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THE H.B. TRIBUNE MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1932 DUBIOUS FRANCE.

The difficulties in the way of reconciling French and German views upon the question of disarmament are emphasised by overnight Paris messages setting out proposals of the French Prime Minister, M. Heriot, that have received the support of a heavy majority in the Chamber of Deputies. France’s contention all along has been that all she requires is assurance of security from aggression. In this respect she can go back to the Paris Peace Conference, from which the Treaty of Versailles issued. In this connection it has always to be kept in mind that there were collateral undertakings on the part of both Great Britain and the United States that they would come to France’s assistance should there be any threat of such a movement against her. The American Senate, however, refused to ratify the President’s signature to this undertaking and that, of course, meant Britain’s withdrawal from it also. Since then we have had pacts of mutual guarantee to the same end, but these have in no way involved the United States. Recently, however, there have been some tentative indications from that quarter, as voiced by Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and now Ambassador in London, that Washington might consider accepting some responsibility of the kind with a view to allaying French apprehensions. Some implied reference to this is to -be found in to-day’s messages and makes it worth while quoting what the well-known publicist Mr. Sisley Huddleston had to say about it when writing from Paris to an American paper some four or five weeks ago. Mr. Stimson’s suggestions with regard to intervention were based to a large extent upon the implications of the Kellogg Pact, generally spoken of as outlawing war. He proceeded upon the assumption that these necessarily held the signatories — France and Germany included—to consultation before any act of war would be permissible. Mr. Huddlestone, however, points out that the French people are by no means satisfied that there is any such obvious implication as would afford no pretext for evasion. In fact, as he puts it, Mr. Stimson’s own words are so cast as to make it doubtful whether his Government would be diplomatically bound to accept that interpretation. In short, the American pronouncement does not do away with the necessity for a definite pact of consultation, such as France "which would automatically and unquestionably bring the Powers together to de-

termine their common action for the preservation or restoration of peace.” He then goes on. "in all fairness,” to point out also that there is a school of French political thought, ably represented by such writers as “Pertinax,” which would not be content even with a consultation pact. For consultations themselves, were they obligatory, might mean anything or nothing. They might lead to inaction as easily as to action. Certainly they would “imply” action, just as, according to Mr. Stimson, the Kellogg pact “implies” consultation; but something more explicit is demanded. Still, it is probable that French public opinion would be largely satisfied with the assurance of consultations, which undoubtedly would, in case of an aggressive movement, render neutrality much more difficult, and would, at any rate, have a moral effect. Indeed, the English writer states definitely that, although the French reactions cannot be fully explained without a frank reference to the opinions quoted, they constitute the extreme argumentative position. The general view is much more moderate, and is ready to accept a compromise. It realizes that there can be no absolute guarantees, and that therefore France must be prepared to defend itself. But it also realizes that there can be sufficient guarantees of an international character to justify an immediate reduction of arms, which can be progressively greater as it is warranted by experience. What, therefore, would probably satisfy France and lead to her falling in with practical disarmament plans would be an express all round commitment to consultation combined with the promise of appropriate action upon the conclusions reached. The question is whether Washington will go that length.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/HBTRIB19321031.2.33

Bibliographic details

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XXII, Issue 271, 31 October 1932, Page 6

Word Count
679

THE H.B. TRIBUNE MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1932 DUBIOUS FRANCE. Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XXII, Issue 271, 31 October 1932, Page 6

THE H.B. TRIBUNE MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1932 DUBIOUS FRANCE. Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XXII, Issue 271, 31 October 1932, Page 6