Initial Blunder In Attacking Poland First.

Horowhenua Chronicle, 16 October 1939, Page 5

Initial Blunder In Attacking Poland First.

Various Weaknesses Analysed By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright Received Sunday, 6.30 p.m. NEW YORK, October 14. The New York Times' correspondent (Mr. H. G. Archambault), in a message from Paris, says the Rhine-Moselle situation is such that the question is not: Will the Germans engage in a general battle, but can they with reasonable hope of success? The competent French reply is in the negative. The reasons can be summarised as follows: 1. Strategic. Because of the uncertainty of British and French action. The Germans initially blundered in attacking Poland, which was the weaker opponent, giving the stronger time to mobilise. A concentrated lightning attack against France instead of Poland might have altered the situation entirely. Now, instead of entering the west with an overwhelmingly superior force, the day can be sighted when the Germans may be inferior. 2. Manpower. Hitherto the British and French losses have been negligible, but it is believed the German casualties in Poland represent the rifle strength of twelve divisions. The maximum force available on the Western Front is estimated at 100 divisions, apart from armoured cars, and the actual striking force is fifty to sixty divisions, whereas the Kaiser had 120 initially. 3. Possible action. The zones and possibilities of the offensive use of the manpower are limited to an attack on the Rhine-Moselle front, an attack on the line between Lauterbourg and the Swiss front, or an attack through neutral countries who are mobilised and are all stronger than in 1914. Mr. Archambault adds: A frontal attack on the Maginot Line would be most costly and probably inconclusive. "Blitzkrieg" was predicted on a preponderance of material, but the Polish campaign reduced the preponderance, also the proportion of German raw materials, which, coupled with transportation difficulties, leads technicians to estimate that each German combatant will require ten to twelve employed in the rear, compared with the Allies' five to seven. 4. Aviation. The French are most gratified at the excellence of their 'planes. The Curtis-Morane is fully equal to the Messerschmidt 'planes, whose war-life is very brief and six replacements are needed annually. It is doubted whether* Germany is in a position to maintain her strength. The war needs of 6000 'planes are estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 tons annually, and it is doubted whether German stocks will stand the strain. 5. Transportation. Reichsbahn's reports give a lamentable picture of the dearth of rolling stock and unrepaired lines.