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Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume VI, Issue 266, 26 October 1916, Page 4

But, he goes on to argue, it seems that when the existence of the nation is at stake, with all the hardwon liberties it represents; when the lives of millions of our comrades are endangered by failure on our part to support them adequately, we must not use compulsion, and must treat as if they were, in truth, the only bearers of the torch of Liberty those who can but will not. fight to kee'p it alight. Clearly, if each individual is to be “free” from interference by others, whether of his own or another nation, there must be some power in society capable of preventing interference, and, if necessary, by force. Once this simple truth has been grasped it becomes evident that liberty itself, as we esteem it, is dependent upon the existence of authority.. “No freedom,” it is quoted, “except for a single and isolated individual, can b>>. absolute and complete. Such freedom as can be enjoyed by all must, from its very nature, imply a compulsory restriction or direction of the action of each.” It is thus manifest that coercion is inferred in the very conception of liberty itself. It is inferred also in the conception of law, and in the constitution of society existence. “No society can hang together if each individual is a law to himself. No society can survive unless its members are willing to submit to organisation for the common safety and the common good, and organisation means sufficient surrender of self-will to assure the attainment of a common purpose.” There cannot, logically, be much debate where the very existence of the society is at issue. To establish throughout the world the principles for which Germany stands would destroy the very soul of the British Commonwealth, for it would make an end of that system of government under which the individual has a voice in determining the extent and character of the coercion to which he will submit. “If,” says Professor Irvine, “any principle" is worth fighting and dying for. tins is surely one. It is the very life-blood of our civilisation. To be a traitor to it is to be a traitor tg ourselves and to everj' rational member of the society to which we belong. ... To maintain it unimpaired millions of men of our race are now facing death, discharging, for the most part unbidden, the obligations of true citizenship.”

The most interesting of our overnight messages with regard to the Western theatre is undoubtedly that which tells us of the marked success

which has attended a revival, upon French initiative, of the struggle round Verdun. This message reaches us simultaneously _ with another stating that the Kaiser is bestowing his gracious patronage on the great drama that is being played upon the Somme, and that big German reinforcements have been transferred to this stage in order to provide Lun with the spectacle of a massed counter-offensive. This new 11 ench attack is doubtless timed to rr rnnd him that while, as stage-nmna«ei-in-chief, he is marshalling his supers for a grand pageant on the Somme a tragedy, in which he is ca t us tlu victim, not'the hero, m iv ue f " < ted upon boards that have ilictdv Mtn his popularity and prestige so bt< 1\ tarnished. The French movt n n however, serves another purpose, inasmuch as it may tenu to eon.usv Hindenburg’s plans in the ,\ui East and help to relieve the pressure on Rumania. It is quite probable, however, that Hindenburg will not allow himself to be easily diverted from his aims in Rumania, but will redouble his efforts to bring about a quick culmination to the efforts which, at the moment, promise so well—on paper at least. Further furious assaults on Rumania, from both north and south, may thus reasonably be expected, and it remains to be seen what measures, our Russian friends have been able to take to resist them. They have never failed us yet in a grave emergency, and we may rely upon it that whatever is in their power—and it is a mighty power—-will be done. Surrendering to the fascinations of the guessing competition that is going on all round, it may* be suggested tnat old Russky may think this an opportune moment to take a hand in the great game and ship in from the Dvina front. We have been told that Hindenburg, relying on climatic and weather conditions unfavourable to operations in this northern area, has drawn substantially upon it for men with whom to subjugate Rumania. But the Russians are as little daunted by these conditions as by 7 human agencies of obstruction, and .there is at least quite a good possibility of a strong movement, if not on the Dvina, then somewhere else north of the Pripet.

