The Franco-Russian Treaty is singularly diminished in military value. Here is the key to the perturbation caused by the remilitarisation of Rhineland. French opinion is inclined to judge Great Britain harshly. It is taken for granted that, either in pursuance of British interests or British prestige, Great Britain deliberately smashed the Stresa front, which might have held Germany in check, by insisting, for the first time, on sanctions against Italy; and then, when other nations at the behest of Britain had made economic sacrifices, and given Mediterranean pledges of mutual assistance, declined .to proceed resolutely to the execution of the terms of the Locarno Pact and of the Covenant itself against Germany. Failure to Understand; Good diplomacy, they urge (and by “they” I mean the bulk of the French people) would have settled the Abyssinian affair without fighting, or at any rate after a comparatively harmless military parade. Without condoning Italy, the average Frenchman fails to understand why Europe was divided, at a moment when unity was indispensable, in face of the German menace, for the sake of Abyssinia. There is an almost unanimous belief in France that Great Britain must share the responsibility with Italy for proving Herr Hitler with his opportunity of challenging the victors, of the Great War and of preparing the next war.

For my part, I should wish to make it clear that I do not accept this view in so far as it implies a policy of despair. It is surely better not to anticipate as inevitable a German aggression either in the East or the West. It is surely better to seize every chance of removing Germany’s ligitimate grievances and of entering into negotiations which may avert the war which many people in diplomatic circles now predict for the end of 1937 or the early part of 1938. Nothing could be more fatuous than to behave like Gribouille.

It is, however, my function, irrespective of my personal opinion, to indicate plainly the French opinion, which is that Great Britain has done Europe an immense disservice in invoking sanctions against Italy and in treating Germany with excessive indulgence.

The Chief Point.

Dr. George Glasgow, who writes every month in the Contemporarj' Review on “Foreign Affairs,” deals with the situation from a different angle and thus concludes his survey: At the present time both Russian and French opinion show less interest in Herr Hitler’s proposals about Western Europe than in their implications about Central Europe. The countries of Central Europe—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania in particular —are deeply concerned in the matter.

To make clear that is the attitude of British opinion it is necessary first of all to state the case as seen from Paris and Moscow. Those two centres argue in this way: The internal financial and economic position of Germany is so bad that it is indispensable, if Herr Hitler is to maintain his position, that he should continue to score spectacular ‘successes” abroad.

His reoccupation of the Rhineland served its purpose on March 29, when the election took place. What next? It is necessary, in Herr Hitler’s personal interests, that Germany should expand, should obtain new territories for raw materials and for markets. It is unlikely that Russia will be his immediate objective, because Russia is enormously strong in a military sense and because there is a vast and powerful Slav bloc between Germany and Russia.

“In the west, there is Holland, with her important colonial possessions. But in the west also there is the certainy that any German aggression would be met by prompt action on the part of Great Britain. It is therefore considered likely that Herr Hitler’s main present thought is concentrated on the old dream of Mitteluropa; and that therefore his next objective will be Austria. (Since the above was written the Austro-German agreement has been signed and perhaps serves only to postpone the fulfilment of Herr Hitler’s dream).

If Austria Goes.

Supposing, for the sake of the argument, that he succeeds, by the method of internal Nazification of Austria, in virtually annexing that country, and no action is taken by Great Britain? What then will be the position of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania? Would not the opportunity afforded by the Henlein Party in Czechoslovakia provide him with his next temptation? And would not the oilfields of Rumania be an added temptation? The treaty relationship between Czechoslovakia, France and Russia would no doubt lead to French and Russian action against Germany in such a contingency. And would not such a contingency have the inevitable indirect effect of implicating Great Britain? If so, why does not the British Government give a specific undertaking to meet the contingency? The crowning point of the Franco-Russian agreement is that if a united French, British and Russian undertaking could be announced, to the effect that a German aggression in Central Europe would be promptly met by armed resistance on the part of those three Powers, then it is reasonably certain that Germany would never commit any such aggression.

Such is the argument. It is met by silence on the part of the British Government and of British opinion alike. It is true that the British Government’s commitment under the Covenant of the League of Nations would by itself, if strictly carried out, provide all the commitment desired by French and Russian diplomacy. But it is a well-known fact that in present circumstances the Covenant of the League of Nations cannot be regarded by the potential victims of aggression as a reliable safeguard. What, then, is the true explanation of British reluctance to take the firm stand demanded by France and Russia? There are two main reasons for it:

(1) That the anti-German combination was successful in the field of battle in 1918, when Japan, Italy and the United States of America were parties to it; yet the military victory of 1918 has not eliminated the German problem in 1936. (2) That no British Government could make a commitment about Central or Eastern Europe and survive the storm of public disapproval that would thereby be aroused.