“ARRANT NONSENSE.”

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume X, Issue 19, 6 January 1920, Page 6

“ARRANT NONSENSE.”

MONASH ANSWERS CRITIC. TAKING CHIPiiLLY SPUR. AUSSIES AND THEIR SCORE. Captain R. Martin, adjutant at the - Rad Battahen at the tath London Naghnant, in a letter to the “Sunday Ttowa,” critictoad General Monash's writing ragardtag the trsops Ranking Nto AuatraMam* left in August, 1919,; daetortag that Coneral Manash is “wry unfortunate In Ma suite untrue statements.” Regarding the capture at CMfcMy Spw, Captain Martin cia*ns that a company at hto battalion captured the township and apur. I In the coutse of a reply to the criticism of extracts from his book, Lieii-toßant-General Momish said in Melbourne that the question at issue affected not the llith London Regiamnt, but the whole of the 3rd British, Army Corps, which consisted on the occasion in question—August 8, 1918—, of three divisions, each of nine bat-: taliou*. On the face of it it was unrwsouaMe to suppose that a captain of , a battalion, even though he was adjutant of his battalion, was likely to Jtnow the true facts of a big battle. Captain Alartin took exception to his statement that the 3rd British Army; Corps failed to capture ChipiUy. Spur, and he (Captain Martin) claimed that a company of his battalion did actually capture it. The ChipiUy Spur was at least two miles long, and a mile' and a half wide, and it was therefore arrant nonsense to claim that such a position could hare been captured by, ■o infinitesimal a force. BRAVERY NOT QUESTIONED.

Ha was not going to join issue with Captain Martin on the bravery of the London Territorials. He agreed that they were very brave wherever they fought, either under his command or ia bis neighbourhood • but it was an undoubted fact, on which there was a volume of evidence, that on August **, 1918. the 3rd British Army Corps totally tailed to reach its objectives and to capture the ChipiUy Spur. It might be true that small <x>dies of the 3rd Corps, and in particular the 19th London Regiment, did enter the village' of ChipiUy and set foot on the spur, but even if that were so they failed to hold it. If they had captured and held it, how could Captain Martin explain that, fur the whole of that daj and'during the two fnliozing days the entire position was in occupation by the enemy, and that at least 22 field guns of the enemy remained in full action against the left Hank of the Australians "THE ONLY BLEMISH. ”

General Monasb remarked that the truth of the matter was as stated in his book that the failure to capture Chipiliy Spur was the only blemish on a great day's operations, which, on every other*part of a twe!ve-mik front, were brilliantly successful. Owing to that failure the left flank of the Fourth Australian Division was seriously exposed, and at the conclusion of "the day’s fighting it had to be sent back along the south bank of the Somme to prevent the Australian Corps from being outflanked from the north.

“Then,” sab! General Monash, “I conferred on the matter with .Lord Rawlinson, the commander of the Fourth Army, and as a result he entirely took- that part of the army front objective out of the hands of the Third Corps and placed it in my hands, adding to my then existing resources the 131st American Regiment. With thia regiment and the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig-adier-General Herring 1 launched a series of operations to attack the spur from the south towards the north instead of from the west towards the east. After three wiiole days of very dificult fighting it was finally captured and held by them, and not by any unit of the Third Corps.”

DIGGERS AND SPORTSMANSHIP. General Monash added that it was not the first time that the issue raised *,» vwpkaxu Alar tin trad been argued. When the result of the engagement •as originally made known the British newspapers placarded the capture cf Chipiliy Spur as a brilliant victory by the Hurd British Army Corps. This compelled him at the time to made very serious representations to the British High Command to the effect that the Australian soldier made war in a sportsmanlike spirit, but like a good sportsman he liked to see his score on the scoring board. If, however, the British High Command was not prepared to g.ve the Australian soldier due credit for what he did, and if it permitted other troops to claim the credit for what was reallyy an Australian victory, then ho said" that he would not be prepared to guarantee the contineed readiness of the Australian Corps to put forth its best •Borts. This representation to head•uarters had an immediate and satisfactory result with regard to future