EUROPE’S ENIGMA

Hauraki Plains Gazette, Volume 50, Issue 3056, 31 March 1941, Page 8

EUROPE’S ENIGMA

RUSSIAN CROSSROADS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN NAZI GROWTH NOT RELISHED Angle-Russian diplomatic relations continue, in a vague, uncertain manner. The situation has long been dependent mainly upon Russia’s assessment of Britain’s power tq resist Germany and Soviet fears of • its own weakness to protect its vital interests against possible new Nasi aggressions. Undoubtedly British cold-shoulder-

ing of Russian proposals for a socalled united front against Nazi-ism before the Munich Agreement, and then the utter neglect of the Soviet during the negotiations which produced that catastrophe, did much to alienate Moscow’s sympathies from the western democracies. -

In the foreground is Russia’s determination to remain out of a major war so long as it can preserve its own territorial and economic gains along the frontiers. Added to this Moscow’s determination to from the chaos of the so-called capitalist world.

Immediately before the outbreak of the European war, Britain was not in a good bargaining position as regards Russia —not merely because of its military unpreparedness as contrasted with Germany, but because Britain had little to, offer Moscow then. Rival Offers to Moscow. Britain asked for an alliance and support for Poland, whereas von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, requested only non-aggression -and gave the Soviet an opportunity to' get cheap gains at Poland’s expense should the latter be involved in war in which Russia remained neutral.

With France’s disappearance as a factor and with Germany controlling almost the whole continent, Europe 'became a modernised version, of Napoleonic times, when the Grand Army was waiting at Boulogne to over-run Britain. Hitler is clearly aiming at becoming supreme master from the Atlantic to the Russian border. The reaction of this change on Russia is

shown in the altered attitude of the Soviet Press, which, formerly hostile to democracy, then became markedly objective in its treatment of the European war. Another stage in Russia’s foreign political development came with Germany’s aggression in the Balkans, which was not too welcome in Moscow. This led to Russia’s seizure of Bessarabia and North Bucovina, and to Moscow’s realisation that Germany was now on the shores of the Black Sea, and that the old threat to the Ukraine has been renewed. Nazis In The Balkans, Russia’s reaction to German viola 1 tion of Bulgarian sovereignty also was indicated clearly. Moscow always has -considered that part of the Balkans its own sphere of influence. Britain has been most careful in its relations with the Soviet—its position fluctuating between hopes of Russian co-operation and fears that Russia would seize the opportunity created by Britain’s military unprepare.dness to further its own aims.

The Soviet never has recognised the British blockade; in fact, it sent an unambiguous Note early in the war which compared, the blockade to bombardment of civilian population. It reserved the right to take reprisals. Refusal to Return Ships. British and Russian relations also have been affected by certain other minor • problems, outstanding among which has been Britain’s refusal to hand over ships and funds belonging to the Baltic States which now are part of the Soviet system.

British-Russian relations cannot be separated from the bigger problem of Germany’s world ambitions. Russia cannot, forget that the anti-Comintern pact was directed against itself. It also knows that its interests coincide more with those of the United States, China, and Britain than with the antiOomintern group. Although he wants to keep his country out of a major war, Stalin knows that Russia has. a common interest with the democracies in defeating the world challenge of Germany, Italy and Japan. For this reason, Moscow is particularly interested in the relations between the United States and Japan. Any conflict between those countries would affect Moscow’s atitude toward the present struggle, and therefore toward Britain.