A NEW STRATEGY

Kaikoura Star, Volume LVIII, Issue 24, 24 March 1938, Page 1 (Supplement)

A NEW STRATEGY

I IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. WHAT BRITAIN NEEDS. The Mediterranean Sea has been a vital artery of the Britsih Empire ever since we acquired India and our possessions in the Far East ami created two great Dominions in the South Pacific, writes Major-General A. C. Teniperlcy. Its importance has been intensified since the construction of the Suez Canal. While our strategy has always led us to be strong in the Mediterranean, in the ever-shifting koleidoscope of foreign affairs the centre of gravity is constantly changing. Once more we have to take stock of the position, for the balance has been | changed by the war in Abyssinia and the deterioration of our relations with Italy, with whom we had been hitherto bound b.v ties of close friendship. It was apparent that the further Italy committed herself in Abyssinia the more completely she became dependent on the Suez Canal. Tn those circumstances, in the event of hostilities between the two countries, we were in a position to strangle her East African Empire completely by the mere act of <-losin<‘’ the canal. Equally, so long as we held the command of the sea in the Mediterranean, we could denv her access to her eolon.v in Libya. Egypt and the Canal, therefore, were seen to bo the keys of the Eastern Mediterranean. Italy Supplied by Sea. The strategical position of Italy is an exceedingly difficult one. She is almost entirely dependent upon hei* seaborne trade both for food and for raw materials. Her political relations make it unlikely that she would receive sunplies from either Franco of Yugoslavia in case of war, and her onlv other land frontiers are with Switzerland and It would be possible for Germanv to send supplies across both those frontiers bv rail, but Germanv herself is far from self-supporting, though she is ''inking great efforts to become so, and she would have little to spare for Italy. In any ease the ordinary flow ■if trade is by son. and the Italian railwa.vs have* not the capacity to ha mile the enormous increased bulk which would bo created by the diversion of supplies from sea to land. For the essential materials for munitions Italy is extremely badly placed. She is completely dependent upon import for rubber, platinum, tin, nickel, ami tungsten, and almost completely so for coal, copper, cotton, iron, lend, manganese, oil. wool, and zinc. The greater part of her seaborne trade comes via the Straits of Gibraltar or the Suez Canal, both of which we are in a position to control. The third channel is the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The attitude towards her of Russia. Rumania, and Turkey would alwa.vs be an extremely important considera t ion. Rumania is her chief source for oil. without which air force's, armies, and navies are to-day immobilised. Russia could supply both oil and corn. Turkey, however, can close the ■door completely at the Dardanelles. The Right Strategy. All these disadvantages are only too well known to the Italian General Staff and the correct strategy for them would seem to be to make things a« uncomfortable for us as possible in Egypt and Palestine, where lie, as I have already suggested, the keys to the situation. They appear to have taken this view. There is a largo and influential Italian population of 100.000 in Egypt, which naturally makes the most of Italian prestige acquired from their victory in Abyssinia and their considerable armed strength in Libya. In Palestine and the Arabian countries there is a good deal of Pan-Arab propaganda, and Signor Mussolini, when opening that wonderful strat‘ ,,r ie road in Libya fr on the Tunisian to the Egyptian frontier, declared himself to bo the Protector of In Libya the garrison has boon raised in the past year from one armv corps to two. perhaps 40,000 to 50.000 men in all. It includes a number of motorised formations and a powerful aii - force. The presence of this large force would seem to serve three purposes. It is a potential threat to Egypt which cannot be ignored; it undoubtedly impresses the Middle East: and it is valuable as an over-insurance in reserves in ease communications with Libya arc severed by naval action. The size of tin 1 garrison is. of course, a threat to Tunis as well, of which, no doubt, the French have taken due note. The Italian population of 100,000 in Tunis actually outnumbers the French population there. The French garrison in North Africa is large, and a considerable part of it would normally be available to reinforce tin 1 metropolitan armv in France, but there is much unrest in North Africa at present, and this and the presence of the big Libyan garrison might limit the number of troops it would be possible to dispatch in case the position were critical on the French frontiers. The Italians have also been constructing ?i naval base at Leros, in the Dodecanese, only 20 miles from the roast of Asia Minor, where it is some embarrassment to the Turks. ’ Leros is 550 mib's from Haifa, about the same distance from Alexandria, and 370 miles from Cyprus. While it is true that, (hose important harbours are within bombing distance, it is equally true lhat Leros is the same distance from them ami would equally be exposed to i.erial attack. Our own position in the Mediterranean has elements of considerable strength. It is true that Malta is only F 0 mih's from Sicily and is therefore much exposed to air attack. During :he Abyssinian crisis it was considered inadvisable t<i use it as a base for our battleships or as a dockyard. There •otild, however, be no question of withIrawing from it completely. Our garrison in Egypt consists of Iwo infantry brigades, a mechanised ■avalry brigade, two artillery brigades, ind a tank battalion. In Palestine we lave six battalions of infantry. As for the air, we have eight squadrons in the Middle East Command and in

1 I ! Palestine ami live squadrons that could jeasilv be made available from the new ; I Air Force base at Dhibban in Irak. I The Desert Barrier. ' The invasion of Egypt from Libya i , would be an ext remel.v difficult under- I : taking, as there is tin* great natural ! i protection of a waterless desert 200 i miles in width. Even with consider-! ;able mechanised forces it would be no i light matter to send them across the I Libyan desert where there is no posisibility of concealment of any kind from air attack. They would be coinhielJod to carry their water and petrol J supplies with them and fight a battle at the end of it with their communi- ; cations exposed to every form of hoslile pressure and with no possibility of , obtaining any supplies unless they won j their bailie. The topographical difi Acuities go a long wav to redressing the | apparent inequality of forces in this | There dot's seem, however, tn be a ! useful lesson for us. when we consider al) the possibilities, remote as they mav be. The Mediterranean is the focus point of many problems in addition fo strained relations with Italy, which wo hope mav onlv be temporary. There is the war in Spain, the situation in Palestine, and unrest in the Mohammedan world. We have no reiserve in this nr»a of anv kind. The j garrisons in Palestine and in Egypt, (are no more than adequte for their I immediate responsibilities. In the event I <>f serious trouble arising in the Middle i East, our reserves must come from elsewhere. A Strategic Reserve. If our Fleet were dispersed on other duties the passage of tran<nort through the narrow part of the Mediterranean might be a matter of great difficulty. From Sicilv to Cano Bon in North Africa is only 70 miles. Reserves could also be sent from India to Basra and Du-nee across the desert to Palestine, but this would take time. Another alternative would be the Cape route to Suez, but this would be even slower. Does not everything point to the fact that, with the changing situation, the grouping of our forces must change -b-o’ I suggest that we ought to establish a strategic reserve in Palestine und. nerhans. Cyprus.• which would bo available for anv calls that might be made upon it. The most essential part of it must be the Army, because the main object is to have the forces available on the spot and so avoid the dangers and delays of a long sen journey. Whether it should bo provided from the Home Establishment or India is a matter that would require attention. The Air Force is in a slightly different position. While a local increase is desirable, it is capable of reinforcement from far-distant bases at the shortest notice, provided, that the ground organisation exists at the threatened point, as it would in this The problem that we have to consider is the location of our forces for immediate action in time of crisis. I suggest that they should bo spread along our linos of communication rather than concentrated at home for a potential Continental commitment. The coming of the aeroplane has forced us to re-orient our strategy, and we should do well to realise the full implications of this without any further delay.