GENERAL HAIG’S STRATEGY.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume VII, Issue 202, 20 June 1917, Page 5

GENERAL HAIG’S STRATEGY.

Historical Despatch Covering Six Months' Operations. [AUSTRALIAN A‘.D NEW ZEALAND CABLE ASSOCIATION AND REUTER ] (Received 20, io a.m.) London, June 19. Sir Douglas Haig, in a despatch covering the British operations from November iBth to the commencement of the present offensive, affords a connected story and a valuable historical record elucidating much which has hitherto been obscure. It reveals the strategic plans behind the apparently isolated attacks and raids which were continued throughout the winter and shows that all were fitting.into a comprehensive systematic scheme in order to prepare a favourable situation for the spring advance. Owing to the Somme battle, the enemy in the region of the Ancre valley had been forced into a pronounced salient between the Ancre and the Scarpe valleys. Therefore a. further short advance would give the British command of the Beaumont Hamel spur. Accordingly an attack was delivered against the defences overlooking the villages of Pys and Grandcourt on November 18th. The object was to advance within assaulting distance of the Le Transloy-Loupart line. Five thousand yards of valuable positions were acquired in January. The weather then held up operations until the end of January, when the whole spur was captured and we advanced 1000 yards up Beaucourt Valley with exceedingly light casualties, owing to the close and skilful co-operation of our infantry and artillery fine aircraft work. The possession of the high ground opened up an extensive artillery field, and further successes on February 3rd and 4th gave us an important section of the Gerfan second line north of the Ancre, making the evacuation of Grandcourt inevitable. The next task was to drive the enemy from the Beaucourt valley, which began on February 10th. The capture of 1500 yards of trenches lying at the southern foot of Serre Hill made the village of Serre a pronounced enemy salient, and further progress in the Ancre valley would make it untenable. Therefore, larger operations were begun with a view to acquiring the northern extremity of the Morval-Thiepval ridge, which commanded the southern approaches to Pys and Miraumont and an observation of the upper Ancre valley. Simultaneously a smaller attack was designed for the capture of the sunken road north of the Ancre, which controlled the western approach to Miraumont. During the night of February 17th the assaults were delivered. Despite heavy ground, thick mist and an alert enemy, w'ho made an artillery barrage, our troops assaulted with great gallantry, and we succeeded completely. We gained the desired observation posts, also a command of enemy artillery positions in the upper Ancre valley and his defences of Pys and Miraumont. Our subsequent bombardments, as anticipated, forced the evacuation of Pys and Miraumont on February 24th. On the following day the positions from north of Guedecourt to west of Serre were captured. The weather favoured the enemy’s retirement. The thaw broke up the roads, the sides of the trenches collapsed, and the acquired ground became the worst quagmire. Contrariwise the roads behind the enemy improved the further he withdrew, and a succession of misty days prevented a rapid pursuit. Consequently it is greatly to the credit of all ranks that constant touch with the enemy was maintained. Continuous systematic advances drove out the enemy from successive positions until March 2nd, when we reached the Le Transloy-Loupart line, except at Irles, which formed a salient. Sevwn days were then devoted to improving our communications Brid bringing up the guns, and on March 10th Irles was Our casualties totalled -less than the number of prisoners, wIW totalled 280. The - way thus opened for attacking the Le TransloyLoupart line, which whs shelled so effectively on March 11th and 12th that the enemy fell back to parallel lines, whereupon GrevilUers and Loupart Wood were occupied and methodical operations were begun for attacking the next line.

Prior to this there were indications that the German withdrawal would further extend. It had been ascertained that the enemy was preparing a new defensive system known as the Hindenburg line, running from Arras south-east to Queant, thence west of Cambrai towards St. Quentin. There were various switches branching off this line, also under construction. The enemy’s immediate concern appeared to be to escape from the salient between Arras and Le Transloy, which had become increasingly difficult to hold. It was also evident, however, that the enemy contemplated eventually the evacuation of the greater salient between Arras and the Aisne valley.