While thus noting the German counter-offensive alleged to be in contemplation in Picardy, it may interest readers to see what Mr. Hilaire Belloc had to say with regard to the prospects of an attempt by Germany to resume rhe offensive. His suggestions are embodied in an article in “Land and Mater discussing the Allied advance on the Somme, and were, of course, written some weeks ago. V) hile the} contemplate the possibility of the attempt being made elsewhere than on the Somme, their general application is none the less interesting with regard to th’e present military situation. After commenting on the enemy's capacity for defence in the west/this writer goes on to say: “He may, however, adopt the opposite and more heroic policy of letting his effectives dwindle to a dangerous limit on the fighting fronts: of forming behind them a nucleus oi rapidly-trained troops out of what would otherwise have been the drafts for the fighting front: and of using this nucleus for a last attempted offensive upon some point of that big crumbling ring, which, as it breaKS, wholly determines his fate. . 1 say he mav have that policy in mind, li he adopts it he will be beaten the more quickly. . . Short of sonic almost inconceivable political tolly or quarrel, an attempted new offensive by the enemy will very rapidly advance the date of his military execution. Failing such an offensive, he will maintain the business of furnislitng drafts from his dwindling material, and of gambling upon the last possible date for a break, and of something happening to help him in the interval on the political side. ■With his legend what it is, with his deception of his civilian population the gross thing we have seen during the last week or two, with the dynastic interests his despotic Government has in view, apd with the inability of his psychology to face reality in anv field, let Arne the terrible test-field of war, it is the former course that is more probable. But only the future can show which he will adopt.”

Petrograd itself is silent with reference to Brusiloff's undertakings on his original front —for it is probable that he has also some control over the Russo-Rumanian operations -but the “Daily Graphic” message to which we have already referred concerns itself mainly with telling us of the tremendous gruelling which he has inflicted, and is still inflicting, upon the Austro-German forces in Volhynia and Galicia. This is a presentation of the case which we are both fain to accept, and justified in accepting. It is matter for regret that on the difficult Salonika front the Allied efforts are being sadly hampered by inclement weather, which in this region renders the movement of all-essential artillery and munitions almost impossible. Of the French attack on the Meuse we have spoken, above, and its significance may be gauged by the fact that at one hit our Allies have recovered ground which it took the Germans weeks, if not months, of most expensive fighting to secure. The French seem to have fairly well established themselves in the newlywon position, German counter-at-tacks to dislodge them having completely failed. We must not, however, expect that further efforts by the French will have such marked results. On the Somme, where also weather conditions are unfavourable to rapid movement, the situation is little, if any, changed, and from Italy there is as yet no further word.

Attention, naturally and propwly, turns first to the position of an apparently sorely beset Ally, and so far as the immediate position is concerned it cannot be said that matters have improved where for the moment the pressure seems to be most severe—in the Dobrudja. There the latest, messages to hand at the time of writing would indicate, our Allies have made a still further retirement, but the phrasing of the cableman leaves us in some doubt as to whether they have been compelled to abandon Chernavoda, where is the only bridge across the Danube that previously stood, behind them. The importance of this means of communication, whether for reinforcement, supplies or retreat, is such that only the direst of necessity would induce its surrender. Moreover, one of the cables distinctly states that new dispositions were adopted mainly with a ( view to its protection. We may therefore hope that possession of the bridge itself has been retained, and that the withdrawal has swung upon it as a pivot, and that its control, which might admit of at least destructive raids into Rumania proper, has been effectually denied to the enemy. Beyond this We have little information, excepting such as is contained in a “Daily Graphic” statement that Russian

troops are “known” to have been “pouring” into Rumania. If this may be taken literally, it would perhaps, not be an altogether extravagant hope to imagine a movement to cross the Danube further to the west and catch Mackensen in the rear with a more formidable force than that which was previously content to make a rapid demonstration across the river, to be followed by an equally speedy retirement. Matters must, of necessity develop quickly on this front, and we should not be long in hearing the first definite result of Mackensen’s “push.” At the moment there are no further informative reports from Rumania’s northern front, but a message received late, yesterday tended to confirm Herr Wiegand’s previous statement to a New York paper that the rapidity of Falkenhayn’s advance had been materially slackened, if not altogether stayed.