PAGES FROM HISTORY

Hawera & Normanby Star, Volume LXXVII, Issue LXXVII, 5 June 1919, Page 5

PAGES FROM HISTORY

I —♦— 1 ANOTHER ARTICLE BY LORD FRENCH. BY CABLE—VKESS ASSOCIATION—COPYBIGHT LONDON, May 23. ! Lore! French, in a further article in the JDuily Telegraph, states: "In September I formed the opinion thit it was extremely desirable to push coast-wi-e ami northward and drive the Germans from the ssa. Mr Churchill enthusiastically suppcrttd th-3 plan and promised an absolutely devastating naval support." Lord French anticipated Joffre and the French Government would. oppose the'plan. Mr Churchill, on December 8, wrote .stating that Lord Kitchener fully agreed -with the p]an, promfsing to -send the 27th Division. Cabinet next day strongly urged the plan upon the .French Government, which referred the question to General Joffre. He rejected it, ,as he had another elsewhere, "which," says Lord French, "was a Very feeble substitute. Mr Churchill continued to press the matter, urging Lord French ag?in to put the Admiralty views before General Joffre. Lord Kitchener, in a memorandum of January 9, 1915, showed that the War Council had abandoned the coastwise advance on the grounds that it would he too costly, and would extend the line too far. Heavy reinforcements could not be furnished without disorganising the general arrangements, and a sufficient supply of ammunition was not available to ensure carrying the project through to a conclusion, though every effort was being made in all parts of the world to obtain an unlimited supply. The War Council also anticipated a strong German attack in ths near future, which could better be resisted in the existing prepared positions. (Lord French disagrees wi(h those objection* seriatim, and menlions that large train-loads of ammunition traversed Franca for a few months later, bound for the Dardanelles. He considers, these reasons for rejecting the plan for a coastal attack illogical. Probably vhe true explanation was to be found in the War Council's memorandum of January 9, in which the view ■was expressed that operations on the West front would probably develop into a stalemate, and that it would be necessary to find another theatre of war where decisive results were obtainable. (Lord French's opinion was invited on the matter. Lord French replied, discussing all possible theories, including Gallippli.- He said the attack on Turkey would be devoid of a decisive result. The only decisive theatre wa« Germany itself. Lord French added: "It is quite feasible to break th e German line with a sufficiency of guns and high explosive shells. In any cas c it would be unsafe to withdraw troopsi from the Western front, which is vital, and where alone decisive results are obtainable." General Joffre expressed a final opinion on May 19, 1915, that it was necessary to be prepared for a German offensive in the near future. The front must foe made absolutely secure. The Allies must be ready to assume the offensive. Reserves were absolutely necessary, and all secondary operations, including the Flanders coast attack, must give way thereto. (Lord French concludes that he always disagreed "with these views, and remains convinced that his plan should have been accepted and tried, whereas those actually employed only resulted in feeble and unsuccessful attempts to break the German line, and absolute failure at the Dardanelles.