The despatch then deals in detail with the operations between April 14th and 19th. On April 19th our advance reached a stage at which the increasing difficulty of maintaining communications compelled a slackening in the pace of our pursuit. South of Peronne the lack of bridges, which the enemy had destroyed, presented formidable obstacles, while north of Peronne the wide belt of devastated ground over which the Somme battle had been fought offered even greater difficulties for the passage of guns and transport. We were advancing, therefore, over country wherein all means of communication had been destroyed, against an enemy whose army was still intact and was capable of launching a vigorous offensive should a favourable opportunity offer. Strong detachments of his infantry and cavalry occupied vantage points along the line of our advance, keeping the enemy informed of our progress and screening his own movements. His guns, which had already been withdrawn to previously prepared positions, were available at any moment to cover and support a counter-stroke, whil,e the conditions of the country over which we were moving made the progress of our artillery slow. The bulk of the enemy forces were known to be holding a formidable defensive system, upon which he could fall back should his counter-stroke miss aim. Contrariwise, as our troops moved forward they left all their prepared defences further behind. Under such circumstances the need for caution was obvious. In the meanwhile, despite the enormous difficulties which the condition of the ground and the ingenuity of the enemv placed in our way, the work of preparing and constructing bridges, roads and railways was carried on with commendable rapidity. The despatch proceeds to describe how the enemy resistance increased as we neared the Hindenburg line, emphasising the great costliness of many of his counter-attacks, particularly in his attempts to recover Beaumetz and Cambrai. Speaking of the outstanding features of the five months’ fighting from November 18th, Sir Douglas Haig says:— “ Despite the unusual severity of the weather, the winter campaign was conducted to a successful issue under the most trying and arduous conditions. Activity on our battle front was maintained from the conclusion of last year’s offensive to the commencement of the present operations. The -successful accomplishment of this part of our general plan has already enabled us to realise no inconsiderable instalment of the fruits of the Somme battle, and has gone far to open the road to their full achievement. The courage and endurance of our troops has carried them triumphantly through periods which have been particularly trying, and fighting wherein they have been subjected to a maximum personal hardship and physical strain. I cannot speak too highly of the qualities of all ranks. The ability wherewith the troops on the Ancre were handled by General Gough, and further south by General Rawlinson, is in all respects admirable. Ihe retreat whereto the enemy was driven by our continued success has reintroduced conditions approximating open fighting, wherein our cavalry has been given an opportunity to perform special duties. The enemy’s withdrawal enabled him to choose his own ground for resistance and to employ every device to inflict losses. Our casualties, which were exceedingly moderate throughout the operations on the Ancre, became exceptionally light during the retreat. The prospect of a more general resumption of open fighting can be regarded with great confidence.

“ The systematic destruction of roads, bridges and railways made unprecedented demands on the Royal Engineers, who were already heavily burdened by the work entailed in the preparations for the spring offensive. Our steady progress in the face of great difficulties is at least a testimony to the energy and thoroughness wherewith those demands were met. The bridging of the Somme at Brie is an example of the nature of the obstacles with which we were confronted, and the rapidity of their removal. In this instance six gaps had to be bridged across the canal and the river Somme, whereof there was considerable width over a swift flowing stream. The work was commenced on the morning of March 18th, and by 10 o’clock the same night the infantry footbridges were completed. By 5 o’clock in the morning of the 20th a medium type of bridge for horse transport and cavalry was completed, and by 2 in the afternoon of the 28th a heavy bridge, capable of taking all forms of traffic, had replaced the lighter type. “ Throughout the winter the transport problems were serious, both in the battle area and behind the lines. On the rapid solution thereof our success or failure necessarily largely depended. At the close of last year’s campaign the steady growth of our armies and the rapid expansion of material resources had already taxed the roads and railways to their utmost. The existing broad and narrow gauge railways were insufficient to deal with the increasing traffic, an undue proportion whereof was thrown upon the roads, which under winter conditions were deteriorating. The difficulties of maintenance and repair became almost overwhelming. An increase in railway facilities of every type and on a large scale was therefore imperatively and urgently necessary. Great quantities of material and rolling stock were required immediately, while subsequently our wants were considerably augmented by the large programme of new construction in the area of the enemy’s withdrawal. The task of obtaining the amount of railway material required to carry out the work of construction at the rate our plan rendered necessary, besides providing labour and material to repair the roads, was one of the very greatest difficulties. Its successful accomplishment reflects the highest credit on the transportation service.” Sir Douglas Haig concludes:—” The loyal co-operation and complete mutual understanding between our allies and ourselves throughout the Somme battle have been continued and strengthened. The events during the winter, particularly the circumstances rendering the enemy’s withdrawal during the latter part of rhe period under review from a considerable tract of country, which has been won back for France by the combined efforts of the allied troops, may be regarded with satisfaction by all ranks of the British army in France. At the same time I wish to express the feelings of deep sympathy and profound regret provoked at the sight of the destruction which the war has brought on the once fair and prosperous countryside.”