THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, '1916. PAST AND PRESENT FIGHTING.

Hawera & Normanby Star, Volume LXXII, 26 October 1916, Page 4

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, '1916. PAST AND PRESENT FIGHTING.

The current daily news : about a great long-continued crisis like the present war, crowded with, vivid incidents and momentous episodes, is necessarily more or less like the incoming tide, every succeeding wave of which removes the impression made by its .predecessor. This may not be literally true in either case, but it is true in the main. If in the current chronicle of the war it does not strictly apply to the news.day by day, nor to the large general results, it practically does so t<o the news week by week and month by month, except for those who have tirrie and a talent for generalisation—-for rejecting what is casual, and for co-ordinating what is continuous and conclusive in its bearing on the main issues or objects. Books written by able and discriminating men who, as war correspondents, have gained experience within the fighting areas, are very helpful in this connection and we have therefore/ from time to time, in the interest of our readers, commented on such works. Mr Stanley Washburn, well known a.s an able newspaper cbr^ respondent on the Eastern front, has written; such a book, which h.e significantly names Victory in Defeat, in which he tells the stoa;y of Russia's bitter experiences last ypar in Poland and. Galicia. Mr Washburn shows how, though Russia was nominally defeated by the Austro-German armies, she was virtually iflie victor. In doing this, he also incidentally lets the reader see how probable JE is that the current news about the vastness of Russia's forces and resources on the Eastern front is trustworthy and how^likely it is that she will do' comprehensively decisive work at an eai4y date. The RussoRoumanian reverse in the Doba-udja and the .enemy's capture of the important seaport of r Constanza taust not be treated lightly, for it is justly observed that the capture of the town means the loss of the.shortest;line of communication between Bucharest and Odessa, via the Black Sea, and increases the difficulty of preventing the enemy crossing the Danube and cutting the Russian land communication with Bucharest. Still, though a disconcerting, it cannot be regarded as a culminating incident in the campaign; It cannot for a itioment.be compared .with any of the disastrous set-backs >r which Russia was subjected last year by the AustroiHungarian drive in Galicia, the occupation of Lemberg, the capture of Warsaw, and the overwhelming fighting on the Lublin and Nerew line. Even in,connection with these disasters, however, Mr Washburn observes' that "the world has not appreciated the fact that there can be vjctory in defeatj but thig is hone the less true when reverses have provided, time in which the character of the nation has asserted itself, and has been able to repair its lack of vision before the war by preparing itself after the blow has fallen., This it what happened in. the Empire of the Czar: I believe that the Russian reverses have been so costly and demoralising t»d their victors that history will judge them as the greatest single source of .the German downfall., which is, in my opinion, inevitable.'-' The vital fact is that Russia was driven out of Galicia-, Lemberg and Warsaw because-^though she has always had plenty of'm.en, and now has them more than ever—she was without the munitions indispensable to successful resistance^ yet nothing that happened to her lessened the moral fibre of her people—-in fact, it increased it. Even the German capture of Warsaw was a factor in this connection. Russia had been prepared for it from the beginning 7of the war; and though Germany counted on its capture as representing the anal failure of the Russian armi.es and as certain to. lead Russia to make a separate peace, its capture led to neither of these results. The supply of munitions on an ample scale and with the needful despatch had begun, the effective training of the Empire's inexhaustible man-power went on increasingly, and the Czar, as representing the spirit of the people, took command in person of the whole Russian army at the front. -This was not done to supersede the Grand Duke Nicholas as a reflection on his leadership, but to hearten up all Russia by a display of tlio Czar's personality and to show alj the world that he was with his people and bin people with him in the prpsecufcion of the war. It has been observed that "the* Cssar's command may be nominal; ho may not, and probably does nofc, make a single military suggestiou to tho experts who aire his advisers. But th.c moral' effect of his assumption of command has been immense to Russia and invaluable to her Allies." To Germany it must have been bitter and disheartening news. It meant that the hope of a separate peace w? vh Russia must be finally jettisoned; arid, further, from the day that the capture of W.arsaw failed to produce the e-ffect expected by Germany, "Germany's fortunes began inevitably to decline He£ hopes of dividing' her antagonists werie*'

frustrated, her actual gains were a poor requital for her losses in men and money. She found herself condemned so a long-drawn, wearisome, grinding conflict which could have but one en.d" All this should be remembered and carefully considered in connection with what is now happening in the fighting between the Austro-Gei-jnans and RussoRoumanians. Those who do so Avill see that, on a large view, and having regard to the Allies' steady gains in the West, and to Russia's man-power and now adequate equipment, there is.no real ground for apprehending the enemy's ultimate success. He has gained and he may still gain now and then, but he pays dearly for what- he gains, and his gains are not final nor cumulative, however disconcerting they may be at the time of their occurrence, This may well be said in connection with the capture of. Constanza, French opinion concerning which is that, though it is an annoying, it is not an irremediable - incident