DECENTRALISATION

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XXII, Issue 271, 31 October 1932, Page 10

DECENTRALISATION

CANTERBURY PROPOSAL AN ALTERNATIVE TO CENTRAL CONTROL OT EDUCATION. EFFICIENCY THE MAIN OBJECT. The “decentralisation” of control of education has been a controversial topic for some time, and the Canterbury District Standing Committee on Education is one of the bodies that has considered the matter thoroughly. This committee has prepared a very comprehensive report on the systems of education in vogue in Australia, the United States and England—highly centralised, highly decentralised and a union of central and local control respectively—discussing the benefits and disadvantages, all leading up to certain recommendations as a basis for an alternative to the proposals current in the Dominion for the centralisation of administration. These recommendations, which are to be submitted to the Minister of Education and the Education Committee of the House of Representatives are as follows: — (1) That unification of control of the existing primary, secondary and technical education in New Zealand is possible and desirable. (2) That the local education area should not be so small as is suggested in either of the proposals considered by the Atmore Committee (pages 41-2 of the report) and would recommend the provincial district as the area unit in general. Note.—The provincial districts are suggested but certain modifications might be the subject of deliberation such as for example Auckland to be divided into two districts; Marlborough to be joined to Wellington; Kaikoura to be added to Canterbury. (3) That there should be a council or board for each school whether primary or post-primary. (4) That the school councils or boards should be elected as follows:— (a) For primary schools —as at present, giving representation to parents and householders, (b) Post-primary—-as a* present, with certain anomalies removed and always with a substantial representation of parents. (5) That the school councils or boards in addition to the powers they already possess should be consulted in the appointment of teachers and be invested with advisory powers in respect of all matters affecting the aims and welfare of the schools.

(6) That the powers and functions of the provincial or district boards shall be such as to enable them to control and administer effectively the* national system of education within their particular district, subject to the general supervision of the central authority. Their powers should include —selection of sites, the designing and erecting of buildings, the provision of equipment, the making of appointments, and the arrangement within limits (mentioned below) of syllabuses District Boards shall make the Dominion classification of teachers the basis of all appointments. (7) That each District Board shall appoint a superintendent or director of education who shall be the chief executive officer for the district.

(8) That the members of each District Board shall be so elected that the educational interests and ideals of ti l whole people of the districts are represented. That in addition to the members so elected each District Board shall include certain other co-opted members chosen because of their special qualifications to serve the ends of education. A certain proportion of each District Board shall be women. Note. —The following is an example of how a District Board might be composed leaving for local consideration the numbers to be appointed under each heading:— Elected by members of primary school councils. Elected by members of secondary school councils. Elected by members of technical school councils. Elected by the University College in whose district the education district is situated. Elected by the staffs as a whole of the primary, secondary and technical schools. Elected by registered non-depart-mental secondary schools. Elected by Members of Parliament and members of the Legislative Council of the province (one member). Each District Board shall have power to co-opt.

(9) That the functions and powers of the central or national Department of Education under the Minister of Education should be: 1. To ensure a minimum standard of efficiency throughout the country. 2. To act as a clearing house where the knowledge gained by local authorities is sifted and re-distnb-uted. 3. To prevent unnecessary duplication of services and enforce a reasonable degree of specialisation on local administrations. 4. Classification and certification of teachers in co-operation with the district superintendents or directors. 5. Appointment of inspectors and inspection of schools in co-operation with the district boards. 6. Provision of a salary scale for teachers and payment of teachers through the district boards. 7. Provision for the training of teachers in co-operation with the University. 8. The distribution of capitation, allowances, special grants and subsidies through the district boards. 9. Provision of the general outline of ' the syllabus of instruction. Note to this recommendation: —

A wise measure of control by the central authority over the administrative organisations, syllabuses, etc., of the local authorities could probably best be secured by the practice now general in English local government, of the “submission of schemes.” Under this arrangement, when the central authority decides to introduce a reform or a» extension of education activities, it states the object of the reform or extension in general terms, and requires local authorities to submit schemes for bringing it infc> effect. By this means general reforms can be

carried through without over-riding local initiative or ignoring distinctive local needs. (10) that the permanent authority under the Minister in the central department should be vested in a small council composed of the chief officers of the different divisions of the Denartment. (11) That the present method of recruiting officers for the higher grades of the education service should be reconsidered with a view to obtaining the best men available for responsible positions both from outside and within the service. The Standing Committee is of opinion that the impracticability of imposing in New Zealand a further burden on local rates and taxes does not mean that the changes implied in the above recommendations are impracticable. The neeessaxy financial provisions for giving effect to the above recommendations should bmafle by Parliament.