ISOLATION

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXX, Issue 4833, 14 April 1936, Page 7

ISOLATION

JAPAN'S NAVAL DESIRE. CONFERENCE PROPOSALS. OUTLOOK IN PACIFIC. London, January 18. By her withdrawal from the FivePower Naval Conference, Japan has asserted her independence of the rest of the world. The common upper limit proposed by Japan is based upon the Japanese theory that equality of armaments alqne can produce equality of security, irrespective of commitments or geographical considerations. It involves Japanese naval parity with ithe British Empire and the United Stages. Japan's- whole naval strength is concentrated in her own waters, and is quite impregnable on the existing ratio. The United States have two vast ocean seaboards to protect; British Imperial interest's are scattered throughout the Seven Seas. Japan has steadily refused to admit the bearing of these plain strategical facts upon her demand for parity. In his long statement to the conference, Admiral Nagano said: "In or ( der to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. We advocate the abolition of aircraft-carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and A-class cruisers. As regards armaments that are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances. Framework of Formula 1 . , "I would undertake to set forth the framework of our formula: — "There would first of all be fixed a maximum global tonnage which none of the Powers concerned may exceed, and which must be fixed at as low a level as possible so as not to be contrary to the spirit of disarmament. "2. There would be fixed for those categories which are generally recognised to be predominantly offensive in character, namely, capital ships, aircraft-carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and A-class cruisers—a common maximum tonnage .and number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately. "3. As regards B class cruisers and vessels of lesser type, which are generally recognised to be esentially defensive it should >be sufficient to fix a common maximum global tonnage for all of the said categories. "4. Any Power which may deem it necessary to do so for reasons of its special circumstances may voluntarily reduce its tonnage in A-class cruisers and increase its .tonnage.in any of the defensive categories. "5. The Japanese plan would not necessarily preclude the adoption of such formula, for instance, as the declaration of naval building programmes. "6. If there should be any Power which claims the necessity of effecting, modifications even beyond the adjustments contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, such claim would be carefully examined by the Powers concerned, and if it is found to be reasonable- and well founded Japan would not refuse it recognition. But we could in no- circumstances consent to an increase in the combatant strength of a navy such as would jeopardise the state of non-menace and non-aggression." Great Britain's Attitude. Lord Monsell, speaking for Great Britain, pointed out: — 1. That naval equality could not be measured in terms of ships, but that remoteness from bases and supplies and long communications must also be taken into consideration. 2. That a Power with greater naval needs cannot denude its territories of their essential. defences and concentrate its entire fleet in the distant waters of a hypothetical opponent. 3. A Power with world-wide responsibilities must devote naval forces to the protection of communications between its various parts as well as the long line of communications of its principal naval forces, and must therefore have forces in excess of those of a Power able to maintain its whole naval forces in or near its home waters. 4. The common upper limit proposal is not consistent with the defence requirements of the British Commonwealth, which have to take into account responsibilities in European waters, and in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. 5. Great Britain agrees with America that "it is impossible to maintain that equal armaments give equal security." The Washington Treaty offers the best guarantee for that security. 6.. The proposal would face Britain with the strange situation in which every country, however slender its resources and small its responsibili-

ties, would be not only entitled, but actually indirectly encouraged, to build up to its neighbours. • Impotent Navies. ' Japan's aim is clear. As a wellknown naval correspondent points out: — "By abolishing all long-range ships, such as bottleships, airship iarriers and heavy cruisers, she would reduce every navy to the status of a coast' defence force, powerful in its own waters but virtually impotent beyond them. "This, would suit Japan's own book admirably, for all her own interests are concentrated in one corner of the Pacific. For the British Empire, however, it is an impracticable policy. All the other delegations are astonished that it should ever have been put forward.'' Admiral Nagano and his colleagues, in a statement to the Press, said: — "We would like to make it quite clear that we do not leave here with any such intention as the possibility of engaging in naval competition. I believe that our country is just as desirous as any other of seeing an agreement come to with regard to an effective reduction in naval armaments and the consequent lightening of the burden of naval expenditure." It is considered that Japan's action will end the truce in the Pacific. It will drive America to implement her big naval.building programme, and it will probably compel both America and Great Britain to reconsider the problem of their naval bases in the Pacific. Japan's Policy in the, East. In 1934 the Japanese War Office said:— "Japan was forced to send her army to China to cope with the antiJapanese movement in that country every time Japan was made to yield to the British and American demands at naval conferences in the past. From this consideration it is apparent that Japan's, attitude at the coming Naval Conference will determine the Chinese attitude in the future. It may be said that the peace of the Far East depends on the coming Naval Conference.'' From this it may be gathered that Japan requires freedom of action in the East. If she could persuade the other Naval Powers to build navies incapable of sailing far from their own shores, so much the better. Failing that, she must have isolation in order to carry on her policy in East Asia in her own time and way.