THE AISNE-VESLE FRONT.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume VIII, Issue 217, 15 August 1918, Page 4

THE AISNE-VESLE FRONT.

As was said in our notes yesterday, matters on the Veslc front, westward of Keims, are for the tune being at a deadlock, such efforts as tiie Allies arc making to push the Germans from this river front proving to be ineffective. The suggestions offered by war correspondents are that, in the first place, the Allied attack is at present lacking in tne essential strong artillery support, which will shortly be forthcoming as tne heavier guns are brought forward and into play- ami. in the second place, that the enemy is putting up such a stiff resistance merely because he has a large amount of valuable war material to get away to safety behind the Aisne, where, too, his preparations for de fence may not yet be complete. In the latest issue of the “Sydney .Morning Herald” to reach us byyesterday’s mail, its military writer, for whose views we entertain great respect, does not presume to dismiss these theories altogether. But. tie offers what look like very plausible and probably sound, reasons why the Germans may prefer to attempt till* permanent maintenance of tin? Vesle line. He points out that the whole of the salient created by the Crown Prince’s advance to the Marne having been flattened oat by Foch’s great counter-offensive, any further " retirement will increase rather than diminish the length cl the enemy’s front, a result he must be anxious everywhere to avoid in view of his the need for conserving bis manpower. Apart from _ this broad consideration, which might be

outbalanced by regard for local conditions, a further retirement behind the Aisne would give the Allies valuable heights covering the northwestern approaches to Reims. it would also restore to them direct road and rail communication between the cathedral city ami Sois sons. By establishing his front along the heights to the northward of the Vesle, the enemy would dominati this road and railway which previ ously afforded such excellent lateral communications for the Allied front along the Aisne. In his present position the enemy will not be able t< make use of them himself, but as long as he retains the plateau be tween the Vesle and the Aisne hi can prevent the Allies from using them.

Of the defensive advantages of the position the same authority tells u? that the plateau between the Vesk and the Aisne is almost as difficult t< storm as that above the lattei stream. Its summit attains an eleva tion equal to that of the C’hernm des Dames, which marks the top of the olateau northward of the Aisne. Its southern escarpment is broken up by gullies, with intervening spurs oi high ground reaching down toward! the river and providing excellent, observation along the valley. On it! western half, between Fismes ano the mouth of the Vesle, the plateau attains a height of about 580 feei ibove sea level, while the eastern half rises to 650 feet in places. A ■ against these arguments in favour ol the enemy electing to hold the Vesle line, it is recognised that a decider! veakness lies in the back area where the Aisne cuts across communion lions, rendering them vulnerable to the Allied airmen, whose activities in the past have been a source oi great anxiety to the enemy as far as iis important river crossings jwen •oncerned. It is possible, too, that this weakness has recently been renlered more pronounced bv the rains to which some correspondents havr ■eferred in their messages. It is nov. just a week since the comments w< have quoted were made, but sinci then the situation has altered but little, and the lapse of time without Infinite indications of coming change vould rather favour the conclusion that the Germans intend to hold tht Vesle as long as possible. Doubtless the Allied air-scouts, hovering conitantlv over and behind the enemy’s line, Have reported much of wlncn the correspondents are in ignorance, ’mt which will let our own High Command pretty fully into the -ecret of the German intentions.

The news that filters through from Russia covers so immense an area and deals with so many contending nterests that it is even, yet impossible to get any definite grip of i general situation that suffers changes almost from day to day. It : s, however, also impossible to escape a conclusion that matters in he immense realm over which the unhappy Tsar held sway are no’ iow shaping in the way that Germany designed when she started out o get control of them. Beyond ;his it does not as ye„ seem safe ti. ?o, although there are not wanting signs of a consolidation and oigani :a-tion of tin? various factors of oTi'-o-dtion to Teutonic domination. In tliis connection, however, it has to >e remembered that the joining up >f forces means the traversing of p-eat distances wi/h but poor facii.'ies available. The operations of ..he Czecho-Slovaks. for instance, ire scattered across vast areas be .ween the sea of Azov, in the south, ind Kazan, near the centre of Russia. Tne Allies at Archangel and on the Murman coast are m.inv mndreds of miles away from, this region while the distance to Vladivcscock must be computed in thousands of miles. At the same time, uhe Allies’ intervention, if it was not nade on behalf of these .Czechoslovak forces, will certainly be favourable to their cause, as well a? that of the great majority of the Russian people, and their progress will accordingly be. watched wit-i. great interest. Up to the presern the cohesion of the various forces in Russia which are working for he) salvation is no; evident, but there arc signs that the Allies’ organisation is beginning to produce results.