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ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

VON TIRPITZ'S STORY. GROWTH OF WORLD POWER, KAISER AND GREAT BRITAIN. Historical documents of cardinal importance are contained in Admiral von T'irpitz's forthcoming book, "The Building Up of German "World Power," of which advance proofs have just been issued by the publishers. Thus the work gives us for the first time a deep insight into the ex-Kaiser's policy during and, after the Agadir incident, and once more reveals T'irpitz as the dominant man in Germany during the decade immediately preceding the outbreak of the war/ The Panther went to Agn.-lar on July 1, 1911, and on the 21st of the same month, Mr Lloyd George made his famous speech, in which lie indicated that France coujld count on British support in her dispute with Germany- On August 12, T'irpitz, then on leave, wrote to the Ministry of Marine a letter in which he announced his intention of using the crisis. ;>k he used all others with an Anglophobo reaction in Germany, to make a further advance with his I expansive naval policy. Very characteristic of tho perpetual friction between Tu'Dj't-z and the Foreign Office is the opening passage of his letter: — THE AGADIR CRISIS. "I was-not consulted at all as to the action of the Foreign Office in the Morocco business. I should like to make that clear. The Chancellor pressed strongly for concessions in the quesi tion of an'understanding with England, I and I in so far took account of this at Kiel (the regatta) that both the Chancellor and Kidorlen (Heir Kiderlen Wacchter) wore satisfied. On that occasion the Chancellor said it was important to meet England in this matter for political reasons. I assumed that this related to Morocco, for on the previous day the Kaiser had said he would not make war for Morocco, but that wo would now demand tho whole French Congo as compensation. I assumed that the Chancellor had come to an. understanding with England over this, and said nothing more to His Majesty about it, because 1 had not been fully informed by the Chancellor, and was not asked. In the whole action of the Foreign Office, as it appears from the reports of the day and the newspaper accounts, it. surprises me in the highest degree how little, according to my opinion, the Foreign Office understands England and Eng lisli policy. A benevolent attitude by England was. assumed, from the outset because a few courtesies had been exchanged. The deep-seated. divergence from us which England feels, and which is to be surmounted only ( by power on our side, or need on that of England, was treated as of secondary significance. They did not really want war, but acted in such a way that they were bound to drift either t<> that or to a Fashoda."

Tirpitz prrieeeds to consider what line of policy was best for Germany in view of the unexpected intervention of Great Britain, and comes to the following conclusions:— "After all that has happened, it. is very difficult for us to fall back upon the' Algoeiras Convention. We arc drifting towards war, oV to a more or less disguised Fashoda. Tho question now arises: 'Do we want it to come to war ' Will the Triple Alliance go with US? Italy certainly not, and Austria only very unwillingly. Besides, how can Austria help us so long as Russia keep quiet? As regards a naval war, the juncture is as unfavourable as it could be. Every year brings us into a nn-re favourable position—Heligoland, the canal (Kiel), dreadnoughts, submarines, and so on. To this it must be added that grounds for war on our part are little convincing for tho masses. It woidd seem to me better to swallow the damage and at the same time, by bringing in a strong bill (navatl) demonstrate tc< the world that we are firmly determined not to lot oursclvo? be permanently forced back in this way. The English already scent a bill (Spectator of August 5), and are screaming against it, but that cannot deter us. "If the English try to forbid the bill, we have grounds for war intelligible for everyone in Germany, and then we must let Fate take its course. I should go so far as to? say that it would be better for us to refuse obviously inadequate compensation for then our path would be cleared." The book, which is a, continuation of the author's proof that the war would have been won if he had got all Ids own way .shows once more that ot any rate he'got most of it. From the correspondence of Herr Kiderlen-Wnech-I ter it appears that the gentle Beth- ; ma.nn-Hollweg once asserted his auth- | ority as the Minister solely responsible 1 for the .policy of the German Empire, and brought'the old man of the sea into due subordination, but the documents printed by Tirpitz show that the Chancellor's daring was soon broken by a threat of resignation, and that he formally withdrew from the position bo had taken up. KAISER AND ENGLAND.

Hen' von Bethmann, Hon- Kiderlcn, and the Firming Minister, Horr Wermuth, wore also agninst the Admiral's proposal to rise the crisis as a pretext for adding to the German fleet. The difference of opinion even spread to the German Embassy in London, whence the civil staff and the Naval Attache sent discordant reports as to the effect of the Tirpitz plan on British opinion. Herr Kidman exhaustively argued the view that u Navy Bill would for ever destroy the chances of agreement with Great Britain respecting the African colonies, at which he was then working. However, the Kaiser, as usual, allowed himself to ho talked; over by Tirpitz, and gave his decision in a letter which thrown so much light on the origin of the war that it may bo quoted in full: — "The report (Kuhlmaiui's) starts from false premises. In the Morocco affair England grievously insulted and profoundly moved the German people both by word and deed. The excitement will be converted into a defence bill for 'the army and navy. England knoiws that, and the English people are scared both by it and by the storm of resentment which its attitude has aroused in Germany. It does not want war, and is giving expression to this sentiment, both through articles and through the scolding of the Government. The latter now wants—and so does the nation—to put us in good temper again, like a slapped child, and, after Lloyd George's whip, is again offering us sugar on plums. For

that reason all kinds of hints are being thrown out as to a colonial Empire to I be built up in Africa. Naturally in the true British way we are being offered the property of others, which England has no right to dispose of. So far Portugal has not made known any« intention to sell her colonial possessions, and will certainly demand enough millicms. which we probably shall not have available. France has preemptive rights with respect to the Congo State. In her present mood it is out of the question that she will make concessions to us there. On the contrary, she is able so soon as our intentions become known to offer the Belgians a milliard—which she always has ready—to snatch it away from under our nose. Tims the British 'presents' turn out to bo Candian sifts, which wotuld bring us, in regard to tho owners concerned, into exactly the. same position a>s Franco is in Morocco, in regard to Spam, Italy in Tripoli, and so on. As soon as wo made a serious attempt to grasp theso gifts thev would, through the Press agitation and diplomatic lies of England, at once bring us into most norhible situations, weaken our European energy concentration and strength, financially and militarily, as well as navally. England's game is clear, but my officials cannot see through it, \\o are to be drawn into complications by the bait of a colonial Empire in Africa, with acquisitons at the expense of others, and drawn away from the world policy, that is to say, the great Asiatic, question is to be solved in a trois without us~a . Triple Entente with Japan and America—and we are to have no part in it. COLONIAL RIVALBY. "But if Asia is partitioned, our export—the production of industry—and trade wiW suffer grave permanent injury, and we shall have to open the open (sic) door for them with a beet and shells. My whole policy, including that of the navy, and ny miliary concentration in Europe, is built up on the solution of the Asiatic problem with us. That is why it is so uncomfortable for others, and that is why it is to be dissolved and broken up in colonial acquisitions. So that m Asia—and elsewhere in the world—we shall have nothing to say. Consequently 1 will'iiot <>-o into these English otters.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/KCC19250106.2.5

Bibliographic details

King Country Chronicle, Volume XX, Issue 2063, 6 January 1925, Page 2

Word Count
1,485

ORIGIN OF THE WAR. King Country Chronicle, Volume XX, Issue 2063, 6 January 1925, Page 2

ORIGIN OF THE WAR. King Country Chronicle, Volume XX, Issue 2063, 6 January 1925, Page 2